SVEN NORDENGREN

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL TARGETS FOR POSTWAR FRANCE

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Economic and social targets for postwar France

Studies of French Economic Planning, Social Development, and Industrial Structure 1940—1962

by

SVEN NORDENGREN

LUND 1972

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Foreword

The present study was planned as a result of experiences gained in connexion with the working up of two market investigations concerning Germany for Deutsche Atlas Copco and France for "La Ventilation Industrielle et Minière". The German investigation was carried out in co-operation with Verkaufsleiter Franz Keders, who pointed out the importance of an understanding of the French potential and problems. The first two chapters are merely intended to indicate something of the background to what occurred in France during the postwar period. For practical reasons, the name "The Algerian Group" is used in the work and refers to the circle around André Philip in the discussions in Algiers before the liberation in 1944. Discussions with other authors have of necessity been thrust into the background or only appear to some extent in the notes.

Professor Oscar Bjurling, head of The Institute of Economic History at the University of Lund, has given me great support and encouragement in my work. I have also had the privilege of presenting a large number of sections for the Higher Seminar at The Institute. In assembling the material, I had the help of archives, libraries, associations, public organs, and individuals. Of the many, I would like specially to mention the late André Philip, the late Maxime Blocq-Mascart, the minister Daniel Mayer, the minister Robert Buron, the minister Jules Moch, and M. Jean Monnet; but many others have also given me interviews and put material at my disposal. Ambassador K.-A. Belfrage found me a post at Deutsche Atlas Copco in Essen, an important essential for the production of the dissertation.

At the analysis of the statistical material, I had great help from Mrs. Greta Rydén, who was also responsible for typing the MS. The translation into English was done by Mr. W. F. Salisbury. A check of the French sections was done by Mr. Åke Styvén and university lector M. Charles Buttin. The work was supported by grants from the Swedish Council for Social Science Research, the Foundation for Undergraduate Researchers, and the late Director Anders Nevsten.

To all these persons, institutions, and authorities, I tender my warmest thanks.
Lund, 23 May 1971

Sven Nordengren

Introduction

This study was undertaken to throw some light on the EEC-problems. During the 1960s, as well as earlier, France has played a prominent role in this sphere. Naturally, French conditions had to be taken into account, besides other factors that influenced the choice of material. France is more centralized than Germany. It is easier for a private researcher to carry out an investigation of this kind in France than in Germany: almost all organs that have material at disposal are localized to one place, to Paris.

On the other hand, the investigation presented a number of difficulties. No common archive or library contained all the necessary material. This had to be traced to numerous places, and it was not always certain that it would be possible to inspect it. However, the French authorities and other organs, as well as private persons, have shown great frankness and generosity in connexion with this work.

THE MATERIAL

The official French statistics which give information about French production have been used. *Annuaire de Statistique industrielle* has been referred to, complemented with *Annuaire Statistique de la France,* both the annually published edition and the retrospective edition (1961 edition). From the latter, an international comparison material has been taken.

When necessary to establish the industrial structure, we used the large inventories in the production apparatus.

The excellent publications from *Statistisches Bundesamt* in Wiesbaden were also used when international comparison statistics were necessary: *"Produktion wichtiger Erzeugnisse der verarbeitende Industrie im Ausland, Reihe 4, Heft 32."*

The O.E.E.C.'s retrospective industrial statistics were also used for international comparisons: O.E.E.C.: Industrial Statistics 1900—1959, Paris 1960.

In France, however, the usual course is for branch organizations to deliver statistics to the statistical organs of the French state; it was therefore of interest to collect and consult this kind of material. Here, we used the publication Répertoire des sources statistiques françaises to trace the syndicates in question.

These organs, moreover, have in most cases made available annual reports

where the syndicates have given their views of the economic course. This was regarded as source material, because in this study, importance is laid on the ideas and explanations held by the branches. Lack of space, however, allows us to report only a few branches.

The background of the big economic reforms in France has been illustrated partly by private material of memoranda nature, worked up during the war in the resistance movement, and partly printed material spread illegally during the war years. This material is kept in Bibliothèque Nationale and in B.D.I.C.

In connexion with the tracing of the material, a number of interviews were carried out with those who took part in deliberations and planning during this period. However, it was not always possible to obtain interviews.

The events of 1940 that led to a change in regime were studied in parliamentary reports, which were made available in the Senate library and in the library of the Chamber of Deputies. Some idea of the economic and social objectives of the Petain government was obtained by a study of Petain's appeals and proclamations that exist in print.

When it was necessary to get an idea of how the political parties interpreted the ideas of the resistance movement concerning the shaping of society immediately after the liberation and at the end of the war, documents from M.R.P., S.F.I.O., and the Communists were examined. According to *L'Année Politique 1944—1945,* p. 318, these were responsible for more than 73 per cent of the votes at the elections in autumn 1945. Documents belonging to the Radical Socialist Party have also been examined because this party was politically important before the catastrophe in 1940.

These parties, except the Communist, made available the stenographic material of the party congresses after the liberation. Thus it is possible to follow in detail the reports, speeches, and debates of the congresses. Material from the committee meetings, however, could not be consulted. Instead of stenographic material, the Communist Party threw open its well provided archives, where speeches, give-away leaflets, and brochures could be examined.

The attitudes in the parliamentary assemblies were mainly studied in the Senate library, where we could make use of records in these matters. The documents of the Consultative Assembly from both the Algerian period and the Luxembourg Palace period were examined, as too were the reports of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies from the period after the 1945 elections. Documents concerning how the economic situation in France after the end of the war was interpreted by the French government were also obtained from the Senate library.

With reference to the so-called plan, this study is based partly on the printed material produced by the Commissioner's Planning Office in the form of reports and similar and put at the disposal of the investigation, and partly on given information.

Two of the organizations of the French Trade Union movement, C.G.T. and C.F.T.C., are concerned in the investigation. These made available printed and

stencilled material; they also arranged interviews and talks on relevant matters.

To get a picture of the judgement of the economic course of the country, we employed O.E.E.C. reports, annual reports of a banking organization (*La Situation en France, Crédit commercial de France*), and the publication: *"Etudes et Conjoncture."*

Material from the French administration could also to some extent be used in this study. Those categories that made themselves available for interviews concerning the economic and social course during the postwar period are politicians, trade union officials, representatives of industry, businessmen, one journalist, and one author in the relevant matters.

One of the most important tasks was to survey French industry and to get some concept of the background for French thinking in relevant matters. We have therefore set up the following objectives in this dissertation:

The vast material we had to examine made it essential to define clearly our aims and intentions.

1. The economic programme of the Vichy regime and that of the resistance movement.
2. Characteristic features of the resistance movement's economic ideas.
3. The origin of the reform ideas.
4. The economic reconstruction in France. The consequences of foreign policy.
5. The political parties and the resistance movement's ideas immediately after the liberation 1944.
   a. The nationalizations
   b. The directed policies
   c. The relations with Germany.
6. The plan. Desired and achieved goals.
7. The trade-union movement. Strength and weakness.
8. The programme of the so-called Algerian group. Characteristic features.
9. The French and the West-German industrial production apparatus. A comparison.
10. Establish expansion, upswing, stagnation, and decline in the French industry during the postwar period up to around 1960.
11. Make a total survey of the French industrial production apparatus during the postwar period.
12. Give an example of the course in a few selected branches of French industry during the postwar period.

We can, of course, conceive of other and varying objectives. However, we have considered it primarily essential to make a survey. Thereafter, more profound studies of special problems can be done. In order to keep this survey within reasonable limits, we were compelled to avoid too detailed examinations of

various matters. In other words, it was frequently necessary to localize the objectives and, for the time being, to put them aside unanalysed so as to preserve the unity. Extensive and detailed investigations of, for instance, industrial structures were undertaken, but lack of space prevents us from reporting them in this work. The political factors are treated in such detail because they were so important in France during the epoch involved.

It proved necessary to investigate the events that took place during World War II and immediately after with the object of clarifying some of the phenomena that characterized the economic and social course of French postwar society. France is an important member of the Common Market. The shaping of the French economic and social policies is not without effect on neighbouring countries. France is included in a larger economic connexion and is an important welfare society. However, French economy has not, on the whole, been regarded as one of the most expansive during the twentieth century. On the contrary, it is one of the leading industrial countries that has been most severely affected by decline and stagnation in Europe.

The intention of this study is not to investigate all these conditions, but to attempt to illuminate, to some extent, the background of the new strains in French economic policy following the liberation in 1944 and the succeeding years. The search for this background is the main theme of the dissertation. We summarize the objectives: What and who lay behind the French nationalization idea? Who and what lay behind the French economic planning and the founding of the planning institution? What lies behind the French engagements in the Common Market? What role did the French labour movement play in the postwar society? Which French industrial structure in the postwar society corresponds mainly to the Fourth Republic? It is impossible for one person alone to give a correct answer to all these questions, at least, with only the resources available to the private researcher. However, it is hoped that this study will throw some light on a part of the French economic policy often debated in international relations during the 1960s: the question of the European Common Market.

1. France—General outlines

The economic development of France before and after World War II has engaged the attention of a number of authors. As Cameron points out in a surveying article in *Annales,* it is the Americans largely who have discussed French conditions during the postwar period.[1] There are many reasons for this interest. The economic course in itself offers interesting changes, for one thing; for another, France has for a long time played a politically and culturally dominating role. When Europe was to be rebuilt after 1945, the presence of the U.S.A. proved

important. Among other things, the economic system in Western Europe was more or less designed according to the American intentions.

Many authors have shown interest in the French planning system: e.g., Vera Lutz, Mc Arthur and Scott, Stephen S. Cohen, and many others.[2] Dr. Lotte Müller-Ohlsen in her work "*Wirtschaftsplanung und Wirtschaftswachstum in Frankreich*" has also treated these problems and made use of the extensive collections of material in Kiel.[3] The interesting work "*In search of France*" with a number of co-workers such as Stanley Hoffmann, Kindleberger, and others, has attempted to explain both the economic and the political course in France.[4]

The Danish author Erling Bjøl has written a book entitled "*La France devant l'Europe. La politique européenne de la IV^e République*".[5] There are many points in common between Bjøl's work and mine. Unknown to each other, we have worked at the same time in France. Bjøl's book treats the period 1950—1957 and thus complements my work. However, Bjøl's objective is to throw light on the background of the French foreign policy. To me, this was only a subordinate objective and was a by-product. The French foreign policy can be interpreted as a result of an economic goal that was or is aimed at improving living conditions of the French citizens. Bjøl wanted to know the mechanism. This is fairly uninteresting from the aspect of my dissertation.

The international interest in France is thus considerable in the literature. The French literature is also extensive, but it is obvious that the course from, say, 1800 and onwards will be illustrated by detailed research with the object of analysing structure and structural changes in various respects. Here, we are guided by, for instance, Maurice Lévy-Leboyer's presentation of the economic growth in France during the nineteenth century.[5a]

Concerning the course during World War II, the political part has been discussed by, among others, Robert Aron in his work "*Histoire de Vichy*"[6] and the resistance movement by Michel[7] and Hostache.[8] A review of both organization and ideas has been made here. Both works are essential contributions to the knowledge about the phenomena during that period. The economic ideas are discussed, but not treated in much detail.

The postwar period is treated and illustrated by an extensive material. The nationalizations, for instance, are discussed by René Gendarme, and the economic development itself has been described by, among others, Jean-Marcel Jeanneney.[9] In addition, there are official material, planning reports, and similar, as well as all that has been published in the publication "*Etudes et conjoncture*" and other works. The political course is illustrated by, among others, "*L'Année Politique*", and there are also a number of political biographies. In brief, the material is extensive, the analyses are many.

We will now, however, quite briefly concentrate on what the statistics tell us about France after about the year 1800.

France was one of Europe's most populated countries around the year 1800. At that time, it had 23-million inhabitants[10] and had for a long time occupied a politically important position on the Continent of Europe. The German Empire was probably the only one that could question France's position as leading nation in this part of the world. Germany, however, had retained its feudal structure, the centralization attempts had failed; in the big conflict during the seventeenth century, its population had been essentially reduced,[11] and the consequences of this were not completely overcome. Germany had, of course, gradually recovered. Around 1800, it had *circa* 25-million inhabitants,[12] but it was still politically split and under the dominance of France.

Concerning population, other countries in Europe ranked equal with France at that time: Austria-Hungary and Russia.[13] There were also those who were the chief opponents of France in the settlement on the European Continent during the 1790s and the beginning of the nineteenth century. At this time, Europe was largely agrarian in its source of livelihood.[14] The state of communications at that time meant that other continents lay far away and could have no effect, but would themselves soon be influenced by the development in the European community, which expanded in a number of spheres. The world population was estimated to be 694-million in 1750 (Europe's share was 144-million = 21 %) and in 1850, 1094-million (Europe's share 274-million = 25 %).[15] Europe was in a phase of population increase; this would gradually be matched by other parts of the world. The population of the politically leading European states is shown in the following table:[16]

Million inhabitants

	Year 1800	Rank order in table	Year 1850	Rank order in table	Year 1900	Rank order in table
France	28.3	2	36.5	2	40.7	4
Great Britain	16.2	4	27.7	4	42.0	3
Germany	24.8	3	35.9	3	56.4	2
European Russia	—	1	57.2	1	103.5	1

The relatively good position of France in relation to the other big European countries in the matter of population was changed during the course of the nineteenth century. In 1850, the position was still relatively unchanged, but by 1900 it was last in the table.

In the beginning of the nineteenth century, the French birth-rates were those that prevailed in Europe at that time, i.e. 32.0 (the period 1801—1810).[17] Sweden during this period had 30.9.[18] The French death-rate lay at 27.8 during the same

period; the corresponding Swedish figure was 27.9.[19] The following table gives the birth-rates in the politically leading European countries:[20]

Birth-rates 1801—1900

Period	France	Germany	England + Wales	United Kingdom	European Russia
1801—1810	32.0				
1811—1820	31.9				
1821—1830	31.0				
1831—1840	29.0				
1841—1850	27.4	36.1	32.6		
1851—1860	26.3	35.3	34.1		
1861—1870	26.4	37.2	35.2		
1871—1880	25.4	39.1	35.4		
1881—1890	23.9	36.8	32.5	31.2	
1891—1900	22.1	36.1	29.9	29.1	49.2

As can be seen in the table, international comparison material is lacking, but the French values seem to differ from those of the other countries. The French birth-rates were falling during the course of the nineteenth century. France appears to have been following a demographic course other than that of other European states, a matter that is often referred to in the literature.[21]

The French expectancy of life during the eighteenth century amounted to about 29 years; this low figure was due to the high infant mortality at that time.[22] Anyone reaching the age of 15, however, and thus having escaped the dangers of childhood and entered working life could during the eighteenth century hope to reach 52 years, which was the life expectancy for this group.[23] During the course of the nineteenth century, the survival prospects of the 15-year old were gradually improved. During the period 1861—1865, the life expectancy for this group, men and women combined, was 60 years, and around 1900 somewhat more than 61 years.[24]

The appearance of the French population pyramid in 1775 was, of course, conditioned by the great number of births and the high infant mortality figure;[25] otherwise, the pyramid had a regular appearance.[26] In other words, it was the same picture shown in many of the world's agrarian countries during the twentieth century. The French population pyramid from 1901 shows a community with a higher degree of survival. The age classes from 1871 to 1900 seem to be fairly intact.[27] The picture of a more prosperous society than 125 years earlier has emerged. Perhaps the 1890s can be pointed to as a time when the living conditions in France were improved. At all events, the infant mortality figures fall considerably from this time.[28]

The industrial development, to a great extent, belongs to the picture of the

expanding community during the nineteenth century. We can observe this course in, for instance, the displacement of the proportion of employees in the agriculture and industry sectors. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, all countries on the Continent of Europe were, as we have seen, markedly agrarian.[29] At least 80 % of the population in Europe at this time must have been employed in agriculture or have lived in association with the agrarian sector.[30] A displacement gradually occurs; more and more will be employed in industry, which was already established in France, England, and other countries during the end phase of the eighteenth century.[31] The number employed in industry was, at first, few. The relative importance of handicraft was quite big in Europe, and the production for household requirements was an essential feature around 1800 and later.[32]

Lévy-Leboyer presents the following figures concerning the distribution of production between the main sectors of industry during the nineteenth century:[32a]

	Industrie de consommation	Industrie d'équipement	Industrie ensemble	Bâtiment	Agriculture	Total
1810—1840	18.8	6.1	24.9	8.6	66.5	100.0
1850—1880	23.9	10.3	34.2	11.8	54.0	100.0
1890—1910	30.2	18.9	49.1	8.6	42.3	100.0

This table too shows the relatively big importance of the agricultural sector during the nineteenth century and during the beginning of the twentieth century. Around 1900, similar to the beginning of the nineteenth century, French agricultural production was largely concerned with grain cultivation.[33] During the latter part of the nineteenth century, the importance of wine growing was reduced; more attention was paid to fodder crops than earlier.[34] The advance of the industrial sector is shown in the table. Markovitch has written a large work[35] which, although it has been criticized in French economic-history circles, shows much of value. He has arranged a programme for the main stages on the road to industrialization in the country. We quote his summary for the nineteenth century:[36]

Première moitié du XIX^e siècle. — Croissance accélérée, taux relativement élevé (env. 3 % par an), repliement vers le marché intérieur à l'abri de la protection douanière, expansion parallèle de la « petite » et de la « grande » industrie, maintien d'un niveau assez important de l'autoconsommation industrielle à la campagne, tendance des prix industriels à la hausse ;

Deuxième moitié du XIX^e siècle. — Croissance ralentie, taux moyen ramené d'abord à 2 %, puis à environ 1,50 %, élargissement des échanges avec l'étranger, évincement de la petite industrie par la grande, fléchissement rapide et

disparition de l'autoconsommation industrielle à la campagne ; baisse prononcée des prix industriels ;

The foregoing has shown that the industrial production in France was considerable during the nineteenth century. However, such countries as the U.S.A. and Germany had probably at this time a more rapid expansion rate than France in industry.

As indicated, France in 1900 had lost its leading position in western and central Europe, as far as population was concerned.[37] Its birth-rate was lower than that of the other politically leading countries.[38] The death-rates were similar to those of Great Britain, but lower than those of Germany.[39] The industrial production apparatus in Great Britain and Germany had developed considerably,[40] and this development in each of the two countries was more important than that of France.[41] The latter was, of course, fairly extensive, but the country's agrarian interests were noticeable.

The European industrial countries had a well-developed banking system,[42] which dominated the world, but growing political differences were arising between the big powers. In Europe, democracy was only slowly developing; the labour movement was showing its birth pangs and was split. In a number of countries, such as Germany, Russia, and Austria, the structure of landed interests and totalitarian regimes dominated; they were based on a landed aristocracy with representatives in leading positions in administration, army, and the royal household.

THE PERIOD 1901—1960

Politically, the course in Western Europe during the first half of the twentieth century was particularly disturbed. The Western European states, highly industrialized at the beginning of the twentieth century, competed with one another, which led to conflict. It would therefore perhaps be more logical to draw a line at 1914 concerning period division, but for the sake of simplicity, we have chosen the periods before and after 1900.

A large part of the French population still lived during the interwar period in rural areas with low standard of living, as they did in many places in the towns. This can also have influenced the death-rates. Towards the end of the 1950s, however, similar demographic figures existed for the Western European countries and for the U.S.A.[43]

We have already referred to the appearance of the French population pyramid in 1901. It shows a prosperous society. The war of 1870—1871 had not led to any radical consequences for the French population structure. The position in 1931 and 1960 was different. The losses in male personnel in World War I can be clearly seen in the 1931 population pyramid. The age classes between *circa* 1880

and 1900 were those that were affected; the proportion of males seems here to have been reduced by a quarter or more. The big mobilization also led to a reduced reproduction during the war years. Moreover, during the period 1920 to 1929, increasingly fewer French children were born.

The French population pyramid in 1960 shows traces of two World Wars. The wounds from World War I naturally were beginning to heal, but the gaps caused by the lack of births in 1915—1919 were still strongly noticeable. A turning point was reached at the beginning of the 1940s, but no increase in numbers came until after the end of the war. The population pyramid of 1960 is wide and prominent; a large proportion of the French population now consisted of young people. Thus in 1960, the demographic situation for France did not differ from that of "the competing countries". The unfavourable exceptional position of France, from a demographic aspect, no longer existed.[44]

Toutain and Markovitch give much information about France's development during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For instance, how at the beginning of the twentieth century, the total population was reduced and how the proportion of the active population had reduced from the time around the end of World War I. The proportion of the active population employed in agriculture increased in France totally up to the beginning of the 1920s. Thereafter, this sector shows a constant decline, except for a slight rise during World War II.[45]

Toutain gives some figure material from which we will take some extracts.

Population active totale

Les deux sexes (en 1,000)

	Pop act	Agric	Indust.	Services
1896	18,959	8,430	5,421	5,037
1906	20,724	8,777	6,049	5,820
1911	20,931	8,625	6,223	6,083
1921	21,718	8,951	6,371	6,324
1926	21,396	8,130	7,022	6,174
1931	21,610	7,637	7,192	6,714
1936	20,262	7,141	6,181	6,877
1946	20,792	7,484	6,141	6,752
1954	20,670	6,388	6,853	6,877
1959	18,840	4,540	7,092	7,208

We can see from these figures partly that the strong agrarian orientation was maintained throughout the entire period up to 1959, and partly that 1936 and 1946 values, concerning industrial employment, were not advantageous. The distribution of gross national product on industrial branches in a few more important countries in 1959 is illuminating.[46]

Origin of Gross National Product in 1959

	Agriculture, forestry and fishing	Industry	Other economic activities	Gross national-product, Total
France	12	45	43	100
Federal German Republic, excluding the Saar	7	53	40	100
Great Britain	4	48	48	100
U.S.A.	4	43	53	100

From a declaration-technical standpoint, it is more difficult to establish, the incomes of the farmers than those employed in industry or other services; it can therefore be presumed that the share of the French agriculture lies above the figures quoted, but the agrarian orientation in France appears, none the less, as a social problem still in 1959.[47]

For the growth of population in France, Toutain has compiled the following table.[48]

Classement des périodes de croissance de la population

Périodes au taux inférieur au taux moyen 1700—1936		Périodes au taux voisin du taux moyen 1700—1936		Périodes au taux nettement supérieur au taux moyen 1700—1936	
1700—1755	0,2	1776—1801	0,40	1755—1776	0,8
1801—1816	0,14	1801—1821	0,28	1816—1846	0,61
(mouvement population)		(recensements)		(mouvement population)	
1846—1856	0,18 à 0,23	1861—1866	0,37	1821—1846	0,60
1886—1911	0,14	1871 (ou 72)—1886	0,37 à 0,42	(recensements)	
		1921—1936	0,44	1856—1861	0,66 à 0,74
				1946—1959	0,87

Périodes de décroissance	
1866—1871 (mouvement de population)	—1,02
1866—1872 (recensements)	—0,88
1911—1921	—0,10
1936—1946	—0,34 à —0,39

Toutain's table shows that "les Périodes de décroissance" coincide to some extent with trials of various kinds; for instance, World War I, the prolonged depression after 1936, and World War II. It might be coincidences, but figure information concerning such demographic conditions cannot have failed to disturb, among others, politically engaged circles in the country.

Markovitch has compiled the following tableau of "les grandes étapes de la « révolution industrielle » en France" during the twentieth century.[49]

"*Premier tiers du XX^e siècle* — Accélération prononcée de la croissance industrielle : taux moyen en augmentation de 2 % à 4 % ; création de tout un réseau d'industries nouvelles, avec un élargissement maximum des échanges de produits industriels avec l'étranger ; hausse sensible des prix."

"*Second tiers du XX^e siècle* — Période de crise et de stagnation prolongée aggravée par la seconde guerre mondiale ; décroissance générale de la production industrielle et transformations importantes de structure..."

"*Troisième quart du XX^e siècle.* — Nouvelle accélération de la croissance, cette fois-ci équilibrée et planifiée, caractérisée par des taux annuels dépassant les rythmes d'avant-guerre (6 %, 7 %) ; refoulement décisif de l'artisanat par l'industrie proprement dite, avec concentration des entreprises."

Thus we see a change for the better in France's industrial development first during the end phase of the twentieth century period treated here. During the economic, social, and political decline at the end of the interwar period and during World War II, however, the cause and cure of it were discussed. The creation of a new France was earnestly desired. Probably, it was not so much the stagnation that continued after 1933—1934 that one wanted to master as the decisive shortcomings in the existing institutions of the country. The present study will to some extent illustrate these efforts, which are important to know because they crop up again during the 1950s and 1960s in, among others, the French attitudes towards the debates on the European Economic Community.

The background and origin of the reform ideas

2. The development in France during the interwar years and World War II

France was subjected to big trials during World War I. Large parts of the country were affected by war, especially where important sections of industry were localized. The population loss was considerable. An economic upswing arose in the 1920s, but was interrupted by the big crisis around 1930. Politically leading circles envisaged the control of Germany by imposing big war indemnities. Occupation of the Ruhr was also discussed.[1]

Immediately after World War I ended, reforms were made in a number of countries; this also applied to France. The labour movement, however, was disrupted by the splitting up of the socialist party into one communist part and one socialist part. Otherwise, the new times, contrary to the period before 1914, meant that monetary stability in France was destroyed, as it was in many other European countries.[2]

Politically, France was led by "the right" up to the middle of the 1920s, and thereafter by "the left", and during the end of the decade, by l'Union Nationale. During the latter part of the 1920s, the monetary value was stabilized, and a high level of industrial production was achieved. These successes ceased with the world crisis around 1930, in whose steps followed unemployment and financial difficulties for the state; this, in turn, resulted in disapproval of those politically responsible, a disapproval that came to be directed even against the democratic system. This same phenomenon occurred in a number of European countries at this time.[3]

Fascist organizations arose in France at the beginning of the 1930s; this was also seen in Germany. In February 1934, for instance, the Chamber of Deputies was stormed. These conditions led to a gathering on "the left" and the formation of "Front Populaire", in which Léon Blum had a leading role. This government presented a social programme and introduced, among other things, the 40-hour working week, paid holidays, and some nationalizations (e.g. the railways).[4]

French foreign policy deteriorated rapidly in step with the development of German power politics. In France, especially in the bourgeois oriented group, there was distrust of and strong opposition to the men of the Popular Front.[5] Immediately before World War II, government power fell into the hands of the radical group with Daladier as leader.[6] It must again be added that France, contrary to, for instance, her neighbours, Germany, England, &c., did not emerge

from the depression and stagnation at the beginning of the 1930s. Thus there was no economic upswing during the latter part of the 1930s in France.[7]

In connexion with the outbreak of World War II in September 1939, no direct hostilities between Germany and France occurred immediately. Therefore, the Maginot line was quiet during autumn 1939 and winter 1940. In spring 1940, the German action against Denmark—Norway came about with the object of gaining a better bargaining position in the military settlement with the Western Powers. During May—June 1940, Germany attacked France, which fell in a few weeks.[8] There was no French capitulation because that would be a disgrace, but there was an armistice with the condition that the vital French zones be occupied. In this situation, the aim of the French government was to try to survive and to keep its empire intact. The result of the conflict was a catastrophe for France, or at least, so it was thought by many.[9]

Bearing in mind what was said in the foregoing concerning France's economic, social, and political development during the 1930s, and the existing situation, we can understand persons of influence seeking a strong man to lead France. It should be someone who was respected, not only in France, but also in Germany. Pétain, the victor of Verdun in World War I, was such a man. At that time, he was 80 years of age and had been Premier since June 1940. It could also be thought that the military breakdown could lead to a reconstitution of the organization of the French state in a wide sense. To some extent, this was accomplished. A few days into July 1940, the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies assembled in the unoccupied zone in a town in Massif Central. Edward Herriot acted as speaker and, after parentations for members of parliament who had fallen in the war, said:

> Now, the day after the great catastrophes that have overtaken our country, we must try to discover their cause. There are quite a few causes ... and the hour of judgement will arrive. France will have it stern, exact, and impartial. In the unhappy situation we find ourselves, the nation rallies around Marshal Pétain in the respect that his name inspires in us all. Let us take care not to disturb the unity that is established under his authority.[10]

Next day, i.e. 10 July 1940, the decisive deliberations that led to Pétain's having "les pleins pouvoirs exécutifs et législatifs", that is to say the executive and legislative power, began.[11] Pierre Laval appeared as dominant speaker. No discussion of the drafted bill took place in the assembly. Nor would it after what was decided by the assembly. The speaker read the draft:

> The only paragraph: The National Assembly hands over all power to the government of the Republic, which will be under the leadership of Marshal Pétain. He will present a new constitution for the French nation. This will guarantee the rights related to the concepts work, family, and fatherland. The constitution will be approved by the nation and by the assemblies appointed by the country.[12]

The minutes from the meetings record that numerous voices were raised demanding an immediate vote, and that there should be no demands for motives explaining the positions adopted. The draft was approved by 569 votes for and 80 against.[13]

M. Fernand Bonissou, who was present, demanded that the adopted positions be reported in Journal Officiel. This was done. Today, it is possible to follow in detail the attitudes. Among those who voted "yes" were René Coty, the President of France immediately before de Gaulle, Pinay, Robert Schuman, Tixier-Vignancour, Guy de Wendel, all well-known names also during the postwar period. Most of the socialists voted "no": Vincent Auriol, Léon Blum, Max Dormoy, Jules Moch, André Philip, among them.[14] Immediately after the voting, Laval rose and said:

Gentlemen, in the name of Marshal Pétain, I thank you on behalf of France.[15]

Thus, the representatives of the French people had handed over their influence to a small group whose objectives were obscure. The country's experienced political leaders, including the President, had stepped aside in favour of an 80-year old military man. This development recalls the happenings in Germany a few years earlier when political power was concentrated in the hands of the National Socialist Group. In France, too, the handing over of power was precipitated. The National Assembly had cause to regret its decision.

THE ACTION PROGRAMME OF THE PETAIN REGIME

How did Pétain think he would manage his task? The declaration to the French people of 11 July 1940 answers:

The provinces of the country should be led by governors allocated administrative personnel. The officials should be under less supervision than earlier and have a freer hand in the matter of regulations, which made them more free to reach decisions. The intention was rationalization of the work, and underlying everything must lie the military way of thinking that came natural to Pétain. Governors should function as army division chiefs, and so on, the officials should act in the spirit of the leadership. With this organization, Pétain intended to conduct the country through difficult times.

Pétain presented his rehabilitation programme as follows: The chiefs should have authority, the population should have discipline; through labour, the French people would overcome its misfortunes. International capitalism and socialism, which exploited and slighted the French people, must now be banished to the past. This did not mean that the prevailing economic system would be abandoned, profit thinking and saving would be maintained, but money should be the reward for toil.[16]

Pétain had been given the commission of the National Assembly to handle the affairs of the country during the transition period, but he also found he had the right to change the social system in accordance with what he and his advisors thought best for the people. The National Assembly had voluntarily relinquished the power and had entered a pupal stage. But what was the will of the people? When did the political picture change? and when did Pétain cease to personify the wishes of the French majority?

In August 1940, Pétain attacked the party system in the country.[17] In October 1940, it was time to present a report of what had happened in the country and of what the new government had done. Three-million refugees and two-million demobilized had returned home. Most bridges, destroyed during the war, had been repaired. The communication network was almost restored. In 6 weeks, a large number of new laws and regulations had been drafted; these referred to naturalization matters, the right to belong to certain occupational groups, alcoholic problems, employment problems, &c. Faced with threats of unemployment, the authorities planned public works. Certain secret societies must be dissolved. Those responsible for the collapse were sought out. The previous political leaders were among them.[18]

The Pétain regime presented a programme that resembled the one in the fascist countries, Italy and Germany. Economic pressure coalitions, trade unions, and political associations were regarded as the enemy, and a new order must be introduced. The colonial empire and the cultural inheritance should be protected. Everyone should work and should have the right to work. Everyone should be compelled to be a member of an occupational organization. These organizations should deal with everything that had to do with the occupation. In this way, labour disputes would be avoided. Lock-outs and strikes should be forbidden; obligatory labour courts should solve the disputes. The country's industry should be organized, regulated, and state controlled. Thus would the power position of the trusts be destroyed, so too would corruption. Activity in private management should be co-ordinated; monetary values should be protected by price control and rationing.[19]

Pétain went even further. The French community should be based on agriculture, which should be operated in the management of the family.[20] This attitude shows the lack of understanding by the Pétain regime, and perhaps by Pétain himself, of the present age and its problems. However, the intention here is not to penetrate the Pétain regime and distinguish what can have been tactics and reality. In France, this period is still too sensitive for easy reference and the attitudes for and against are strong. But we must discuss the main features of the programme presented by this regime in order to see to some extent its positive or negative influence on the idea formation in the circles that sought to reform France after the war.

The political situation that had arisen in Europe after the events in summer 1940 appeared to some reviewers as a turning point. Germany would now have a

dominant position on the European continent, with all that this implies, and perhaps for a long time into the future; that was the opinion in many quarters.

The Pétain regime unquestionably wished to realize a national renewal, but the target as sketched was, as we have seen, doubtful and the methods even more so. Opinion supervision, prohibition of political parties, oppression by trade unions, antisemiticism, all these were methods known from the totalitarian states. Industry in France should be organized in corporate forms—the agrarian community was the ideal for the old Marshal and his environment.[21]

World War II, however, was a turning point. The fortunes of war changed after the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. had been drawn into the dispute. For France, this meant a closer connexion with the German production apparatus. Germany must mobilize all available resources and therefore large orders were placed with the French industry. Big contingents of French labour were also transferred to Germany to be employed in production. This was the situation, broadly speaking, at the beginning of 1943.[22]

The French opposition had either been forced underground or had left the country, but it was a reality. The support of the resistance movement was, of course, slight, but there were many different organizations and cells of this kind, where discussions were carried on and general lines for the new community to be created were drawn up. What was required was an economic, social, and political change in the country. The politician, General de Gaulle, operated outside France, being resident in London from June 1940, and a number of resistance fighters, among others, supported him. In May 1943, Conseil National de la Résistance was created. This co-ordinated the various resistance organizations.[23]

When the Western Allies began to have military successes in North Africa, possibilities were created for a change of regime in the French territories and contact with the Vichy regime was broken off. Thereby, it was possible to establish a French consultative national assembly in Algiers in autumn 1943. This included politicians who had succeeded in escaping from occupied France, trade unionists, members of the liberation movement, and members of the colonial administration.[24] This assembly perhaps dealt chiefly with economic matters. A section of de Gaulle's address to this assembly on 4 November 1943 is quoted; it is chosen because de Gaulle in his political career often showed himself to be sensitive to opinions and atmospheres. He said:

> After the war, our country will not be as it was before the war. Away with intrigues and corrupt influences in the community. France wishes to end an economic regime within whose framework the country cannot share in its rich resources, where production and distribution defies the control by the country, where the enterprises reject influence from the worker and white-collar organizations upon which they are none the less completely dependent.[25]

This pronouncement seems to have been inspired by the economic ideas of the resistance movement. The address, which was received with enthusiasm and a

standing applause,[26] must have interpreted the then prevailing opinions in, among others, the Algiers assembly.

France was largely liberated in June 1944 by the invasions and the military operations. The German military collapse came a year later. Pétain, who had been in prison in Germany, returned to France, was brought to trial, and condemned to death, a punishment that was changed to life imprisonment. Pétain was not, of course, convicted for his economic and social objectives described above, but for events that occurred during his period in office as Chief of State and earlier.[27] In his defence address, he referred to his social and economic reforms as follows: "Malgré d'immenses difficultés, aucun pouvoir n'a, plus que le mien, honoré la famille et, pour empêcher la lutte des classes, cherché à garantir les conditions du travail à l'usine et à la terre."[28] Whatever Pétain's regime's objectives and intentions had been, they were swept away by new political winds and evaluations, whose significance and importance for the French community we will try to establish.

3. The opposition formulates its action programme

After the armistice in June 1940, attempts were made to achieve unity in the country, among other things, by taking as leader Pétain, a man who was above party disputes.[1] The new regime, however, discouraged attempts to create free opinion.[2] There was a settlement with the past directed against those politicians who had played a prominent role during the period before June 1940.[3] Although the Vichy regime embarked on a precarious path in its actions, its election had been legal, and it was supported by wide factions in the community.[4] Also after measures had been taken against trade unions, political parties, and Jews, as well as press censorship and supervision of opinion had been initiated, the administration and the army remained loyal to the government.[5]

It is fairly obvious that only few were in direct opposition. The period after the military breakdown must have been, in a number of respects, a recovery period. It is clear that many wanted a national rehabilitation; the question was how it was to be brought about. In a German-dominated Europe, national reorganization should follow the lines drawn up in the Third Reich, in any case, that was the path the ruling clique in Vichy embarked upon.

But the community could also be organized otherwise. Trade union movement, political parties, and the state too could be given a position so strong that economics were controlled by these factions. Instead of a return to the agrarian state, one could desire industrialization and so on. This and many other things were the objectives of the opposition, but there must have been few who supported this opposition; in any case, few became members of the resistance movement.[6]

The resistance movement concentrated on armed actions and sabotage, but

also worked along other lines. Discussions groups were set up. Here, the future of France was debated. Blocq-Mascart, one of the leaders of one of the many resistance organizations, has mentioned that the discussion groups could include about five persons, often of different political opinions. These groups were really small parliaments where reforms necessary for the country were discussed, for instance, the question of the constitution and economic and social matters.[7] Unfortunately, too little material remains from the period involved. Some of the matters dealt with were not noted down: this was a time when it was dangerous to carry on one's person documents of any kind. Some material was destroyed, but some still exists.[8]

It is probably natural that politicians were attracted to this opposition, or even formed it, and there is reason to suppose that the socialists were eager resistance fighters: they it was who dissociated themselves from handing over political power to Pétain in June 1940.[9] However, persons from all grouping, social and political, were found within the active opposition. Among these names noted in the sources are: Blocq-Mascart, Daniel Mayer, André Philip, Pierre Villon, Henry Teitgen, François de Menthon, Jules Moch.

André Philip (S.F.I.O.) said, among other things, in an interview, about a contact in Montpellier in 1941, where possibly the breakdown and postwar France were discussed, that he met René Courtin, who was a liberal and belonged to the bourgeois milieu. Courtin said that it was the bourgeoisie who had betrayed the country, and we should therefore nationalize. The present generation bourgeoisie deserves this. Courtin was an economist. He considered that it was no particular advantage but a political necessity. He said that in fifteen years when a new bourgeoisie emerges which is worthy, we can denationalize. It was, instead, Philip meant, the workers who adopted a dignified attitude.[10]

It was mainly the workers who played a predominant role in the direct opposition to the occupying powers in France.[11] The labour movement in France is largely communistic, and the workers were, or became, inclined to support other social groups in the fight against the common enemy.[12] The same inclinations seem to have been, or come to be, present on the ideological plane.[13] However, we can presume that there were great prerequisites for the general attitude within the opposition becoming radical in social matters.

From the period of occupation, there remains part of the underground press; concerning this, a bibliography has been actually arranged.[14] There, for instance, we find the series Cahiers du Témoignage Chrétien, whose first number came out in 1941. It bore the title: "France, prends garde de perdre ton âme." The following numbers were called: "Notre combat", "Droit de l'homme et du chrétien", "Collaboration et Fidélité", and so on.[15] There were also other publications that were passed around, hectographed, for instance, "Ceux des Maquis", a resistance movement organ.[16] Some of these publications were in the nature of a news service and reproduced press reports from Swiss, English, and German newspapers. Others adopted the new thinking in social matters and reported it.

The French resistance movement was co-ordinated in 1943, the year Conseil National de la Résistance was created.[17] There was also another organ, Comité Général d'Etudes, abbreviated C.G.E., sometimes called "Comité des experts" or "Club des Cerveaux".[18] The founder of this institution was François de Menthon under the pseudonym Tertius, and Pierre-Henri Teitgen under the pseudonym Tristan.[19] P. H. Teitgen, Marc Bloch, and Louis Terrenoire were the leaders.[20] Their co-workers were, among others, Paul Bastide, Albert Bayet, René Courtin, Michel Debré, Léo Hamon, Robert Lacoste, Alexandre and Dominique Parodi, Leonard Rist.[21]

At an interview with François de Menthon, he explained that C.G.E. was created by Bastid, former radical, Lacoste, socialist, Parodi, socialist, and de Menthon, Christian democrat.[22] C.G.E. represented the entire community and its various factions. De Menthon made the following comments on the list of the co-workers in C.G.E.:

> Paul Bastid was radical. He is a professor of law here in Paris. Albert Bayet engaged himself in press matters and founded l'Association de la Presse. Michel Debré was kept busy with appointments to prefectures and other high posts. Léo Hamon is a professor in Dijon. Hours was a historian, professor in Lyon. Lacoste, a socialist and trade union official, was probably one of those who urged on the nationalizations. Parodi became President du Conseil d'Etat. He is Conseiller d'Etat. He and Debré co-operated to reorganize the administration. I never met Leonard Rist. Dominique Parodi was brother to Alexandre Parodi. Louis Saillant was a communist and trade union official. Edmond Vermeil was a Germanic philologist and specialist on German questions.[23]

C.G.E. was thus a research organ and in 1943 presented "Rapport sur la politique économique d'après-guerre".[24] Here, the economic programme of the resistance movement for France was outlined. We know that in different circles it was asked how could the country be so humiliated in 1940.[25] The document was a link in soul-searching. C.G.E. also published a number of brochures called: "Les Cahiers Politiques" and which were probably written for the purpose of clarification and opinion creating.[26] They had the following content:

No. 1 April 1943:	Pourquoi je suis républicain.
No. 2 July 1943:	Pourquoi je suis républicain. (suite)
No. 3 August 1943:	Sur les réformes à apporter au régime politique de la France.
No. 4 November 1943:	Le problème de la presse.
No. 5 January 1944:	Pour la France de demain.

What is surprising when reading through these texts is the verve with which the subjects are presented. It appears to be a series prepared some time before, perhaps the result of many meetings and discussions which were now made public.

Each number was divided into three parts. The first dealt with ideological questions concerning the French republic of tomorrow. The second discussed technical questions, for instance, the new constitution, the economic and social conditions in the country, and such like. The third part reproduced documents about the circumstances of the country, in one way or another.

The first 20 pages of No. 1 thoroughly surveys the history of the German Reich, its motive powers, its ideas since the 1850s, and its social situation after 1918. It penetrates the ideology of the Germany that had occupied France since 1940. The second part of the brochure carried the title: "France and the European Concept"; the third part: "General de Gaulle and Great Britain." The brochure suggested that the thought of a European unit had been present for a long time, not least in France, but the interests that were found to be represented in Europe clashed on many points. It was necessary to allow the great world powers an insight into and control of European affairs. In this way, peace and security could be guaranteed. The thought of a European community was thus probably present in the French resistance movement in 1943.[27]

The first number of Les Cahiers Politiques was reviewing and analysing; the second was engaged in internal political matters of fundamental type, where representatives of various factions in the French community: resistance fighters, Catholics, representatives of culture, trade unionists, socialists, gave their opinions about the republican—i.e. the democratic—ideas. The third touched upon, among other things, necessary reforms in French political life and in the educational system. The fourth took up the problem of dealing with the French press after the country had been liberated, having in mind the non-national and neutral attitude the press had, in some cases, adopted during the occupation and war years. Economic problems were also discussed. The fifth dealt with the doctrinal problem seen from the Catholic standpoint, the role of France in Europe of the future, and again, economic questions. The sixth and final number, which was issued before the liberation, dealt with questions about the French constitution.[28]

We find the Les Cahiers Politiques thus contains a programme declaration of the shaping of the future French community. Here, can be observed the philosophical formulation of the exposition, the retrospective historical glances, the presentation of arguments intended for an educated public. What was required? That the French should have leaders recruited from all strata of the community. The power position of the French plutocracy must be broken down. This would be difficult because they controlled the press. The big monopolies should be nationalized, bank and insurance systems, transports, electricity undertakings, the iron and metal industry, and the large chemical enterprises should be controlled by the nation. Money must not be borrowed from abroad. If that was done, the political role of France would again be weakened. The future republic during the next few years would be poor, but without capitalism. The state would completely regulate foreign trade. The French Empire would work for the good of all member countries. Its large population would enable the Empire to support

France's position in Europe.[29] We thus have here a concentrated programme with whose help the country could again be put on its feet and rehabilitation brought about. We will now look in more detail at the report about the French economic postwar policy.

SURVEY OF "RAPPORT SUR LA POLITIQUE ECONOMIQUE D'APRES-GUERRE"

We first take a quick glance over this report, which is the basis of the understanding of the French postwar period.[30] It is arranged in two main parts provided with a number of subsections. The first is called "Les impératifs permanents de la politique économique", the second "La phase de reconstruction". The first part deals with such matters as the internal problems of France, where the origin of the monopoly is treated and where solutions via nationalizations and increased influence from the employees on the enterprises are proposed. The demographic situation and full employment are other problems treated, as well as those concerning working hours, profits, conditions in agriculture and trade, and savings and investments.[31] The role of France in international economy and related problems was also dealt with.[32]

The second part of the report, "La phase de reconstruction", emphasized the need for a directed industry and the problems concerning production targets and their accomplishment.[33] Then a survey of the production apparatus followed sector by sector: employment, agriculture and food supplies, scarcity in production, investment problems with proposals for solutions, transport systems, problems of taxation, the future monetary policy, and regulations concerning future imports.[34] One section dealt with "Restitutions et réparations", i.e. the relations with Germany in the economic sphere.[35] Finally, there were forecasts for the future and an appraisal of the postwar trend with conclusions.[36]

The research group concluded that the influence of capitalism was too great in the French community. The influence of the workers should be increased; they "should be given a recognized position in the community".[37] The levelling of incomes was also a desirable objective. The idea was that technical development had now progressed so far that it was possible to create resources intended for the good of the community and that these resources should not be controlled by a small group of industrialists or financiers.[38]

The report also shows that the long depression was not forgotten: "la dépression économique qui a affecté l'ensemble du monde à partir de l'automne 1929 et qui en France n'avait pas pu être entièrement résorbée à la veille de la guerre, a suscité un profond bouleversement des idées."[39] Concerning France, this crisis led to extensive unemployment and therefore to a reduction in consumption. There were resources in the country – for instance large supplies of foodstuffs that did not reach the market, but were intentionally destroyed – but large sec-

tions of the population had not the money to buy what they needed.[40] Because the system that prevailed in the country did not guarantee a satisfactory distribution of the resources, it seemed reasonable to try to change it when a suitable opportunity presented itself.

Already under the Popular Front this was to some extent possible. Some social reforms were then introduced, but the dispute between socialists and non-socialists was bitter.[41] The situation came to a head because of involvements in foreign policy and was complicated by anti-democratic feelings, which had already infected neighbouring countries in the east and the south. World War II was mainly a settlement between democracy and dictatorship. In France, this tendency made itself felt in, among other things, antagonism between the Vichy regime and the opposition.

We can thus suspect that the medication prescribed by the report for the recovery of France was more political than economic, although much argues for the economic interventions. We base this on the following sections of the report. In the introduction, there is a declaration of discontent with the then existing regime and the social classes supporting it.[42] It says in the report that the working class, the year after the breakdown in 1940, had reacted correctly. By its attitude, the leading class had undermined the confidence that had earlier been placed in it and was therefore unfit to lead the future policy and economy. It also said: "A tout le moins, a-t-on généralement reconnu que les démissionaires de la défaite devaient partager les responsabilités du pouvoir avec d'autres groupes." Now that the opportunity had arisen, the bourgeois strata would be pushed aside, the structure of the country would be totally changed, and the path to a strictly planned economy be embarked upon.[44]

"Réforme de structure" was mentioned. What lay in this concept? Larousse defines it as follows: "Réforme législative qui modifie profondément une des structures administratives, économiques ou sociales d'une collectivité."[45] Because it speaks of a plural concept in this connexion, the whole definition covers the objectives of the report, which demonstrates the uncertainty about the reasons for the prolonged depression in the 1930s in France. It mentions: that the time before the war had been, and still was, interpreted in many ways, with the result that no principle that could be used as model for actions could be established. For one group, anarchy and unemployment was responsible for the depression, whereas others accused the numerous faulty interventions in the economy of responsibility for the rising powers being paralyzed. Therefore the crisis was serious and prolonged.[46]

The report pointed out that there was lacking a balance of economic policy in the French community. The lacking economic balance might be due to the monopolies with their price-fixing that existed in the country.[47] The lacking political balance might be relieved by increasing the influence of the working class and by strengthening the position of the state against financial and economic power groups.[48]

The following conclusion can be drawn: It was not certain why the country was hit by the prolonged depression in the 1930s. The cure prescribed was thus not dictated by any positive insight into what economic factors caused it. What was desired was a change of the social organization. This could be achieved politically. But the economic situation of the country was at the same time in a difficult position because of disturbances caused by war and blockade. Severe regulations had to be imposed. This question was related to a desire in some circles for a settlement with high finance. Regulations of various kinds must become effective, as they could if the state was given control. On the other hand, bureaucracy must have been strong also during the Vichy regime; therefore it must be supposed that the liberation of France would be followed by purgings in the upper stratum of the administration apparatus. It would not be feasible to purge further down: the administration had to continue functioning.

What lay in the structural concept? This might have been interpreted fairly generally. To begin with, it must be established that not all the bourgeoisie were condemned.[49] There was a minority in this camp that reacted correctly.[50] There were many in the working class who did not react until after the food rations had been reduced and the prices had soared.[51] The report points out that it was less a question of trying to eliminate a social class than trying to draw out an elite from the working class which would strengthen and complement what was left of the old bourgeois elite.[52] The working class was as yet judged incapable of governing the country, its education level was too low, its knowledge of economic matters was too slight.[53] A real worker influence in the country could thus be expected only at some time in the future.

What the committee—or at least the writer of the report—was afraid of was anarchy and bloody revolt at the breakdown of the occupying power.[53] It can be imagined that the republicans tried to get a settlement with the socialists, who naturally wished to seize power but calculated that they could not use it because of lack of suitable persons for the leading roles.

The desire of the republicans for a settlement for the mentioned reasons can be more or less conscious. There was thus a threat of revolution; it was impossible to judge how serious it was, but it existed. The republicans must therefore have been prepared for a settlement. In socialism, the communistic group was a great power factor. According to Daniel Mayer, the communists were prepared to co-operate with the republicans in order to compel the Germans to station the largest possible forces in France to take the pressure off other fronts, mainly those in eastern Europe.[54] According to Mayer, the communists' desire for co-operation arose from this;[55] we can therefore suppose that S.F.I.O. representatives stood for a more radical programme.

4. "Rapport sur la politique économique d'après-guerre"—more detailed

What were the objectives of the programme writing for France? They were:

a. that the country ought to try to recover its position as a great power
b. that the living standards ought to be raised immediately
c. that the production apparatus ought to be expanded
d. that a protectionistic policy ought to be pursued
e. that when the economic expansion was ready, the country should become integrated into the international market
f. that the trusts should be opposed and that the Government, immediately after the liberation, ought to carry through structural reforms, i.e. establish a control of the powerful economic interests in the country
g. that the inflence of the working class must be increased in the production apparatus
h. that a directed economy must be put into force during the expansion phase.[1]

Here, were both economic and political targets. That the industry of the country would be controlled by the state during the coming years belonged to the times. This took place in a number of countries during the war and during the immediate postwar period. The increased influence of the workers was missing in some other countries or was given a natural solution there.[2] The report judged the increased influence of the workers to be essential, and the period immediately after the liberation was suitable for carrying out the big reforms.[3] Regard for general opinion urged on the interventions against the trusts,[4] if a general opinion can be mentioned in the occupied France. We should perhaps instead speak of the opinion held in certain circles, among others, those that put forward proposals for an action programme. Their line could be thought to gain increasingly more supporters as the fortunes of war had turned in 1943, and the outcome of the war became increasingly obvious.

The report mentioned that the administrative apparatus, the industrialists, and the trade union movement wanted a directed economy and that the representatives of other industries, i.e. medium industry, small industry, trade, and agriculture, on the other hand, wanted to return to a liberal regime as quickly as possible.[5] An opposition could thus be counted on from these groups to the plans worked out. How would the directed economy be carried out? The report discussed planned economy, but did not reach any direct positive solution.[6] In some quarters, there was fear that the position of the large companies would be strengthened and that those parts of the administrations or those persons who would lead industry would gradually obtain a too strong position through the directed policy.[7] With the individual in mind, one also wanted to avoid a development similar to that brought about in the Soviet Union during the 1930s.[8] It said

that the French policy could not be formulated without being related to the structure of world policy ... and in the event of the situation becoming less clear, i.e. where England and Russia adopt different positions, it might fall to France to choose or—purely in accordance with the tradition of the country—to formulate a synthesis of apparently contradictory tendencies.[9]

It also said that at all events, it would be anachronistic and a poor joke to try to work out plans within a national frame, as was too often tried without caring about, or providing for, the adjustment between the national market and the foreign market ...[10]

It stated, too, that a rational planned economy—if such can be formulated—cannot be realized other than on an international scale.[11] The French planned economy, as it appeared after the war, is not found in the report.

The rehabilitation plan was intended to provide for a recovery in production, an improvement in distribution, and a re-establishment of what is called "les équilibres fondamentaux".[12] This could be achieved by forcing the price policy of the monopolies to cease; the price fixing should be correct.[13] The working class should also be given the right of increased responsibility, and the state would be liberated from the influence of financial and economic power groups.[14]

We can thus conclude that the reform efforts of the opposition were politically oriented.[15] The aim was to carry out a more democratic order than had earlier existed in the country. The struggle against the trusts was indicated in the report as a demand by the opinion, and it must be carried out in one form or another.[16] Whether or not the state-directed industry could be carried through as a planned economy was still an open question.[17] It seemed highly improbable that this would be the case.[18]

The working class would finally have influence.[19] It was not a matter of eliminating the middle class, but of drawing out an elite from the working class which would strengthen and complement what was left of the bourgeois elite.[20]

The report mentions that it was a common concept that industry should be completely nationalized.[21] One did not want to embark on that path.[22] It was probably feared that the reorganization would be too difficult. What, in the main, was needed after the liberation was an industry that functioned satisfactorily.[23] What, on the other hand, was desired was to increase social control of this industry.[24] This control must not be so shaped that a cumbersome state apparatus exterted controlling and inhibiting functions.[25] If now state influence had to be developed, it ought to help the development of production and create the best possible living standards for the people.[26] Therefore it could not be accepted that certain trade corporations would have freedom to defend and utilize their special interests.[27]

It was necessary to render the state independent of the big economic organizations, i.e. the so-called trusts.[28] That the railways, the water, gas, and electricity sectors should be controlled by the state was considered obvious.[29] If the large-scale enterprises were to be prevented from regaining their power position, those

branches where, in one way or another, a monopoly existed had to be nationalized.[30] The nationalized enterprises would be controlled by "des fonctionnaires ayant, à la fois, toutes les compétences des grands hommes d'affaires, le désintéressement et le sens du service public..."[31] The limited companies should also be reformed by, among other things, making the economic accounting similar.[32] The agreement between enterprises and groups of enterprises should be reported and published.[33] The Minister of Economics or his representative should have the right to veto such decisions as were judged capable of harming the economic situation on a large scale.[34] An obligatory representation was also envisaged for workmen and white-collar workers in the Councils (conseils d'entente).[35]

A study of the text reveals that although the report speaks of nationalizations that could be carried out later, it was none the less only proposals. The future political development must decide whether or not they would come into being. Otherwise, it was thought that the purgings of industrialists who had co-operated with the Germans were even more important than the question of the trusts.[36] The nationalizations were thus not a primary target for the committee. Other problems treated in the report concerned the working life, the prerequisites for a progressive economy, the demographic problem, and full employment.[37]

To begin with the workers, it was desired that this social class should be integrated in the community.[38] This would take place by the primary restoration of trade union freedom.[39] The working class should also appear united in a trade union organization.[40] The workers would be allowed to negotiate on an equal footing with the employers about wages and conditions.[41] This would take place according to the forms established in 1936.[42] Within the companies, the workers would be allowed a say in social, technical, and economic questions, but in a way that did not harm business.[43] Representatives of the workers in the company management was also envisaged.[44]

Some of these proposals have for a long time been applied in a number of other countries. Other reforms have been late in coming about, for instance, worker representation in the company management. To what extent did these proposals cause surprise? It is not easy to determine, but it is probably no exaggeration to say that French society and working life carries a certain stamp of patriarchalism. The ideal picture is that found in the Swedish postwar society: a strong labour movement and a united trade-union movement. Whether this for Sweden led to an economic expansion can perhaps be discussed, but it unquestionably led to a more even distribution of resources. This is what the French proposal sought to achieve.[45]

What was sometimes found later in the wage negotiations—or rather what ought to have been found—was wage equalization.[46] The report mentioned that unskilled workers should have a bigger wage addition than professionals, and that white-collar workers and technicians should have less increases in wages than workmen got: all this in order to reduce the economic contrasts in society.[47]

The stagnation tendencies in the French community during the 1930s are again

encountered.[48] These tendencies were to be found in many countries. We have had some idea of the demographic picture of France during that period. There was no increase in the birthrate during the latter part of the 1930s, which was probably due to, among other things, poor incomes for the population.[49] Prolonging the crisis did nothing to ease the hopelessness of the situation. Why? The report gives its opinion: "... les gouvernements qui se sont succédés ont en effet tous commis une faute identique, celle de freiner l'activité économique."[50]

Tariff protection, restrictions in production, and concentration on the national market are indicated in the report as remedies that were tried without result.[51] Good economic resources must first be developed in order to make it possible to carry out far-reaching social reforms.[52] The report states: "Le redressement français paraît avoir pour condition un retour à une économie progressive. Ce renouveau dépend lui-même de tout un ensemble complexe. Une économie dynamique suppose, en effet, une population accrue et améliorée en qualité, un emploi total, une efficacité portée à son maximum, des investissements importants."[53] A whole programme lies in these words.

The report also says: "... tout homme et toute femme doivent être pénétrés de l'obligation de transmettre la vie qu'ils ont reçue eux-mêmes à travers la série ininterrompue des générations qui se sont succédées depuis le début de l'humanité."[54] All kinds of measures should be tried to increase the birthrate: loans to newly married couples (prêts au mariage), housing policy, tax reliefs, labour legislation concerning women, and campaigns against abortions.[55]

The need for workers in the immediate future, however, could not be solved with those measures.[56] Instead, during the period immediately after the liberation, immigration policy had to be introduced.[57] It must be a controlled immigration where those needed in industry were allowed entry.[58] The policy of full employment was the goal, and the problems of unemployment were analysed.[59] Where there was unemployment, fewer assets were produced and the released worker and his family found themselves in an often miserable and always humiliating situation.[60] "L'emploi total implique ainsi la réalisation d'un équilibre économique qui a généralement fait défaut à partir de 1930 et qui pourrait rapidement être menacé après la guerre si certaines erreurs étaient renouvelées. Cet équilibre général est indépendant du régime économique en vigueur; il doit être recherché tant en économie dirigée qu'en économie libérale."[61]

Concerning agriculture, it was thought natural that its relative importance should be reduced as an economic development in the country increased, a development that would naturally occur in the industrial sector.[62] It was also pointed out that the number of farmers would decrease.[63] Thus the so-called flight from the rural areas was regarded as normal from the standpoint of the state, an unusual attitude at this time.

Here, for the moment, we can pause in the analysis; later, we introduce international matters. There is available some material concerning a few targets and deliberations that were topical in 1943 when the possibilities for the future of

France were being appraised. Next, we further illustrate the lines of thought and the work with these problems by an attempt to survey the material put at the disposal of the investigation by one of the leading personages in the French resistance movement, Maxime Blocq-Marcart.

5. Documents belonging to Blocq-Mascart

The documents belonging to Blocq-Mascart naturally do not give a complete idea of what was discussed during the occupation period in France, but they give us some concept of the debate summarized to some extent in the previously-mentioned proposal. The debate, however, was continued after the report was presented in 1943.

Politically, Blocq-Mascart could be described as bourgeois-liberal.[1] He was vice-chairman of the resistance council and belonged among the leaders of O.C.M.[2] His material is put into four main groups: Réformes Economiques, Notes Générales, Travail, Législation Professionelle and Notes Parti Communiste.[3]

The documents are his conference and meeting material, which he or others carried in the pocket to the meetings and discussions. The material contains various projects handed over from O.C.M. to C.G.E.; for instance, "Note pour Lanson et le C.G.E.", which contains opinions about suitable framing of the administration in order to manage supplies according to principles envisaged.[4] Blocq-Mascart supported a directed economy.[5] In the material, we can recognize a far-reaching detailed planning concerning the future planned economy.

A closer examination of a document dated 17 June 1943, entitled "Notes sur une Doctrine Economique", shows that it is in the main an appraisal of the economic situation of France. This appraisal resulted in certain proposals. It begins by establishing that an economic and social policy should be prepared, aimed at maintaining and developing what can perhaps be called the population capital. For the French population to have the best possible living conditions, it was necessary to take an inventory of the resources and to make a production plan.

Because the country had colonies that provided it with raw materials, it could in a normal situation manage more important necessities. France had enough wheat, corn, rye, oats, rice, sugar, butter, vegetable oils, and salt. Other resources at its disposal, in sufficient amounts, were iron ore, bauxite, potassium carbonate, and phosphates. The appraisal stated that the degree of maintenance was more than 50 % satisfied by the country's own resources concerning maize, cocoa, timber, coal, nickel, graphite, cobalt, and hides. It was necessary to import more than 80 % of wool, cotton, and silk, and petrol and rubber. Copper, zinc, tin, manganese, sulphur, and so on, also had to be imported.

The imports had to be paid for, but as it was calculated that immediately after

the liberation the material destruction would be found to be considerable, it was essential to try to obtain credits to finance the needed imports. If this proved impossible, the object must be to make France self supporting. If cheap credits were obtained, however, the French production capacity must be restored as soon as possible. Thus labour could be used at full scale, and social restlessness in the country might be avoided. The idea was that the credits should be used for constructing houses and producing necessary goods and chattels to restore the material resources that had been destroyed or had deteriorated during the war and to meet the population's normal and vital needs during industry's reorganization period. There was no intention of increasing the production capacity in the country. It was feared that a crisis similar to that of 1930 would in that case occur again.

The appraisal presented the following conclusions: France, to a considerable extent, must itself build up its resources. Therefore it must create a limited self-management. So that this could be achieved, it was absolutely essential that production be organized. The following targets were mentioned: products from France and its affiliated colonies would be used. Where substitutes and substitute material could be developed, this should be used. Both energy production—in all its forms—and transports should be developed: "Soit à les rendre purement français (transports maritimes et aériens) soit à utiliser des sources d'énergie françaises (électrification)." The French industrial production would also, on the basis of domestic resources, try to develop products that could find markets abroad, and the industry should be decentralized.

The public administration should draw up the main outlines of the French exports because, as it was supposed, only the state could have a clear idea of the position. The aim should be high quality of the export goods. There could be no question of exporting mass products. Instead, the object would be products such as luxury goods, where one could not fail. Thus competition with countries that had better supplies of raw material or labour should be avoided.

The French colonies and their resources were also included in the estimate for the economic rehabilitation. It said: *The colonies are profitable only if they loyally enrich the homeland and its possessions.* It means that France and its colonies must economically have a joint leadership. A time-honoured colonial policy must be established: raw material deliveries from the colonies to the homeland in exchange for industrial goods. This does not mean that the colonies would not have industry. These should be created, but with caution so that the homeland is not robbed of the market. They should have industries that have no counterpart in France or that could complement French industry. Produced raw material should be so processed that transport would be cheap.

It also said that numerous and cheap labour in the colonies could be used. In this way, some of the external markets could be recaptured. France should not import from foreign countries goods that her colonies produce, and the colonies must not import from abroad what can be imported from France. The outlined

conditions could, incidentally, be a description of the economic relations between England and her North American colonies at the mid-eighteenth century.

Because the state had a comprehensive view over the maintenance of the French people, it would be able to draft a flexible general plan according to which, directions could be given to various professional organizations that should work under government control.

This document, in other words, contains the outlines for the economic planning that came into being after the war. The document dated 17 June 1943 must have been inspired by the bourgeoisie. It gives proof of the way of thinking inspired by the experiences gained during the inter-war period. It foreshadows an economic nationalism and protectionism developed during the postwar period, at least, during its initial phase. This attitude was necessary in view of the demands of the new times for a developed production apparatus and of the neighbouring countries' degree of industrialization being high, as was also their birthrate.

Was it wise to aim at luxury and quality production and not at mass production? Possibly it was. Probably, there were personnel or other resources to increase the production by the luxury goods industry. It could be estimated that this production would start almost at once. The other production target, mass production, would come when the basic industry was developed and the market prepared to receive these types of goods.

The Blocq-Mascart material contains two drafts of a "Charte Economique et Sociale". It was an attempt to formulate a Magna Charta of economic and working life. The fear that what had happened to individual freedom in Russia would happen here during the reconstruction period can be traced in these documents. This was a sacrifice that one was not prepared to make. The economic planning was fully outlined in the draft, whose more important lines were: The state must play a leading role in industry. Industry should put at the disposal of the public an increasing supply of products by the intensive use of natural resources and the best industrial equipment. What was produced would really be needed and be available in the easiest and most comfortable way and at the correct price. All available labour should be employed in industry.

The public authorities should also establish a plan of production. This plan should agree with the views held by the leading economic organs and the organizations of the labour market in France. Naturally, there were more important and less important productions. The more important should be directed and controlled by the state. Imperative and rigid regulations should be made for those parts of industry that produced vital necessities. The state itself, or through agents, should control its monopolies and enterprises in the service of the public or key-production enterprises.

Private companies must under no circumstances lie idle and unproductive or be prevented from delivering. Unlimited profit should not be allowed in industry. Goods of various kinds should be distributed according to a rationing system. The

objectives in the planning must not exceed the financial means that were available; credits should be arranged by state banks; thus control by private banks would be prevented. The sales companies should not work for their own profit interests, but should be "mutuelles", i.e. work on a non-profit basis.

The second group postulated that the new economic and social organization acknowledged that everybody could devote himself to what he found most suitable, that everybody had access to the positions that his service merits entitled him to, and so on. Some kind of protection for the employee and his family was envisaged, and everybody should find it possible to exist, i.e. should have employment.

Yet another "Projet de Charte Economique et Sociale" is found in Blocq-Mascart's papers. The previous one was unfinished, but this was fully formulated. The document begins by stating that freedom in industry causes social injustice and had resulted in economic anarchy. The democratic institutions should be maintained; the nation must therefore impose on itself a strict economic discipline. Within the framework of an international co-operation, the state should co-ordinate and orient the economic activity. This could be accomplished by everybody being assured of the right to work because the public had at its disposal the largest possible resources and because these were distributed equably. Natural resources and labour must be put to the best possible use and thus ensure the largest possible production. How could this be achieved? By the state conducting a rational economy. In this way, too important a part of human labour would not be used for the production of goods intended for a minority as long as the essential needs of the people remained unsatisfied.

Private ownership of the means of production could in no way give the owner absolute disposal right, leadership, or operating rights. The means of production must serve the community. They exist for and through the community.

Irresponsible economic feudalism must therefore be abolished. The following production sectors, monopolies, and enterprises must be socialized: Electricity, coal mining, transports, insurance, and the production apparatus that worked for the needs of defence. The big credit banks should also be socialized.

The document also points out that it is the state that must establish the general production orientation. Therefore a plan should be drafted by an organ including representatives of "Organes de Direction Economique" and of the trade-union movement. This organ, "Assemblée Nationale Economique", did not establish the plan; this should be done by the political leaders of France and be guaranteed by production groups responsible to the state. Planning directives should be issued, and these should be imperative in those sectors important for French economy. In other sectors, it could be anticipated that private initiative could freely develop.

The continuation can be described as an economic Magna Charta. The document states that everybody should, for instance, have the right to devote themselves to any kind of occupation compatible with law and justice. The only prerequisite for employment would be the qualifications of the person involved.

Everybody should have a fair wage for his work. By insurances of various types, social risk cover should be available, whereby poverty should definitely disappear. The employees should also have an influence on operational and management affairs in their companies as well as on the economic policy. Part of the company profits should be allotted to the employees, either personally or through social institutions or measures of various kinds.

Workers should have the right to choose the trade union they wished to belong to, but only one organization should represent all trade unions to the state. This "national organization" should be completely independent. The representatives of the employees should always be appointed by the syndicates they represented.

Working conditions and related problems should be regulated by agreements between employers' organizations and workers. At disputes or when unity of action cannot be agreed upon, an obligatory conciliation should be imposed. It was expected that the employees should manage "les œuvres sociales" because these were intended for them. Mainly, this refers to workers, who thus had the possibility of making their influence felt in vital spheres.

The views about the problems we find in the finished version of "Projet de Charte Economique et Sociale" are very similar to those in the report previously referred to. We observe the strong position intended for the employees (the workers). The finished draft largely foreshadows the debate that much later would emerge in Europe.

6. The economic policy immediately after the liberation

Besides the deliberations and appraisals of the organization of the community just referred to, there are aspects of the economic policy that the French government should follow immediately after the liberation. In a document dated 8 August 1943, entitled "La politique économique française immédiatement après la libération",[1] the following principles were stated: Although it was believed that an allied invasion of France was relatively distant, it was already necessary to draw up the outlines of production and price and wage rates, not only in the long-term but also for the period immediately after the liberation. These matters could not be improvised. The successful accomplishment of the military operations on French soil depended on the country's economy functioning satisfactorily. It was feared that social unrest would arise in the country unless a careful check was kept on monetary value so that large groups of the community were not ruined. A severe price control was therefore judged a necessary ingredient in the economic policy to be pursued by the French state after the liberation.

It was believed that the economic situation in France at the liberation would be characterized by a distinct scarcity of goods which would depend only in part

on a decrease in production. It was presumed that the purchasing power would increase strongly, but not because of a greater money circulation. Big price differences were expected to arise, and a large gap would open up between prices and wages. There was also the possibility of a general feeling of freedom among the community when the Germans had departed, a feeling that perhaps could not always be curbed.

Information from Vichy supported the fact that the agricultural production was one-third less than in 1941 and industrial production two-fifths. This could only go worse. Agriculture suffered severely through shortage of fuel and fertilizer.

An extreme scarcity of goods existed in France, a situation that would worsen because produced goods and foodstuffs were not put into the general market but went to the black market. It was also presumed that the actual decline in production was unknown because, in all probability, the farmers declared less than they produced. The Germans had increased the official figures of grain production in order to obtain larger supplies; despite this, however, it was thought that the farmers had quite large stocks of foodstuffs that mostly went to the black market.

The country's entire purchasing power had increased since the period before the war due to the rise in wages. Moreover, the wages paid to French workers in Germany were in the main transferred to France. There was thus much to spend, but little to purchase on the general market. What was produced consisted largely of war material of various kinds, and of other products transferred to Germany. Thus not all French production benefited the homeland; instead, the country was drained of its resources. Because there was little to buy, savings accumulated. It was feared that when more goods became available the savings would be used and thus bring the country into inflation.

The cost of living was doubled (official prices) between 1939 and the beginning of 1941. In reality, prices should have risen much more; wages, on the other hand, only by 20 to 30 %. This means that the workers and part of the middle class were in considerably poorer circumstances. Despite rationing, workers, for economic reasons, could not buy their food rations. Industrialists, businessmen, and black marketeers were far better placed. It was therefore expected that demands would be made for more tolerable conditions for the populace. Big demands for increased wages from and including the liberation were anticipated. It was necessary, moreover, to introduce a severe price control that must be respected. To do this, a choice must be made between importing foodstuffs and breaking up the black market. It was emphasized that no social group should suffer or consider itself unjustly treated. This was judged especially important for a successful pursuance of the war. Naturally, the economic policy must be adapted to the situations that would prevail.

Objects important for the French economy after the liberation were listed in the following order:

a. Hoarding and black marketeering must cease.
b. The more flagrant results of German economic policy in France must be immediately set right.
c. Prices must remain stable to avoid serious social unrest that would follow inflation and to prevent a further worsening situation for the lower classes.
d. The working class had suffered much through the occupation and had been especially active in the fight for liberation; they must therefore have enough food after the liberation. Wages should be increased, but at the same time, a severe check must be kept on the monetary value. Hidden stocks of food must be put on the market.

The economic policy that must be followed should aim at allowing a moderate rise in prices of agricultural products. This should lessen hoarding and black marketeering. It was important for the new regime to gain the confidence of the farmers, whose main requirement was commodities, which they should get. The country's food supply should be safeguarded primarily by imports. Commodities needed for agriculture, such as parts of machinery, fertilizer, band, bags, &c. Production should benefit the public by natural channels, a suitable control mechanism should be created, commodity should be changed for commodity. The farmers would thereby be compelled to make suitable investments. It was advisable that their incomes were not put into securities. Price control and other suitable measures must also be resorted to. This policy ought to yield the desired results.

As pointed out, the wage question was serious in France during the occupation. Important groups of the community had had their economy destroyed. An increase in wages was inescapable. On the other hand, inflation must be avoided. The increase must thus not be too big. An immediate 20 % increase in wages was thought necessary. The prices of some consumer goods, such as soap, washing-powder, and clothing, should be reduced because of the import of raw material. The intention was also to reduce, in one way or another, the difference between wholesale and retail prices (state subsidy). Wage increases could thus be kept under control.

In the country, there was obviously a general desire to increase consumption. For years, they had been denied what in normal times were counted as necessities. Money was not lacking. Therefore the need for a strict price and rationing control immediately after liberation was recognized.

The memorandum referred to clearly shows the importance of the farmers and the farms during the immediate future. It indicates that the farmers would have some political influence during the periods after the liberation, when a political party would be created which, at first, gained some support from the farmers. Consideration for the farmers can also be noticed in some political statements, for instance, those by Thorez in the Communist party. It resulted from, among

other things, the consciousness of the necessity of getting the food supply system in the country to function during the process of rehabilitation.

Another document in the Blocq-Mascart collection predicts the economic planning in the postwar France. It is dated 24 August 1943 and entitled "Questionnaire sur la situation économique en France au moment de la libération et les mesures à prendre pour passer de l'économie de guerre à l'économie de paix."[2] The contents of the document suggest that it was written in Algiers by a committee related to Conseil National de la Libération (C.N.L.). The authors—or author—thought it necessary to draw up a rehabilitation plan for France after the liberation. The objectives should be that employment and the more important consumption needs of the public be secured. This plan should be formulated in collaboration between, on one hand, economists and other specialists in France, and on the other, the committee in Algiers and its experts. To be able to present such a plan, information about the situation in each industrial branch in France at the liberation was required. Knowledge of the available workers in each branch, the technical position of the French production apparatus, the need for products that must be imported, and so on, was required in order to take suitable measures for as painless as possible a transition to peacetime economy.

Only the experts in "le Comité de la Libération Nationale" were able to decide what commodities and what quantities could be obtained from the allies; they were the only ones who knew the economic planning of the allies. The duty of the committee should also be to issue directives concerning the economic structure to be raised in France after the enemy had gone.

Information was necessary about the production capacity of each branch, as well as about raw material requirements in order to make plans for production. The main features must be outlined within the branches. A draft must be made and the material sent to Algiers. The committee should thereafter study the documents and information it had been given. Thus it would be able to indicate whether the needs could be met, or whether the various branch plans agreed with what was envisaged in the Comité de la Libération Nationale. The plan, based on the supplied information, was meant to be continuously adjusted, i.e. up to the moment of starting, so that as far as possible it could respond to the prevailing situation.

The questionnaire shows that the producing sector, including the non-metaliferous mining industry, was referred to and that agriculture, transports, trade, and banking and insurance should be treated separately. Matters such as organization and financing of industry would not be raised at this stage; they must be dealt with later. The intention was that each branch should make two series of specifications: one showing the resources probably available to the industrial branches at liberation. This would also embrace information about the manpower then in Germany, which was expected to be reinstated immediately after they returned to France. The second series should cover the need for raw materials, fuel, and so on for the workers that could be employed. Three alternative times

for the liberation were suggested: towards the end of 1943, towards mid-1944, and towards the end of 1944. If the situation in the branches had in some way been changed, the committee would be informed of this and of the appraisal of the changed conditions. Thus it was expected to be over in about one year. This depended on a rapid reversal of the position. The general worldwide shortage was pointed out; it could only worsen with time. The local resources must be utilized, and the objective should be to keep the available labour force occupied. Other rearrangements because of shortage or supply of raw materials had to be solved in such a way that the regional or branch considerations were taken into account. Thereafter, it must be decided what was most suitable or what agreed with the ideas of the central leadership on mastering the situation. Production could not be regulated in detail during the first year after liberation. The needs were judged unlimited in all sectors. However, it was considered wise to make a general production plan based on a confrontation between the various production sectors. Thus a necessary general idea could be obtained, and those essential changes, for instance, the transfer of labour from one sector to another or in some other way, could be made. It was thought that the demand for iron and steel would be large from the consumer goods industry. Iron and steel production must therefore be expanded, labour must be transferred from some consumer goods branches or enterprises whose production was considered less essential in the prevailing circumstances.

Emphasis was laid on the need for continuously correcting the action plan, with the changed production conditions in mind. Industrial plants could be destroyed, labour could be put out of action or carried off. Those goods needed by the army for carrying out the liberation or judged, for other reasons, to have priority must come first. Examples of these were those that agriculture required for the rapid increase in food production. To co-ordinate all these measures, it was thought necessary to draw up a plan of action for the country's industry that should be valid for twelve months after the liberation, and a specification of the import needs arranged in order of priority.

After this explanation, a questionnaire followed with four main headings:

A. Available resources at the liberation
B. Production plans
C. Needs that must be met for full-time use of the labour
D. Hypothesis in view of the liberation.

Under *A,* questions were posed about the extent of the labour force, the length of working time, the number of workers who normally worked within the sector but who were now imprisoned in Germany, the condition of the machinery, what raw material resources were available, and so on. Under *B,* the possibilities of production and various conceivable alternatives, according to the judgement of

those questioned, were listed. *C* included, among other things, questions about available energy and how much raw materials would be needed during the first twelve months after liberation. Only one question lay under *D*:

What modifications do you consider called for if the liberation takes place a) towards the end of 1943, b) mid-1944, c) towards the end of 1944?

This detailed account shows much of what later was included in the French plan to have been outlined on this occasion, i.e. August 1943. North Africa was then liberated, and collaboration began between the French organs there and the resistance movement in France. Other material clarifies the conditions. A questionnaire concerned with the French State Railway Company, S.N.C.F., dated 8 September 1943, was received with the following demand:

Send a list of directors, chief engineers, and important engineers with information about present appointments and what is thought to be their present attitudes.[3]

Answers to these questions would form bases of how best to use the communication resources, for instance, at an invasion.

This is how detailed information was obtained about the prevailing organization. What was particularly desired were competent persons who could be entrusted with key positions in S.N.C.F.'s organization. Similar information was also required from other parts of the communication system: roads, ports, and waterways, according to preserved documents.[4]

7. Material made available by André Philip

During the war, André Philip was head of C.G.E., regarded as the research department of the resistance movement. However, he transferred this post to Henry Teitgen when General de Gaulle asked him to come over to London. From England, André Philip went to Algiers where he collaborated with Mendés France, Jean Monnet, and Jules Moch.[1]

The subjects of the discussions were the changes thought necessary for France and which concerned the structure of the country. André Philip has indicated that it was at these talks that Jean Monnet, who was a Liberal, changed over to "our camp" (Socialism).[2] We will therefore refer to and to some extent comment on the result of these discussions, which are to be found in a memorandum under the title "Reformes de Structure".[3] This was written in 1944, but before the liberation of France.

"REFORMES DE STRUCTURE"

It was established, to begin with, that the liberation of the country was only "le premier pas dans la voie de la libération totale...".[4] Now, rehabilitation and reconstruction would begin, in order to put France back into its place among the great nations. This rehabilitation and reconstruction should not only refer to material conditions, but also should have organizatory and social aspects.

A return to the Third Republic was unthinkable. The situation of the country in the 1930s was envisaged as: "... les faiblesses qu'elle comportait et les germes de corruption et de divisions intestines qui l'ont fait tomber comme un fruit mûr entre les mains de l'ennemie."[5] One continued: "Si nous devions connaître demain la même faiblesse de la démocratie en face des puissances économiques et financières, la même puissance des Banques capables, sous la menace du non-renouvellement des Bons du Trésor, d'assurer le retour au pouvoir de ceux qui ont été chassés par le suffrage universel, le même désordre économique avec les crises successives, le déséquilibre des prix, la généralisation du chômage, la constitution de cartels et de trusts freinant l'essor productif du pays pour maintenir leur monopole, notre victoire, désormais inutile, n'aurait aucune suite."[6] Therefore suitable structural reforms must be undertaken.

The economic reforms judged necessary and urgent were

1. to carry out a state controlled economy,
2. a shared influence by the workers on the operations of the companies,
3. socialization of the big basic industries.[7]

It said: "La direction de l'économie par l'état est tout d'abord pour la France une nécessité vitale, la condition absolue de son relèvement industriel et social."[8]

Apart from other factors, the food situation in France made state intervention necessary. The prevailing shortage situation demanded that the state determine the planning of agricultural production. Moreover, only the state could reach an agreement with the Allies to regulate the supply of foodstuffs and other necessities from outside. The agricultural programme contained, besides the need to transfer labour from the agrarian sector to other sectors, the following points: "il faut décourager la culture du blé sur les terres à prix de revient élevé, éviter de reconstituer certains vignobles du Midi abandonnés ces derniers temps, soutenir au contraire les progrès de l'élevage par la sélection des races et l'institution du Herd-Book obligatoire, organiser la production et la distribution du lait, encourager la culture des fruits, des légumes et des produits susceptibles de servir comme matières premières industrielles.

Le remembrement des terres devra être obligatoirement poursuivi, l'enseignement agricole généralisé à la campagne, l'action coopérative encouragée (jusques et y compris, dans certains cas, la constitution obligatoire de coopératives de travaux agricoles), les contrats de culture enfin favorisés par lesquels un groupe

de consommateurs des villes dirige la production agricole dans le sens de ses besoins."[9]

The rationalization programme for agriculture contains no items worthy of mention here. It concerns a number of measures necessary in an up-to-date oriented state. In some way, France does not seem to have been this, at this time. Otherwise, for instance, the enclosure conditions would not have been referred to, and so on, but we must remember that after World War II European agriculture entered a period of change. Here lay, and lie, considerable difficulties. A large part of the labour force must be transferred from the agrarian sector in France. Therefore new jobs must be created in new sectors. Where can these be located? Industry attracts industry. We must thus expect the new jobs to be located in the few but important industrial regions, whereas the remaining labour could only with difficulty find other work where they lived, and must be transferred to regions that already were facing housing problems. This is mentioned to indicate the course of the whole rehabilitation process so difficult to master.[10]

However, to proceed with our inventory of measures considered necessary to get the French social machinery to function satisfactorily. The distribution apparatus must be changed.[11] "La multiplication du nombre des intermédiaires, des petits détaillants en particulier, crée pour l'appareil productif une charge insupportable et fait obstacle au progrès de l'industrie."[12] Here, efforts must be made systematically to remove the large part of the population that were occupied in trade. This would take place by, among other things, the development of co-operative shops and stores (Prix unics) that would be nationalized. The condition of French industry was characterized: "Complètement épuisée, coupée depuis quatre ans de tout contact extérieur, ignorante des immenses progrès scientifiques et techniques réalisés à l'étranger..."[13] This is probably not altogether accurate, but the situation was serious. The biggest problem was to provide industry with necessary equipment. Without this, unemployment and destitution would be rife, and it was feared that there would be social restlessness, which was for many perhaps the most important reason for state intervention in the economy.[14]

The exposition continues by stating the necessity for the state itself to organize the supplies, both by production and imports, and also to be responsible for the distribution of goods essential for the industry. It must then be decided what should be given priority in production, and thus it was most fitting that an economic plan be created for the community. It says here: "Il faut... que l'Etat, conscient des nécessités de la renaissance nationale, établisse un plan général de répartition de tous les facteurs disponibles, éléments de la vie économique..."[15] Here, we have the planning thoughts outlined.

What was expected in many parts in the world after peace was declared was also feared in France, according to the memorandum: "Une brève période d'intense prospérité suivie d'un effondrement général de tous les cours..."[16] Therefore the French state ought to accept its responsibility and set the country's economy in order. The policy of full employment and the balance of the various production

factors should be aimed at.[17] It also says: "Du moment que l'on reconnait la nécessité de la planification, il n'y a plus de secteurs libres possibles, car aucun élément de l'économie ne saurait échapper au plan. La direction peut être réalisée par des méthodes plus ou moins souples. Certains secteurs peuvent être socialisés, d'autres dirigés, d'autres simplement contrôlés. Rien cependant ne saurait échapper à l'impulsion de l'autorité gouvernementale..."[18] It is the French growth policy that is sketched here, and France would be the country during the postwar period that, among the western countries, really would have such a growth policy.

We go further into the text of the memorandum in order to try to clarify the motives for the state intervention. There were three reasons for wanting to nationalize the big basic industries:

1. the nationalizations were easy to carry through. Germany had already obtained considerable interests in the French basic industries, and the French state merely had to take over these blocks of shares. There was also property that would be confiscated because of collaboration with the Germans. The French state would thus, after the liberation and after the end of the war, administer a considerable part of the apparatus of production;
2. the nationalizations were politically necessary. They must be carried out to soothe the opinion, disturbed by the French-German collaboration in industry. We can imagine the strong indignation of the French workers at a time when they were restless and perhaps faced with destitution;
3. It was desirable to pursue an active growth policy. "Dans une économie planifiée, certaines productions sont tellement essentielles, soit par leur importance même, soit par leur répercursion sur l'ensemble de la vie industrielle, que l'Etat doit assurer lui-même la direction s'il veut exercer un contrôle effectif sur l'ensemble des investissements." Therefore it was necessary for the state itself to lead the operation of "tous les moyens de transport, par terre, par mer ou par air, sur les mines, l'électricité, la sidérurgie, les produits chimiques, les assurances et les banques". By controlling these sectors, it would also be possible to control and put in order the rest of the French economy, it was calculated.[19]

How could the growth in the private sector of industry be influenced? This would be done with the aid of the general control of investments. On the whole, the state control immediately after the liberation would be rigidly concentrated on raw material distribution and price control. Thereafter, when production had gained ground, it would be possible to give the companies greater possibilities to take the initiative. The small enterprises and trade would be completely free. In those sectors where medium enterprises were usual, it would be possible to change over from directing to control. The text reads: "... passer peu à peu d'une direction effective à un simple contrôle des cadres généraux..." The state would always control: "les industries fabricant des produits — clés, tels que la petite sidérurgie,

les engrais, les matières colorantes, les combustibles, la meunerie, la soie artificielle, le papier-journal, le ciment."

PRACTICAL PROBLEMS

Naturally, it was a problem how to manage so many state enterprises. A central bureaucracy in any country is usually reputed to work slowly and in detail. This must be avoided. It was therefore decided to appoint a special organ led by a board of management, consisting of representatives for the workers, for the administrative personnel, and for the state. The board would appoint regional directors, who would see that the plan was carried out in their own regions. They would distribute the credits to the various enterprises and appoint local directors. These, in turn, would alone be responsible for the direct management of the enterprises, but would co-operate with the industrial council. These councils would only be consultative in function.[21]

It was also visualized that inspector generals could be appointed by the board. They would supervise the execution and application of the plan, as a whole. On the other hand, no director general should be appointed; the board would be responsible for the co-ordination. A director general, however, could in exceptional cases, i.e. if conflicts arose within the board, be appointed, but then only for a limited term. During this period, he would be responsible for all the functions of the board.[22]

The general control of the industry would be undertaken with the aid of about 40 trade associations. The head of a trade association should be appointed by the state and be provided with a title and salary high enough to set him above the business executives concerned. This official should in no way be allied with the industry he controlled, and he would be forbidden to accept any form of employment in the industries under his supervision.[23]

The branch prefect, if we can call him such (prefét professionel), would have at his disposal a consultative council composed of representatives of employers and workers. These, in turn, would be appointed from the most representative among the trade organizations. In a great many problems, for instance, those of routine nature and of less importance, this council would have the right of decision. Concerning the big decisions, quotas, production, and price policy, these would be made by the council director alone, who would have great authority.[24]

Freedom would, of course, be restored to trade unions. Industrial councils would be appointed to each company and would be competent to present proposals for improvements and to see that social laws and collective wage agreements were applied and followed. They could also serve as conciliation organs in the event of social disputes. The trade councils would also have the role of conciliation organs; they could, in fact, make general decisions concerning work-

ing conditions. When the trade council functioned as Labour Court, it would be provided with judges appointed by a Labour and Works council set up by the state and connected to the Ministry of Labour.[25]

The trade council, as long as scarcity existed, would also handle the distribution of raw material; when price control was required, it would submit price proposals to the responsible Minister. At the same time, the group would prevent the formation of ententes, cartels, and similar phenomena within the trade interest monopoly; the intention was to restrict or force fixed prices on to the consumers. The control and co-ordination of production would thus rest completely in the hands of the trade council and nobody else.[26]

A similar organization was visualized for agriculture. Every farmer would be free to join an organization, either co-operative or other. In the French "departement" (corresponding to a county) agriculture would be represented by a chamber of agriculture. This would include representatives elected by all the local groupings. This chamber would have sections for owners, leaseholders, smallholders, and other agricultural employees. A council would be formed for each type of production and be headed by a council director. The council would include representatives for the consumers and for the type of production involved, wine producers, grain producers, and so on. The final decision in production and price matters, similar to the industrial matters, would be taken by the council director alone.[27]

An agrarian representation was also visualized, provided with a permanent secretariat and having an annual conference, an agrarian parliament. Some seats here would be appointed by the regional chambers of agriculture, others by organizations representing independent farmers, leaseholders, farm workers, co-operatives, and so on.[28]

This was the organization! How could be made to function? How would it be possible to realize the direction of the industry? To ensure this, a Ministry of Commerce and Industry must be created. Its function would be to work out a plan and to see that the plan was put into execution. The plan would run over a number of years, essentially an election period. Charts and tables would be drawn up each year. Corrections to the long-term objectives would be made. In order to carry this out, the Minister of Commerce and Industry must have at his disposal The Institute of Economic Research[29] and The Institute of Foreign Affairs.[30] He would deal with price control and would have the right to co-ordinate, an essential if the state was to control economics. Each Minister involved would be responsible for the technical realization of his part of the plan. Finally, it was thought fitting that the Minister of Commerce and Industry should have at his disposal a consultative organ, The State Economic Council[31] with representatives for The Employers' Association, the employee organizations, The Central Organization of Trade, and so on. Only the government would be responsible for the plan and its realization. The political representation of the country made the final and supreme decision.[32]

OTHER REFORMS

Other policies were also important for France if, in the long-run, it was to become equal to the big neighbouring countries. The demographic course and the social conditions ought to be the same as obtained in these countries. Consequently the population policy, for instance, was important. It was feared that the birth-rate had been reduced because of two-million prisoners of war and deportees being absent from the country. Therefore immediate measures were required.

Attention should also be given to the alcoholic problems. Castles and large estates should be requisitioned for homes for sick infants. Sanatoriums should be founded; social medicine, developed; all employees should have regular medical examination paid for by National Health Insurance. Everyone doing the same work and getting the same wage should have the same standard of living, irrespective of the number of children. This meant child allowances. Healthy and modern housing should be given priority in the production plan.[33]

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

When production had got under way, care must be taken to ensure that employment remained stable. It is obvious that the basis for the discussions, although not actually put into words, was the depression of the 1930s and its consequences. One did not want to experience that again. The aim was to try for a steady economic development in the country. At first the state would urge on the investments so that the heavy industry was re-organized. Thereafter more caution would be exercised in order to obtain a balance between savings and investments, and between investments and the demand for consumer goods. A cheap money policy should also be pursued, as well as a distribution of the pressure of taxation, and a programme for public works would be drawn up to counterbalance the fluctuations in the economic situation. To ensure this, the French economy must be state directed. All industrial sectors would be embraced by the plan, but the guidance would be conducted with more or less flexibility. Some sectors could be socialized, others directed, still others, merely controlled. The government would head the leadership.

The worker influence should be increased within the productive apparatus, because of, among other things, the role this social category played within the resistance movement. They should have co-influence on all levels of administration. Otherwise, bureaucracy and specialists would dominate. They represented the middle class and could therefore be suspected of working to subordinate the state to the economic power factors. It should be the reverse.

8. Origin of the reform ideas

SOME INTERVIEWS

Some of those who acted as programme writers, thinkers, and debaters, during the period 1940—1945, were still alive twenty years later, and it was possible to contact a few of them to obtain their views and opinions about the questions dealt with here.

One question put to these persons was: Where did the economic ideas of the resistance movement originate? Daniel Mayer, who played a dominant role in S.F.I.O. said:

> Already during the popular front, nationalizations were carried out under Léon Blum. The railways then came under state control. Those nationalizations made after the 1939—1945 war came as no surprise to us as they had been on our programme for a long time. But there were many motives. In bourgeoisie quarters, there were those who wanted to penalize industry by means of nationalizations. The Renault Works, for instance, were confiscated for these reasons.
>
> S.F.I.O. and M.R.P. were the parties that enforced the nationalizations. But M.R.P. soon changed. It faced the choice of losing its voters or changing its position; it chose the latter . . .[1]

Daniel Mayer had the following to say concerning C.N.R.'s programme:

> Pièrre Villon (Communist) formulated one programme, Léon Blum another, which he made while in prison and which I presented. The main outlines came from S.F.I.O. The communists made changes that were more favourable to the bourgeoisie. This may seem strange, but it was their old tactics. Stalin intensely desired a second front. It was therefore in his interest for the French resistance movement to remain strong. The communists in France were therefore invited to collaborate with the republicans so that unity was assured. The communists consequently did the same during the war as in 1936, that is to say, following their usual tactics . . .[2]

What Daniel Mayer says in his remarks mainly applies to those sections of the thesis which refer to "Rapport sur la politique économique d'après-guerre".

The question concerning the origin of the economic ideas of the resistance movement was also put to Jules Moch, who said that Henri Teitgen had formulated this, and he had had nothing to do with it. In 1943, he fled from the country after having been imprisoned. However, he formulated other proposals concerning social conditions and the labour market. He made suggestions about, among other matters, Conseil Economique, which George Boris took with him when he went by secret route to London.

> Jules Moch posed the question: What lay to the credit of the resistance movement? The launching of ideas that were old and came from the Socialist Party. Already before the war, in 1937, we had nationalized: a) la Banque de France, b) the arms industries, c) the

arsenals and defence works, which supplied to the defence, for instance, Snecma, Nord-Aviation, Syd-Aviation, &c. . . .[3]

— Can it then be said that de Gaulle did not have much to do with nationalizations, or in any case, did not inspire them?

Jules Moch: . . .

De Gaulle had nothing whatever to do with this. Actually, he is not and never has been interested in economic matters . . . The economic ideas did not come from de Gaulle but from Teitgen . . .[4]

Jules Moch was anxious in the interview to emphasize that the resistance movement in the metropolis was independent in relation to de Gaulle in London, at least, before the joint operation of the various resistance groups in May 1943. London—or at least de Gaulle—has meant little to the economic ideas that later played so large a role in French domestic policy during the postwar period.

André Philip was interviewed on 12 November 1964 and replied as follows:

— Where did the economic ideas of the resistance movement come from?

— Quite early, small study committees were set up in that part of France not occupied by the Germans, in the free zone. The function of these study committees was to bolster up the morale in the country. I was the head of C.G.E. . . . We signed a declaration that we had formulated beforehand. All that stood in the declaration, we fulfilled after the war. The nationalizations were written in there. As a result of this manifesto, we introduced in France: a) industrial councils, b) nationalizations, c) the economic planning.[5]

— You soon came over to England and from there to Algiers. Had your activities there any importance for the way France's rehabilitation later came about?

— I sat in Algiers and discussed and co-operated with Mendés France, Jean Monnet, and Jules Moch. We tried to elicit a study of the structural reforms that we judged necessary for the future of the country. It can be asserted that Jean Monnet was liberal, but it was during these discussions that he changed over to our camp.[6]

— Can it be said that it was Jean Monnet who suggested the idea of the economic planning in France?

— This thought was born during our discussions. We came upon it together. Jean Monnet was accustomed to viewing things on a large scale. From the beginning he was located in London and provided France with necessities from England. Then he provided England with necessities from the U.S.A. In Algiers, he provided the French army with American material. The idea of an economic planning thus came into being as a result of our exchange of ideas and discussions. We had a considerable communication with the metropolis (France). It was a continuous exchange of thoughts and ideas. For instance, we sent over memoranda to Blocq-Mascart's organization, O.C.M.

The nationalization idea came from all quarters. My first contact was in Montpellier in 1941. I met René Courtin, who was liberal and belonged to the bourgeois milieu. René Courtin said then: "It is the bourgeoisie that has betrayed the country. We will therefore nationalize. The present generation of bourgeoisie deserves this." Courtin was an economist. He believed that it was no greater advantage, but a political necessity. "In fifteen years when a new bourgeoisie has emerged that is worthy, denationalization can be accomplished." It was, instead, the workers who adopted the dignified attitude.[7]

— Did the nationalizations introduced under Léon Blum inspire those nationalizations that came after the liberation in 1944?

— No, they did not. The railway companies had, of course, been nationalized in 1936—1937, but we were especially inspired by our discussions with the British Labour Party.[8]

We continue with our enquiries. At an interview on 8 October 1964, Maxime Blocq-Mascart said:

The communists were very brave. They thought for a long time that in the war against the Germans, they would take charge. It can be said that in their doctrines they put water in their wine, and we put wine in our water. I had friends who made great sacrifices in their attitude. One was very hostile to what happened before the war, but now one wanted to join forces against a common enemy. There were a maximum of 80,000 resistance fighters in the country.

We sought a joint programme. It was based on the idea of attacking what, during the war, was called the trusts. Even liberals, such as I am, supported these ideas, and we did this because we were negative in our attitude towards what had taken place in the country before the war. We wanted nationalization of what we call "Public services". It no longer concerned nationalizations of the arms industry, but direct intervention into the country's economic life . . .

The ideas of the resistance movement came to play a big role in the economic planning. For my own part, I am a supporter of an imperative plan. It should have been stated: "You can do as you like, but you must follow the plan's main course." However, one thing is certain, and that is that the economic planning played a bigger role as idea than the nationalizations. It was C.G.E. that was occupied with the preparatory studies. The European scheme has always been present, but now it advanced further.

In the resistance movement, we looked upon de Gaulle as a leader. Already in 1941, we followed him; even the communists did. But de Gaulle did nothing when finally he came into power. Thorez supported him; therefore the communists could not make a *coup d'état*. The presence of middle class elements in C.N.R. prevented this also.

It can be said that de Gaulle was a paradox. He created C.N.R. and introduced the parties into it. I was opposed to this. There were no longer any parties, but de Gaulle reinstated them. Then it finished in an open fight between de Gaulle and the parties, and seven months after the war ended, he relinquished the reins of government . . .[9]

Later, in the interview, Blocq-Mascart summarized:

The ideas of the resistance movement were certainly not common in France. The "left" took a step to the "right", and we took a step to the "left"; the inheritance from this period was the political ideas. A Catholic Party, M.R.P., was created around Bidault. He was a member of C.N.R., and it was said that he represented the Catholics, but what, in reality, he represented was nothing. But Bidault thought well, and was well regarded by the communists. I could not accept a communist as chief of C.N.R. They could not accept me. We agreed on a compromise candidate. That was Bidault . . .[10]

Blocq-Mascart's statements can speak for themselves. A summarizing comment is given further on.

François de Menthon also made himself available for an interview. He appeared

as one of the founders of C.G.E. and later played a politically prominent role as, among other things, Minister of Economics after the liberation.

François de Menthon:

> Nationalizations were introduced for political and not for economic reasons. C.N.R. prepared all this. Bidault was President. Laniel, who later became Prime Minister, accepted this programme for political reasons. The nationalizations particularly interested us. They came directly from C.N.R.'s programme, which the planification did not. C.N.R. included people from all quarters and factions of the community.
>
> I cannot at all recall whether the planification played any role as idea in the resistance movement. No, the economic programme was the nationalizations. We naturally wished the state to play a bigger role in the economy sector of the community, but discussions of whether the plan would be indicative or imperative . . . no, we never discussed that . . .[11]

Concerning the economic ideas, de Menthon wanted to point out that Keynes was hardly known in France at that time. His books were not even translated into French. The French economists were Keynes-inspired first after the war was over, that was de Menthon's opinion.[12] In "Rapport sur la politique économique", p. 93, however, Keynes name is mentioned. Therefore he was not altogether unknown. Actually, the policy he recommended in his public works was not unknown in France, because Germany and Italy had this on their programmes during the interwar years. Influence from these countries could also have affected the thinking in these matters.

François de Menthon, however, also stated:

> The Vichy government was allied to certain conservative powers. The reaction to this regime was the nationalizations. Some industrialists delivered war material to the Germans. Rightly or wrongly, one wanted to take revenge—during and after the war—on the capitalists, who had to take the blame for the disasters. Thus the nationalizations were introduced after the liberation in 1944, and nobody could prevent this.
>
> The nationalizations became a method of suppressing the capitalists to a much higher degree rather than a way to lead and expand the country. We wanted a new regime. We were tired of the old one that had led the country to ruin. We wanted an anticapitalistic regime. The nationalizations became a means to reduce the power of capitalism . . .[13]

These testimonies can be discussed, bearing in mind the long lapse of time since the events in question. Twenty years is quite a long time between occurrence and testimony; perhaps too long when it concerns bringing out clearly what actually happened. A person who has taken a direct part in these actions, however, can provide information about written primary material, and here we can obtain direct knowledge. If nothing else, the testimonies are an expression of the opinions of the interviewees in 1964, and of how they then interpreted what actually happened and the circumstances at those times. In 1964, de Gaulle was firmly established, and a bitter attitude towards the General could be found in some of those interviewed.

DE GAULLE'S ROLE

What role did de Gaulle play in the postwar period? It is perhaps too early to pose this question, but we can frame it in another way: What is the opinion of the reformists about de Gaulle and his importance for the economic and social reforms?

First, let us look at the material de Gaulle himself gave rise to. There is no doubt that General de Gaulle played an extremely important role for France in the political sphere during World War II. He left France in June 1940 for London. From here, and perhaps from other parts in the French empire, he wanted to continue the fight. Through this, and with time, he became a collective name. In November 1942, de Gaulle needed support from the socialist leader Léon Blum in order to demonstrate his position to the Western Powers. Léon Blum also gave his full support in a long letter intended for Churchill and Roosevelt.[14] In the political sphere, de Gaulle's role was, or became, important. But what was his role as re-organizer? Did he inspire the economic and social reforms?

It has already been stated that de Gaulle's ability in this sphere was less prominent. However, at regular intervals, he made various kinds of declarations; in these, we can follow his attitudes towards different matters.

To the Republic, which collapsed in July 1940, de Gaulle, in 1941, expressed his attitude thus:

> We know that the predominant part of France's citizens, which includes us, have definitely condemned decadent regime's anarchistic misuse with its governments that had economic advantages and privileges.[15]

This declaration perhaps provides some idea of the antagonisms that prevailed in the French community before 1939—1940. It also gives, or will give, an idea of de Gaulle's attitudes at the time of the declaration, perhaps of his disappointment after the military and political catastrophe. However, it should be borne in mind that political declarations are one thing, personal opinions can be another; this must be taken into account when judging the following. In November 1942, he mentions the trusts:

> France also knows what a rigid social and moral regime costs, where the fatherland is increasingly neglected by the exploiting masses, where it is betrayed by trusts and their agreements. France intends to undertake social and moral measures so that each individual will be able to live a life in dignity and safety, without monopolies and without being exploited.[16]

On 3 November 1943, he said—as already quoted—at the opening of Assemblée Consultative Provisoire:

> France wishes to end an economic regime within whose framework the country cannot share in its rich resources, where production and its distribution elude the control of the

country, where the companies reject influence from workers and staffs' organizations, upon which they are, none the less, completely dependent . . .[17]

To some extent, these pronouncements indicate an advanced view on these matters.

But de Gaulle, and the circle surrounding him, had continuous contacts with France.[18] The opinion forming in these circles, which in connexion with the liberation would re-organize France, influenced the French circles in London during these years.[19] André Philip, in his interview, gave the following account of the facts:

De Gaulle, who sat in London, was in the beginning right-wing and nationalist ... In France, the resistance movement took a swing to the left. They were socialists and Catholics ... That was the position in February 1942.[20]

Jouhaux, Vivier-Merle from C.G.T., and Brodier from C.F.T.C. wrote an appeal which was sent to de Gaulle in London with Christian Pineau. "If you read this over the radio on 1 May (1942), we will consider you as leader of the resistance movement." De Gaulle immediately answered "No". But when Pinneau was on the airfield to return to France, a messenger gave him the following note: "Yes, de Gaulle accepted and would read the communique." Thus this was the price for him to become leader. The speech was read over the radio, and two or three hours later, it was distributed into all letterboxes in the metropolitan area of Paris, Ile de France. Imagine the distribution apparatus that de Gaulle had at his disposal. It made a big impression.

Thus de Gaulle stayed on the fence, as he always does. In 1942, he took a step to the left; in 1943, to the right, with the assault of all military forces on Algiers. In 1944, when he saw how the wind was blowing, he went left again,

as André Philip said.[22]

Did de Gaulle lie behind the nationalization scheme or did he inspire it? We recall Jules Moch's answer that this was not the case. We again call attention to Blocq-Mascart's statement: We in the resistance movement considered de Gaulle to be a leader. As early as 1941, we followed him, even the communists did . . .[24]

De Gaulle thus was and became a leader, but a political leader. The more certain victory for the western allies became, the more far-seeing must de Gaulle's attitude and alternative be in the eyes of the general public. But he had many factors to take into account because he was a collective name. He must thus accept the reform programme. Daniel Mayer characterizes the liberation phase in the following way:

When de Gaulle came into power, he failed to make use of his position. He thought: Now I will do nothing in the way of reforms. Thereby, he would calm the conservatives and pilot the country through a sensitive transition stage. Why was de Gaulle accepted? There was nobody else. In France, there were anticommunists, antiHitlerists. De Gaulle spoke for everybody . . .[25]

André Philip, on another occasion, characterized General de Gaulle as follows:

He can very easily change his standpoint according to how opinion swings ... Take the Algeria question! He was brought into power to make Algeria French, but he quickly found

that that solution was not opportunistic. He swung with the opinion, to the indignation of those who had brought him to power . . .[26]

The political game up to de Gaulle's resignation in January 1946, we neither can, nor do we wish to, follow in this context. We are satisfied with establishing the disappointment of the reformists that the reforms were not carried out immediately after the liberation. Blocq-Mascart said that de Gaulle did nothing when he finally came into power.[27]

De Gaulle's wielding of power can have made the interviewees bitter. At the liberation in 1944, however, de Gaulle's position was strong and his prestige great. Proof of this is given in the following sections, which discuss the attitudes in the political parties immediately after France was liberated.[28] Supported by the presented testimonies, we must presume that de Gaulle was the recipient, rather than the originator, of the new economic and social ideas. On the other hand, there is talk of teamwork, where de Gaulle appears as a politically active factor, which perhaps contributed to the course being what it was. But let us once again quote Daniel Mayer: "Why was de Gaulle accepted? There was no other . . ."[29]

In the following, we further illustrate the origin and also the spreading of the social and economic ideas. We maintain that at the liberation it had been fully obvious what France's economic programme would be, at least, in broad outlines. What was the role of the political parties for the rehabilitation of France after 1944? To illustrate the question in more detail, we must study the internal material of the political parties from the period immediately after the liberation of France. However, it is apparent that Léon Blum played a role in the programme writing of C.N.R.[26] We therefore take a closer look at his contributions.

LEON BLUM'S ROLE

Léon Blum was the political leader of France during the initial phase of the Popular Front and also later. When France lost in 1940, the new leaders of the country under Petain wanted to finish with the past: the Riom process started, Léon Blum was prosecuted. He was accused of, among other things, having introduced a 40-hour working week, paid holidays, and the carrying out of the nationalization of the arms industries. All this, the prosecutor said, had reduced the efficiency of the defence.[30]

As head of the government, Blum had also, to quote the bill of indictment: shown weakness in the face of revolutionary agitation and had tolerated occupation and the neutralization of factories, which considerably lowered production.[31]

This process was discontinued at the beginning of April 1942. Blum remained in prison and was later brought to Germany to a notorious concentration camp there. At the beginning of May 1942, Léon Blum wrote a letter addressed to the

French in London. This letter was entrusted to a socialist deputy, Edouard Froment, who brought it to England. The letter begins: Nazi Germany will collapse, either militarily, politically, or economically. The occupied zone will revolt in connexion with—or without—an Anglo-American landing. The German occupation forces will be withdrawn, hunted down, or destroyed. What will happen in France at the liberation? Under which regime or authority will France lie? After these questions, Léon Blum presented a number of points that he considered incontrovertible:

That the Vichy regime would disappear; that a new government should be appointed immediately; that this government should be provisional, and that the citizens of France, by popular vote, should determine the new regime; that the interim government should be led by General de Gaulle.[32]

Léon Blum also stated in his letter that the parliamentary system had almost unanimously been condemned in France at the 1940 armistice, but that the Vichy regime introduced then had caused a further reaction. Therefore French opinion was now democratically oriented, that the people of the country undoubtedly wanted an active central power, but naturally, a controlled one. Léon Blum thereafter dealt with some political problems, for instance, the question of the communists. They showed great courage, but they asserted that they, and only they, had at their disposal an active organization. Blum thought that there were also others. Could the communists with their double solidarity become members of the government, he asked, and by that, he referred to a topical problem.[33]

Blum, moreover, explained that France fully understood that Europe—model Hitler—was nothing but an inexorable utilization of the conquered for supplying the military needs of the Axis Powers. France instinctively makes it clear to itself that the terms "new order", "European collaboration", "international organization" had been robbed of their significance by a veritable intellectual betrayal. France rejects collaboration with the warring Axis Powers. However, it is by an extensive collaboration between the states and the people that the large masses of the French people, and mainly the French workers, continue to expect a sure guarantee of peace.[34]

After this statement, which foreshadows the attitudes of the 1950s and 1960s, Blum returns to practical details: that General de Gaulle's coming into power should take place at once, that an agreement should be reached between him and those who were in the occupied and in the free zones and who were leading the resistance movement. He also discussed how the administration should be prepared for the coming situation, that the general election should wait until the prisoners of war returned, and so on. It was important that this election did not occur too early, as it did in 1848. It must not come too late, either, as had happened in the 1870 republic, Blum wrote.[34] Here, too, we can observe agreement with the material on which the present investigation rests.[35] Léon Blum's letters were a pattern, a general instruction for active Frenchmen in London, in the homeland, and in other parts.

Daniel Mayer was party secretary of S.F.I.O. when the party was forced underground, i.e. before the 1944 liberation.[36] After the liberation, he still held this post.[37] He has put himself at disposal for this investigation and, speaking of C.N.R.'s programme, said at an interview 9 October 1964: Pierre Villon (Communist) made up one programme; Léon Blum, another, which he made in prison and which I presented. The broad outlines came from S.F.I.O.[38]

We here refer to the document that Léon Blum dated 15 August 1942, intended for the French in London, and which Daniel Mayer and Captain Rolland brought to England.[39] It deals with political deliberations of the same type as those in previous documents. Another is dated 28 August 1942.[40] It is a memorandum intended for the French socialist leaders in London and in France. This mainly refers to the re-organization of the party, with closely-connected problems. It refers to the doctrine. Blum states: We have absolutely nothing to change concerning our socialistic doctrine.[41] We recall the antisocialistic and also the anticapitalistic attitude of the Vichy regime. All these sections in Blum's exposition we ignore in order to consider his attitude to the internal problems of France.

Speaking of these, Blum maintains: We must put the French economy on its feet.[42] Immediately after the war, such measures must be undertaken as are perpetually indicated in the socialist doctrine. The key industries, the credit system, the Exchange, and the distribution of raw material and essential foodstuffs cannot again be entrusted to private enterprise and free competition. The whole matter must be organized in a new manner, and this must replace the present system.[43] Blum also said that there were ready-prepared solutions at hand in the socialist portfolio.[44] The Socialist Party was thus favourably placed. It could take the initiative. Blum, however, thought that the party should not obtain advantages or give people reason to suspect that it sought such advantages.[45] He wrote that his wish was that the Socialist Party should try to create a programme that all can rally round. It should be a programme for immediate action. This programme should adopt two matters: 1) preparations for peace; 2) immediate arrangements for economic measures.[46]

The foregoing has shown that the objectives Blum presented here were followed. In other words, this is programme writing dated 28 August 1942 for what was to take place later. De Gaulle in London, we gather, was supported by Léon Blum.[47] De Gaulle, in turn, took part in realizing the thoughts Blum formulated in a French prison. Blum's correspondence with London continued through autumn/winter of 1942/43. In April 1943, Léon Blum was transferred to Buchenwald. Work along the lines drawn up by Léon Blum was undertaken in France, in Algiers, and in other places. The outcome of the war was even then obvious, which naturally contributed to a hastening of the development and the opinion grouping.

9. The international perspective

How did "Rapport sur la politique économique d'après-guerre" anticipate the shaping of the foreign policy during the postwar period?[1] Is the later political development already outlined in this early document, with the development of the concept of the European Coal and Steel Community and later, the Common Market? This does not seem to have been the case directly. However, it was obvious that there would be difficulties on the national plane in working out plans for the economic development. On page 10 in the report, it said: une économie planifiée rationnelle — si une telle économie est concevable — ne peut être réalisée qu'a l'échelle internationale. The question, however, is what was intended on that occasion: collaboration with the victors in the west or the continental powers or with any other constellation?

The big initiatives ought to be taken abroad, it was thought. "D'autre part, les diverses économies conserveront pendant plusieurs années un caractère assez étroitement national, en sorte que les plans visant à établir une organisation commune ne sauraient être prochainement mis en application" it also stated.[2]

France must guard its interests in international conferences and co-operate with other occupied countries. "Elle devra être ainsi présente pour assurer la défense de ses intérêts vitaux et pour éviter, dans toute la mesure du possible, la solution désespérée qui consisterait à se replier sur elle-même."[3]

It also stated "si l'économie française est appelée à s'intégrer à un vaste marché il ne saurait être question de faire repartir simultanément et sans discrimination tous les secteurs de l'activité nationale..."[4] This means that, if immediately after the war France should be integrated into a commercial block, for instance with England, the U.S.A. &c., the development and shaping of the French production apparatus would thereby be influenced. It can therefore be envisaged that this entire alternative was less attractive and actually opposed to the thinking within the resistance movement and in other quarters at this time, which aimed at a change and an expansion of the production structure so that it became, it would seem, similar to that in the large competing countries, for instance, Germany.

Precisely what role does Germany play in Rapport sur la politique économique d'après-guerre? The situation of Germany during the 1930s and World War II was characterized: "l'Allemagne, — — —, repliée sur elle-même a ressenti tous les inconvénients de l'autarcie qu'elle s'imposait, les ressources dont elle était privée ne pouvant être qu'incomplétement compensées par une coûteuse production nationale. Ainsi à été lancée la thèse de l'espace vitale qui autorise et justifie toutes les agressions et toutes les rapines."[5] The text continues: "l'Exploitation en commun des ressources du globe doit faire disparaître ces antagonismes. La constitution de vastes espaces économiques, ou même d'un seul marché, permettra à chacun d'accéder librement aux ressources du globe. La notion d'espace vital finit par se dissoudre dans celle de communauté universelle."[6]

Here it refers to real long-term perspectives. To achieve these, it must be

presumed that the production apparatuses in the various countries were adjusted to such collaboration, and we have seen, or suppose, that in, for instance, the French case the production apparatus must first be reorganized, and presumably this should take place in stages, just as the adjustment would to a market situation that was both from a geographical standpoint and in some other way bigger.

The report points out: "L'Allemagne, elle-même — — — a affirmé la nécessité de faire participer toutes les nations européennes à la constitution d'une économie continentale et, à l'époque où il lui était encore loisible d'afficher des ambitions africaines, se plaisait à affirmer que le continent noir serait exploité en commun par les nations européennes unies."[7]

Concerning the U.S.A., it says: "Depuis l'autre guerre, les Etats-Unis, riches en matières premières, forts de la puissance de leurs outillages, sûrs de leur technique se sont orientés dans des voies libérales. Ils recommandent aujourd'hui avec une autorité accrue, une extension des marchés qui leur sera d'autant plus profitable qu'ils pensent avoir moins à craindre la concurrence d'une Europe ruinée. Prenant dès aujourd'hui, l'initiative de conférences particulières, il est très vraisembable qu'ils chercheront à établir une organisation internationale de l'économie."[8]

This situation was anticipated in 1943. What could the consequences of these conditions be for France? It was judged that the victors would have a dominant influence "dans le développement des affaires et l'orientation de la politique".[9] Here, how France would be affected was an unknown factor. It is obvious therefore that the big international organizations whose founding was anticipated should work for equalization: "Des institutions internationales, loin de constituer des instruments d'hégémonie, doivent donc permettre d'équilibrer les forces en présence et d'éviter en toute hypothèse des décisions arbitraires."[10]

The report dealt with a number of standpoints regarding the organization of international trade under the headings: "l'extension du marché et ses conditions, l'intérêt militaire, l'intérêt économique, les limites à l'extension spatiale de l'économie, la technique de l'économie internationale" and so on.[11] Are there any elements in this section that point to the development which later arose in western Europe with the creation of the Coal and Steel Community and the Common Market? The answer is partly yes. There are arguments that suggest the advantages of a larger market.[12] If this came into being, the economic fluctuations would be less conspicuous, it was thought.[13] The big economic relations would also make it harder or impossible for any particular country or combination to finance a war.[14]

It is thus obvious that, as a member of a large market, France would have to wait until her production apparatus was expanded and had become suitable to compete with others.[15] But there were other motives. France was not indifferent to how Germany's future would be shaped. In an interview in 1964, André Philip referred to a conversation he had had with de Gaulle on Hampstead Heath during the war. He mentioned that, on this occasion, he had said that we in the resistance movement are not nationalists, we are not against the Germans, but we are

against Hitler. Henry Freynet had in his possession a paper that stated our aims: to create a united Europe. That was at the end of August 1942. André Philip also said there were Germans, Austrians, and Italians with us in the resistance movement, social democrats who had sought refuge in France. An Austrian socialist, Strasser, was a skiing instructor in the vicinity of Grenoble.[16] This is how André Philip judged the situation during the war in his retrospective glance in 1964. This picture could be completely accurate, but it is obvious that the attitudes to Germany were considerably more critical in places at this time. France was still at war with this nation.

Rapport sur la politique économique d'après-guerre reveals the attitude to Germany. It refers to Germany under the heading "Restitutions et Réparations". Was it thoughts of compensation and reparation? "La question des réparations sera reglée par une conférence interalliée devant laquelle la France sera appelée à soutenir ses intérêts légitimes", it said in the introduction.[17] The impression is that the writers of the report were not altogether clear about the political development in Europe after the war.[18] The wish of France was naturally to live under normal conditions and to have a peaceful and good relation with her neighbours, at least this might be the opinion held by the population. Some settlements must obviously be made with the Germans in order, for instance, to recover French property that had during the occupation been transferred to Germany.[19]

The report referred to the whole group of complexes: "Ce problème..., n'est pas uniquement technique. Un souci de justice et d'exemplarité porterait à accroître les charges imposées au peuple allemand, alors que, inversement, des considérations politiques pourront être invoquées en faveur d'un allègement. Tel serait le cas si l'une des préoccupations essentielles des alliés était de faciliter la tâche d'un gouvernement d'inspiration démocratique et de pousser le peuple allemand à collaborer loyalement avec ses voisins et à renoncer à toute idée de revanche. Pour les mêmes raisons, on peut penser également qu'il serait désirable de réduire à une courte période le règlement des réparations."[20]

According to the reasoning, the initiative here really belongs to the victors. In this situation, the question of Germany could not be dealt with strictly according to the wishes of France. It is perhaps not absolutely certain that France will be allowed to be present at a political settlement. Here it is clearly seen that, for instance, de Gaulle's mission in London was of the highest importance and that of necessity he must devote himself to political work. On the internal political front, he must work for unity and accept almost every solution, every proposal, or every grouping that led to this unity. Therefore he can be thought to have been prepared to accept the radical tendencies within the resistance movement. It is obvious that many considerations played a role here and complicated the course. However, we do not go deep into this reasoning, but establish that the report shows that France or its reporters in 1943 considered that there were rather small possibilities for influencing the direct fate of Germany.[21] The decision of

the victors had to be accepted. The advantages of creating big market relations were also recognized, but that, for France, was a reality that lay in the future, when production apparatus had expanded.

There are other sources that can give an idea about the attitude to Germany and her problems. In autumn 1943, a Free-French Parliament assembled in Algiers under the name l'Assemblée Consultative Provisoire and included, among others, representatives of the resistance movement, politicians, and representatives of the trade-union movement and the administration. The first session was held 4 November 1943.[22] France was liberated in 1944. The consultative assembly moved to the Luxemburg Palace in Paris. In spring 1945, some time before the war in Europe ended, the assembly discussed the future position of Germany.[23] The proposal to a resolution stated how impossible it was for France to reach a peaceful development with a neighbour who was more or less hostile in its attitude. Thoughts turned to similar problems faced during the interwar period. The German economy could then be used for military purposes; this must now be avoided. The measures undertaken, however, must not lead to German economy being ruined. If this happened, the risk would be "créer au centre de l'Europe, dans un pays industriel et peuplé, un centre de dépression économique et sociale, dont les peuples qui vivent sur ses bords, eux-mêmes déjà appauvris par la guerre, souffriraient les premiers...".[24]

The attitude towards Germany was defined in the resolution proposal in spring 1945 in eight points, among which were the following: that armaments factories were to be destroyed, that those enterprises able to produce war material in the future must not be created, that a certain number of blast-furnaces (haut-fourneaux) should be destroyed, that aero-engines must not be made, that Germany's research organs should be controlled, and that Germany's foreign assets should be confiscated, especially those in neutral countries.[25] There was also talk about a "constitution d'une entité économique dont les frontières seraient délimitées par les gisements de houille ou de minerai et par les installations industrielles existantes et dont la gestion à durée à determiner, serait assurée par un allié, plusieurs alliés ou un organisme international".[26]

The last point contained much that later came about. The other points were in parts difficult to realize, a fact that one was also conscious of.[27] However, the essential was that, in one way or another, France could control German industry. How this was to take place was not, as yet, defined.[28] It was risky for France to found a German-French satellite state. This could attract Alsace-Lorraine, which had just been regained. A number of problems were mentioned in connexion with the control of Germany, or parts of it: "On doit se demander qui administrera ce territoire. Sera-ce la France ? Sera-ce la France et un ou deux alliés ? Sera-ce un consortium international de toutes les nations ? Constituera-t-on une société à forme capitaliste intérieure dans le style de la Compagnie du Canal de Suez ? ——— Pour combien de temps et au profit de qui « cette entité » économique sera-t-elle constituée ? L'Allemagne pourra-t-elle profiter des bénéfices de cette

industrie ou bien servira-t-elle uniquement aux services des réparations des dommages causés aux alliés par l'Allemagne ?"[29]

We thus find that ideas, similar to those later submitted in connexion with the Coal and Steel Community, were suggested in the consultative assembly in 1945, and that these ideas were related to the concept of how the security of France's foreign policy could be assured. The committee that had investigated the problems and had framed the questions reported that it could not, and did not wish to, answer the questions, but remarked that it would be the responsibility of M. Maurice Schumann and M. Bennett to do so.[30]

Spreading of reform ideas after the liberation

10. Attitudes and opinions in the socialist party S.F.I.O.

PARTY CONGRESS IN NOVEMBER 1944

What opinions were held in S.F.I.O. about the sig social, economic, and political questions after the liberation? It is naturally difficult, so much later, to reconstruct the grouping of opinions in a large party. We must presume that the group of socialists who played a prominent role in the resistance movement in France or who had been active in Algiers and other places maintained and strengthened its influence. The official attitude of the party is easier to establish. It is shown by the party congress, the highest authority within the organization. As soon as possible after the liberation, S.F.I.O. summoned the congress. On 9 November 1944, the party secretary Daniel Mayer opened S.F.I.O.'s extraordinary party congress.[1] The general impression of this congress is that the ideological matters were scarcely discussed. This is naturally explained by the party's ideological outlook being fairly obvious contrary to that of M.R.P., which was a bourgeois party. André Philip also said:

> This congress is not called to discuss doctrinaire matters. Perhaps later, at the next congress, we can again discuss the party doctrine, define it, and present it to our people.[2]

The congress was more a meeting after difficult times during which one was forced to silence and apparent inactivity. It was a gathering where people could mix together and talk freely. The purpose of the congress seems largely to have been to encourage an interchange of views. It also aimed at consolidating the party apparatus.

The leading group in S.F.I.O. could be found mainly in the executive organ of the party. By a vote, 25 persons were elected members of it, called le Comité Directeur provisoire.[3] There we find such names as Vincent Auriol, Eric Bloucourt, Gaston Deferre, Salomon Grumbach, Gérard Jacquet, Daniel Mayer, Jules Moch, Naegelen, André Philip, Robert Verdier, and others.[4] At the same time, the party rejected those elements that failed to show the right attitude in July 1940.[5]

It is obvious that a great tension was engendered towards the party members who, in one or other way, supported the Vichy government. At the 1944 congress, a careful inventory was made of the attitudes and positions of the party members.[6] Thus those were listed who had the confidence of the party and had been

deported to Germany. This group included Léon Blum, Bedin, Biondi, Jordery, Lebas, Malroux, and Eugène Thomas. Max Lejeune also belonged to this group. He was a prisoner of war in Germany. Then followed a group of fortyfive names of those members of parliament who in 1940 voted against the proposition that Pétain be given absolute authority or who had, for urgent reasons, abstained from voting. This group contained such persons as Vincent Auriol, Pierre Block, Froment, André Philip, and Tellier, to name but a few.[7] Another group of about ten were acceptable from the party standpoint, despite their having voted yes or having abstained from voting. They had done big service to S.F.I.O. However, they were deprived of all positions of trust during an election period. About eighty members of parliament were completely excluded from the party. Among them were two senators. In some cases, no decision was reached because the person concerned was deported or for some other reasons.[8]

The congress material provides some information about the economic condition of the country. A congress member from Allier, Rougeron, explained, for instance, how his department was arranged:

> In two months, we have got a worker representation in the management in forty different places. They manage the absolutely largest factories.[9] ... We were forced to imprison the boards of the capitalistic companies and their directors, and we had the satisfaction of completely reaching our goals ... In each company of more than one-hundred workers, the trade union and the staff union each appointed a representative. These, in turn, appointed the Managing Director, who as usual was supervised by a Board, but he had roots in the company and in a joint department committee.[10] There was thus only one fundamental difference compared with before the change.[11] The Director was obliged to report weekly his own operation and that of the company.[12] This was one way of increasing production and it was successful.[13]

However, some companies had lost orders from the Paris companies.[14] Coal companies had refused to deliver fuel, banks had refused to give advance credits.[15] Crédit Lyonnais had explained that it was unable to advance money intended for wages.[16] Rougeron had intervened and telephoned to the bank director and had told him that if the money is not paid out within three quarters of an hour, he would be put into prison. The bank director had replied that the money would be sent at once. Rougeron concluded:

> You see, friends, that the method is not stupid, but I wish the baron in Paris had been spoken to in the same way. He is at the same time chairman of the board of directors in question, and a director in Crédit Lyonnais, which explains one thing or another ...[17]

This example was not perhaps universal, but the activity in Allier was described as an experiment studied by a special committee.[18]

The problems that are a pervading theme in the present study are illustrated by the congress material. Daniel Mayer, for instance, said that the party worked according to the ideas found in C.N.R. and around de Gaulle.[19] The party

programme was not exactly the same as that of C.N.R., but it was not far removed.[20] The proposals presented by S.F.I.O. were directly inspired non-socialistic programmes; they were given in Huiqhien's writings in 1919 and by the popular front in 1936.[21] The C.N.R. programme was not fully complete, Daniel Mayer said, there were gaps in it. Therefore S.F.I.O. must submit its own programme to mark its position.[22]

Vincent Auriol reported on the work in Algiers to the congress.[23] A consultative national assembly had almost been created in the big prisons in France.[24] The delegates were sent out of the country secretly "under the noses on the enemy".[25] The whole thing was the idea of André Philip and Felix Gouin.[26] This consultative national assembly was based in Algiers. Auriol also said:

> We submitted, to the assembly; a proposal that referred to the present but as a function of a complete plan aimed at a directed economy. This is based on nationalizations, on moral rehabilitation, and on social reconstruction within a national framework and in the international sphere.[27]

A commission of party groups led by Jules Moch had submitted a proposal which, *apart from a few formulations, exactly resembled that presented by the executive committee as a joint programme to the resistance movement and which served as basis for more vague and less daring programmes of the national resistance council.*[28] In the collaboration that took place in the assembly in Algiers between some representatives of the resistance movement, the communists, and the Auriol group, this was the position; we quote Auriol: the socialist delegation could animate and direct . . . the assembly in every special subject.[29]

Aurial also referred to the economic reforms demanded by the Popular Front committee in 1936.[30] Then we wanted structural reforms concerning the trusts, the credit system, and large nationalizations.[31] These proposals, however, were rejected by the radical party and by the communists.[32] The latter had thought that the question of nationalizations was raised too early, Auriol said.[33] Towards the end of his speech, he referred to the often mean attitude of the U.S.A. and England to France.[34] He made a few pronouncements here that are well worthy of observation: What! France was not acknowledged? France should not be a member of the European commissions? When all is said and done, it is we who introduced the economic and political plans.[35] He meant that peace should not merely be a political settlement; it should stand on European ground.[36] His opinion was that a Europe should be created of the type that was attempted during the 1950s and 1960s.[37] Was this prophecy or action programme delivered by one who would shortly become the President of the Republic for seven years?

The war was still not ended, but the exposition presented to the congress by Grumback, which referred to how the relations with Germany would be regulated after the war, expressed some appreciation of the Germans and of their culture.[38] This problem was strongly allied to the regulation of the internal economic life of France. Grumbach had the following proposals:

1. Total and prolonged military occupation of Germany.[39]
2. Supervision of German production.[40]
3. Breaking down of the power position of Prussia in Germany.[41]
4. Breaking down the power position of the German industrial trusts.[42]
5. No demand for indemnity from the Germans.[43]
6. Detention of German labour in those countries and districts that suffered war damage.[44]
7. Control for a long time into the future of the German school and educational system.[45]
8. Control of Germany's future foreign relations.[46]
9. No annexation of the Rhineland.[47]

Almost all these points were fulfilled. The military occupation of Germany has been prolonged, German production has been supervised and is now restricted by the agreements of the European Economic Community, Prussia's power position in Germany was broken down. Despite the fact that the territory in Germany is called "die Zone", it is considered as a Soviet satellite state. An attempt was made to reduce, for a time, the power position of the German industrial trusts. A new political situation changed the target in this sphere. German prisoners of war have had to carry out mine clearance in France, German technicians have been detained to serve in French industry, Germany's foreign relations are controlled by points and the arrangement of the European Economic Community. Finally, why was annexation of the Rhineland not desirable? It was due to the fact that a German minority was not wanted in France.[48] This could mean that the German-speaking districts that had existed in France for a long time could be attracted by the population in the new land acquisitions and become less loyal to the other parts of the French nation.[49]

THE PARTY CONGRESS IN AUGUST 1945.

The next party congress was held eight months later. During the time that had elapsed, the socialist group in the consultative national assembly had been active.[50] A whole series of proposals for resolutions had been submitted: Concerning the socialization of the credit system, the position of the coal mines, socialization of electric power, nationalization of insurance and of the mercantile marine, and war on the black marketeers.[51] Proposals for the creation of a social insurance in the country &c. had been submitted,[52] but the assembly was consultative, power lay higher up in the hands of the government. Socialists were members of the government. Comments must therefore be made at the congress concerning what the members of the government did or failed to do. We know from the foregoing that Daniel Mayer and Blocq-Mascart, in 1964, expressed their disappointment that the government of de Gaulle did not carry out the big reforms expected.[53]

At the evening session on 1 August 1945, Guy Mollet made a powerful speech attacking the government, mainly those members who belonged to S.F.I.O.[54] The next day, Mollet put forward a motion that was carried unanimously by Pas de Calais-federation; Jules Moch also agreed with this.[55] The motion said, among other things, that so far the following had taken place in France: incomplete justice, sabotaged purgings, the consultative assembly totally ignored, contempt for the indications expressed by the result of the municipal elections, the promises of nationalization of gas, electricity, &c. unfulfilled.[56] The motion also invited the party executives to contact the Prime Minister immediately about these matters and also the question of the future elections, an essential point in the context.[57] Guy Mollet had become dangerous, perhaps not to the S.F.I.O. members of the government—they were probably loyal to the party and worked for it—but to Premier de Gaulle and to his desire for a wide governmental basis. A few days later, Guy Mollet again appeared and spoke of the pressures he had been subjected to in order to moderate the criticism he had made. He persisted in his opinion and read his motion containing, among others, the words: The congress recommends that the members of the party who are also members of the government resign immediately.[58]

To judge from the methods used to thwart Guy Mollet's project at the congress, his initiative was considered dangerous. The heavy artillery consisted of Daniel Mayer and Léon Blum.[59] After their statements, a vote was taken.[60] This opposed Mollet's proposal with a big majority.[61] The entire matter was really a tactical one. As we have already seen, Blum perhaps arranged the tactics so that the elections would occur at a time convenient for S.F.I.O. and less suitable for the communists, but there were certainly other reasons also.[62]

The big discussions can be followed in the stenographic material, but extensive work was also carried out in the committees of whose proceedings no records were kept; at least, so S.F.I.O. states. Despite its relatively large membership, it is impossible to avoid the feeling of a small active group, a governing camarilla, within S.F.I.O. who cleverly managed the party congress and its functions. But there is and must always be a leading clique in any kind of organization if it is to survive. During World War II, S.F.I.O. had undergone a crisis. We were few who believed in 1940 and 1941 that it would be possible to reconstruct our party, Léon Blum said, to take an isolated example from the transactions.[63] But politically, the situation was altogether different a few years later. A series of political executions, where the executioner Daniel Mayer's hand did not appreciably tremble, took place as a necessary stage in the party's renewal.[64] Mayer possibly feared another development in the party if other powers became permanent. However, if the axe fell, the position of those who had voted correctly in 1940 was consolidated.

The president's final speech indicates the atmosphere in the party at this juncture. He said that the atmosphere at this congress was in strong contrast to what was customary before the war.[65] This was followed by vigorous applause.[66]

These conditions were fairly natural. In 1945, the future was hopeful; some years earlier, the position offered anxiety and fear. To vote according to party lines or according to personal conviction was a much discussed problem after the war.[67] The answer was to follow the directives of the party executives.[68]

The 1945 party congress had two images: Léon Blum and General de Gaulle. Innumerable compliments were paid to these two during this congress.[69] None the less, some reservations were entertained regarding the latter,[70] but Daniel Mayer did not hesitate to call himself a Gaullist, by which he meant that he supported the resistance idea advocated by de Gaulle in his appeals from London since summer 1940.[71]

Why did de Gaulle hold such a strong position in France in 1945? One of the many reasons, apart from the gratitude of the nation, was that France lacked traditional institutions, such as the Crown and Parliament were in England.[72] De Gaulle was all there was to rally round.[73] There was no President, nor was there any decision-making national assembly. This situation was not to last very long, but that is how things stood in August 1945, when S.F.I.O. party congress, nationalization matters, and the economic reforms were of current interest.

What, then, was S.F.I.O.'s programme in summer 1945? A single sovereign and directly elected national assembly was first and foremost an essential.[74] S.F.I.O. also thought that it might have its economic programme written into the constitution.[75] The new national assembly must co-ordinate the production.[76] Private monopolies must be abolished in the more important branches of industrial life and be replaced by nationally controlled productive units.[77] The following sectors would be involved: electricity production, raw materials, fertilizers, transports, chemicals, and above all the banking system including insurance.[78] All these were included under the heading la charte économique.[79] There was also a charte politique, which referred to the future political institutions and the organization of administration.[80]

These were the objectives, but what was it possible to carry out? Despite this ambitious programme, approved by the congress, there were already points that must be renounced, for instance the banks.[81] We have discussed the opposition manifestation. The weakness of the socialist parties can be seen in the fact that they could not, or perhaps did not wish to, reach the target that would give them the highest control of economic life in France, control of the banks.[82] In the foregoing, we have concentrated on the German question because it is intimately associated with the French rehabilitation and future plans. What about Germany? Its heavy industry must be socialized and controlled by the European nations.[83] The big estates must be split up.[84] The administration must be decentralized, war trials begun, humanizing and pacifying through teaching and the press.[85] The resolution warned against one thing, the German thought of revenge, which would be given fuel by the splitting up of the country and by having to surrender specially German territories.[86] In the congress material, it can be read that Vincent Auriol and Jules Moch had participated to a considerable extent in

creating the broad outlines.[87] But in all probability there were more collaborators.[88] The present study, however, does not pursue this question. From the material so far reported, it can be presumed that Léon Blum had provided the guiding principles for the political actions in France at the mid-1940s.[89] These principles, distributed to London and other centres, led to the creation of C.N.R. and its economic, social, and political programme. The ideas were worked out by many, but it is surprising to see how firmly Blum's ideas were followed. It has been denied by André Philip that the nationalizations by the Popular Front should have inspired the economic changes in France after the liberation.[90] In a way, he was perhaps right, because the French people did not feel inspired by this regime. Léon Blum, however, introduced his old ideas, which were actually the old socialist ideas. He tried to apply them during the Popular Front and on the next occasion that his influence could make itself felt, i.e. at the mid-1940s. This does not exclude patriotic and other reasons. In 1942, he made an appraisal, guided by the facts to hand; this proved correct to a large extent.

11. Attitudes in economic and social matters with associated problems in Mouvement Républicain Populaire (M.R.P.) immediately after the liberation in 1944

M.R.P. was reorganized at the liberation.[1] It was formed around Bidault, de Menthon, and Teitgen and had the support of the church.[2] France is Catholic, and the church organization has contacts with all groups in the community, an excellent prerequisite for the creation of a new party. Which groups supported the party? An indication of this can be found in the composition of the representatives at the 1947 party congress. They represented twenty-five occupational categories, listed below in a few main groups:[3]

Workers	17
Craftsmen	4
Trade representatives	99
Farmers	29
Officials in state and private administration	65
S.N.C.F. (French State Railways)	12
Persons with academic or similar training	93
Non-determined professions	38
Total	357

Thus we find that those representing the party at the congress in 1947 belonged mainly to the middle class. The workers are poorly represented. This can naturally be due to economic reasons. A journey to the capital was perhaps expensive for a worker. As seen in the following, M.R.P. was a middle class party, as was well known. In 1964, many years after the 1944 and 1945 party congresses, a spokesman for the party defined its situation: We try to have workers on our left flank and certain industrialists on the right flank, but we are not a labour party. In one way, we are not far removed from the German C.D.U., but naturally, we are different.[4] Earlier, we heard one of M.R.P.'s representatives, François de Menthon, give his opinion of the preparatory works during the war.[5] He was Minister of Economics in de Gaulle's cabinet that functioned immediately after the liberation. Another former cabinet Minister, Robert Buron, speaking in 1964, expressed his views on M.R.P. and its functions.[6]

Robert Buron:

After the end of the war, we had three important problems in France: 1) The plan. 2) Rehabilitation. 3) The question of Europe. In M.R.P. at that time we were in favour of economic control by the state. Our voters came from the middle class and the farmers. They liked the ideas, but fundamentally they were opposed to the terms. A farmer is against everything in the form of socialization and state intervention; he walks safely on his land. Nobody interferes with him, but at the same time, he is quite satisfied if the state has a strong position to protect him against lowering of the prices of his products. They were thus not averse to our ideas, but at the same time, they were reserved on the question of controlling the economy. However, at the beginning of the period, state interventions were necessary; after 1951 and 1952, these things were no longer popular and M.R.P. lost some of its electors. The bourgeoisie, the farmers, and the Christian workers are and were thus our basis.

When I was Minister of Economics, I entered into a dispute with Dr Erhard, who later became German Chancellor. He considered that all progress rested on finance. It is possible that he thus created the German miracle, but we consider that Erhard's thinking was shocking. Our directing, however, was a thorn in the flesh of our voters; when the situation became more normal, that, among other things, was why M.R.P. lost its positions. On the other hand, control was needed after the war, mainly so that private industry could not take advantage from the situation. We therefore carried through the nationalizations. Personally, I was, and am, a supporter of such ideas; in France, we must protect our industry against foreign competition. I belong to that flank in our party, Lecanuet belongs to the other.

The other big idea we had was: how to get industrial production on its feet and according to the lines formulated. Pfimlin was more liberal than I was. He sided with the agricultural plan, I took charge of the general propaganda. Information was necessary. Investments were needed, but in the right place. We spoke of intelligent investments and the investment of intelligence. By that, we meant that people should be educated: skilled workers, foreman, engineers, and other technicians, who would then be spread across the country. With the times, we modified our programme. Direction was transferred to the planification through the struggle for productivity. The necessity for investments was generally agreed upon.

Now we come to the European question. How would this be realized according to our ideas in M.R.P.? In 1949, these questions were being discussed in O.E.E.C. The liberal Anglo-Saxons then said: "Lower the tariffs and all will come out well; form a common market." I and our party replied: "No, we cannot do that. Our industry is too vulnerable."

In 1952 and 1953, I was *for* Europe, but I wanted to protect our industry, I was a so-called nationalist. The whole thing was gradually solved by progresses of our industry under the direction of the Plan. However, the position in this matter still persists. M.R.P. has maintained its stand, but naturally there are different attitudes in the party. I represent the standpoint I have already declared. Lecanuet is probably more liberal than I am, he is on the other flank.

— Who introduced the thought of nationalization?

— Pierre-Henri Teitgen in C.N.E. ... It must have been at an earlier stage or during the middle of the war. It was Teitgen who was the director. He and representatives of other parties included in the group. Concerning these interventions in industry, l'école dirigiste was created. We tried to collaborate with the socialists, but I find the socialists to be a little bit too conservative in France. Economy must be controlled with the aid of a price policy.

— What role did the trade-union movements play during the period after the war?

— They played a big role, but unfortunately their views were resticted. Well, perhaps a few leaders had vision, but in general, it was lacking ...

— ... Can it be said that the common market and its associated problems is a stage in France's security system against Germany?

— I understand quite well what you want to say. I believe that Robert Schuman thought it to be the only way it was possible to permanently agree with the Germans. It was necessary to remove all misunderstandings ...

— I have seen that the iron-ore syndicate has said: This, with the canalizing of the Moselle, is an excellent idea, but why were we not asked. Is it the administration that has introduced this matter?

— It is very difficult to say whether it is one or the other power that directs the economic life. It refers to a complex of powers that are always present concerning whether it is state controlled enterprises or others. They are always present. Louis Armand, who was head of the Railway Company, was the chief opponent to the canalizing of the Moselle. It was not profitable to the interests he represented. To protect itself, this Company's attitude became even severer.

— What role did General de Gaulle play in the nationalizations after the war ended?

— A big role. He wholeheartedly approved of the ideas presented by C.N.E., and he also carried them through. With time, however, he crossed over to a liberal view. Nowadays, he gives the capitalist interests a free rope.

...

That is how Buron saw the events. What attitudes were reported in the party immediately after the liberation? Before dealing with that matter, we will mention that earlier the party called itself Mouvement de la Liberation, and that after the liberation the name was changed to Mouvement Républicain Populaire. This organization was summoned to a conference that was held in November 1944.[7] The work that preceded the conference, or perhaps we should call it the congress, points to a strong wish of the organizers in Paris to control the movement from its inception and to take over the leadership.[8]

THE 1944 PARTY CONGRESS WITHIN M.R.P.

The leading persons at the 1944 party congress could be found in the party's executive committee. Here, we find two categories of members: "les membres de

droit" and "les membres élus". To the first category belonged Georges Bidault, P. H. Teitgen, François de Menthon, André Colin, and André Pairault.[9] To the second, belonged among others, Mlle Lamblin, Robert Lecour, Jean Letourneau, Fransique Guy, Fernand Bouxon, Louis Bour, Max André, and André Debray.[10] Maurice Schumann also held an important position in the organization. He was for a number of years spokesman for "France Combattante" and immediately after the liberation, and later, for these and other reasons, enjoyed great prestige.[11]

Bidault, Teitgen, de Menthon are names we are familiar with in connexion with the French resistance movement.[12] Blocq-Mascart characterized Bidault within C.N.R. as one with an excellent brain.[13] After the liberation, Bidault and others formed a party which quickly gained millions of votes.[14]

The party thus gained a big hearing in the French postwar community. Why was this? One reason must have been that the party was associated with the resistance movement and its new ideas. Obviously, it fulfilled the need for something new in the political arena. Teitgen, who is often mentioned as one of the originators of C.N.R.'s programme was Minister of Information in November 1944 in de Gaulle's Cabinet. In a speech to the congress, he outlined the policy the new party should follow.[15] According to the stenographic minutes, his speech was received with hearty applause.[16] However, at the same time, the assembly was faced with a government programme that should be carried through, an accomplishment that nobody could prevent.[17]

Teitgen's points were, briefly: The position of the state must be strengthened, the trusts must disappear, and considerable nationalization must be carried out; this referred to the mining sector, the electricity sector, insurance and banking.[18] Concerning the companies, the change would mean that owner-directors and those of a similar category and standing were removed from the management of the companies and replaced by salaried non-owners in leading positions. Other employees were unaffected by changes apart from the fact that they now, as Teitgen expressed it, would work for the interests of the country instead of those of a family.[19] Teitgen's speech was rather violent and took the form of a settlement with the economic ideals of the past, ideals which, he asserted, were no longer practical.[20]

Twelve were appointed by the congress to work out a manifesto, among other matters. The following persons were included in this committee: de Menthon, Schuman, Robichez, Janton, and Bacon.[21] A proposal for a manifesto was later read in the assembly. It contained the following main points: A revolution within legal bounds was desired, as well as a change in general opinion. A new constitution was wanted. A republic where the people had control and where the position of the individual was guaranteed, at the same time as the central authority was strong, was also necessary. What was envisaged was an industry controlled by the state and a restricted authority for banks, insurance companies, monopolies, and so on. All social groups should take part in the rehabilitation. Both new lines and old French traditions should be followed in this work. Moreover, a new

educational system, based on democratic principles, should be organized.[22] All these points show the proximity to the socialistic proposition, earlier discussed in fuller detail and put at the disposal of André Philip.[23]

These were matters that concerned domestic policy. The principles for foreign policy were outlined by Teitgen as follows: One of the most important matters for the future was to avoid a war with Germany. How could this be accomplished? German territory was not necessarily wanted, but a military and economic occupation of Germany should take place.[24] Teitgen also said that it was possible for some parts of Germany to attain an autonomous position for a time.[25] It could also be thought that some parts of the German population would perhaps want to attach their territory to France.[26]

This latter view was not completely unrealistic. In fact, we can see that the attitude to Germany, despite the war not yet being over, was fairly moderate.[27] In the propaganda material spread by the party across France after the conference, it said, referring to foreign policy, that it was necessary to clarify the situation of Germany in the future, but that it was difficult to say how this would take place.[28] No annexation against the will of the population should be carried out.[29] But it was possible that a military and an economic occupation, as well as a demilitarization, should take place.[30] Perhaps a combination of these phenomena could be achieved.[31] We suspect behind these words the future arrangements: the European Coal and Steel Community, with its later extension into the European Economic Community.

Was there no opposition at this conference in November 1944? The authority of the leading group was great for a number of reasons, among others, because of the general trend of affairs in France. The leaders were, moreover, represented on the highest level; actually, the party was not new. The scope for an active opposition might therefore not have been especially large. Despite this, there was an opposition. The manifesto just referred to found, for instance, one speaker talking too generally: We are all inspired by Christianity, but let us go a step further than the Marxists, he said.[32] A few were disturbed by the stipulations concerning the union membership of the farmers. One of them called attention to the effect this could have on the future election.[33] Another posed the question: What is the new interpretation of the concept private property? What does the phrase "un nouvel aménagement de la propriété" mean? This must be clarified if we do not wish to be regarded as complete Marxists.[34] However, he was reassured by the chairman on this point.[35] Finally, Teitgen took the floor again. The points that were discussed were in the main the processes against the co-ordinators, the crusade against the black market, the fight against the big trusts, the future elections, and the rehabilitation of the country.[36] The speech closed with admiring words about the head of the government, General de Gaulle.[37] The minutes record that the delegates rose and applauded loud and long.[38] Teitgen's big guns were thus well supplied with ammunition, and he shot well and truly. However, it cannot be denied that there were already now those who thought that the

socialist garment fitted them badly.[39] The party's propagandists presented the organization, after the conference, with phrases similar to the following: it was new, it was magnificent, it was created for various social groups, "c'est pourquoi il se dit populaire".[40] Who would be followed in June 1940, Petain or de Gaulle? It soon became obvious that it would be de Gaulle, Maurice Guerin wrote, and continued that a group was formed around George Bidault consisting of Teitgen, François de Menthon, Stanislas Furnet, Alphons Juge, and a few others. All in the group were positive that they wanted to form a new party, that they wanted to create something completely new (du vrai neuf).[41] C.N.R.'s programme thus was the basis of M.R.P.'s policy.[42] The leading section in the party was convinced that in this way France would be renewed economically, socially, and politically; support for this was obviously gained from the members of the congress. Bidault, de Menthon, and Teitgen seemed to be the most important names in the organization, at least as far as initiative and ideas were concerned.[43] They were also put on a level with the government in connexion with the liberation.[44] When the November 1944 conference was in progress, the political situation in France was still obscure. A general election was not so far wanted, despite the country having been free for several months. This was because millions of Frenchmen were still in Germany as prisoners of war or as forced labour.[45] They should also have the right to make their voices heard.[46]

THE 1945 PARTY CONGRESS WITHIN M.R.P.

The election was held in October 1945.[47] It gave M.R.P. more than 4.5-million votes.[48] The party was thus a factor to reckon with in French politics. The economic and social ideas of the resistance movement, which were not at first generally embraced by the French community during the war, but only by a small group, could now be introduced and completely or partly realized.[49] Who were the leaders of M.R.P. in 1945 and 1946? This can partly be seen from the lists of the persons who were included in the party executive committee.[50] Here are found Robert Schuman, Lamasse, George Bidault, Teitgen, François de Menthon, Paul Coste-Floret, Max André, Paul Bacon, Robert Buron, Maurice Schumann, and others, representatives of the government, the parliamentary group, the regional interests, and so on.[51]

The big speeches at the beginning of the congress were given in rather general terms. Ideological questions were not particularly referred to. It is obvious why. The party already had its positions. The assembly did not need to be prepared in advance for the new and revolutionary ideas. The uncertain future had been changed into big electoral successes, effectiveness, and influence.

André Colin's speech to the congress is of great interest.[52] He considered that the nationalizations as they were expressed in 1945 were part of the necessary

forms that would bring about economic changes in France.[53] Max André describes M.R.P.'s position in the nationalization question explicitly in the report about the party's economic and financial policies.[54] The state, for instance, should not intervene in the affairs of nationalized banks. These would work as before. High officials should not be placed in the nationalized companies. The shares in these companies would not necessarily become valueless. The whole thing was planned so as to act against the big trusts that were thought not to have worked for the general good. Control of the credit system would enable the state to have an instrument for financing production and exports, and would ensure that workers and staff would be able to take part in operating the companies and share in the profits.[55]

The objectives in the foreign policy had not been changed since the 1944 conference. A friendly relation with Germany and Italy was desirable.[56] There was no talk of annexations of German territory; what must be avoided was to leave Prussia in a leading position in Germany.[57] There were also resources in Germany that ought to be used, not merely by the Germans.[58] The Ruhr should be controlled in one way or another.[59] Belgium's and Holland's interests here agreed with those of France.[60] It was also said that the Saar was of great interest to France.[61] About this, it was said, among other things: We believe that the lawyers will find a formula that will result in the resources of this territory being set at the disposal of the French economy.[62] It could be queried what resources. It must have mainly referred to coal. These supplies of energy would serve the French industrial reconstruction. The Ruhr could also be thought to figure in this context. Thus we see a French policy taking shape, a policy that must work with neighbouring countries and in a friendly spirit if permanent results were to be achieved in the long run. The French foreign policy depended on the economic objectives in the country. As shown in the interview with Robert Buron and diagrams, France—or rather, the French industry—was far from being prepared to compete with foreign countries in its own markets.[63] Therefore the control of the sources of energy were first essential.

What was revealed by the discussions at the 1945 M.R.P. congress? The minutes show that there was some uncertainty in the party concerning the question of doctrine.[64] What kind of party was it? What was the answer when people asked?[65] Max André in his answer said something that can be interpreted as a return to freer conditions in industry coming about as soon as circumstances permitted.[66]

There were those whose opinion was that a stand should be taken on the question of the liberal capitalistic system, but a warning was sounded by a M. Daly who warned: Look out! C.G.T. or parts of the organization will go further with these nationalizations. They think that there must be some kind of centralization.[67]

12. The attitudes and the atmosphere in the republican, radical, and radical-socialist party after the liberation

This party, which for the sake of simplicity we call the Radical-Socialist, at the so-called small party congress in December 1944, took a less strict view than did S.F.I.O. of the attitudes in the national assembly in July 1940, when Petain was given power.[1] In S.F.I.O., a yes-vote for Petain in 1940 meant expulsion from the party four years later, no matter what merit had been earned during the dark days that ensued.[2] The Radical-Socialist party in this matter took a less strict view. This probably had a reason, although it was not obvious from the congress debate 21 December 1944. Perhaps the Radical-Socialist party could not afford to follow the line of S.F.I.O. because of its numbers. We recall the big majority that had voted for the proposition in July 1940.[3] The Radical-Socialist congress, however, resulted in extensive banishments from the party.[5] A purging commission, appointed by the congress at that time, investigated fifty-three cases.[5] Of these, thirty-four persons were expelled and two suspended for four years.[6] Those expelled included thirteen senators, others were members of the Chamber of Deputies.[7] The decision regarding one was postponed; this concerned a senator who was deported to Germany and whose case would be reviewed after the end of the war.[8] The decision about the solution of the entire purging question was unanimous, apart from three no-votes.[9] To judge by the minutes, the atmosphere at the Radical-Socialist congress seems to have been more nervous than that at the S.F.I.O.'s party congress. The leading clique in the Radical-Socialist party does not seem to have lost its position during the congress, thanks to the general secretary Mazé's energetic defence, in which he employed all conceivable arguments and a series of emotions.[10] Mazé's opinion was obviously that it would be best to await a more favourable time before appointing the party executives.[11] The country was still at war, parts of it were occupied by the enemy, and many Frenchmen had been deported to Germany. The same reasons that led to the country being given a provisional government headed by de Gaulle thus led to a similar arrangement, a provisional executive, for the Radical-Socialist party.[12] An examination of the congress material, however, gives the impression that the general secretary tried to disguise this matter.

The 1944 Radical-Socialist party congress did not differ from other party congresses held at the same time in France. Big problems were discussed, the struggle for power, the purgings, the ovations for de Gaulle and for some of the big men of the party also took place;[13] all this is to be found in S.F.I.O. and M.R.P.[14] The economic and political ideas that were introduced resembled those of the just-mentioned parties, although the concept of the economic ideal society differed somewhat.[15] Through reporter Laffarques declaration, the party professed to be followers of the concept of free competition.[16] Pierre Cot perhaps had a stricter opinion, but what he said was fairly sound:

It is no longer a matter of whether we are supporters or opponents of a directed and controlled economy; it is a matter of urgent necessity for tomorrow.[17]

Pierre Cot, however, would soon leave the party and transfer to the communist fold.[18] The general line of the Radical-Socialist party at the December 1944 congress can be said to be: nationalizations, yes, where it is necessary, but cautiously.[19] The fight against the trusts was included in the Radical-Socialist party programme.[20] The impression is of a bourgeois party in a period of transition faced with the difficult rehabilitation of its country and perhaps faced with a reconstruction of its own organization.

M. Laffarque, who was appointed chief reporter of the party concerning the economic and financial policy it would be advisable for the party to follow, held a long speech full of verve, which resulted in little or no discussion, but was unanimously approved by the congress.[21] He said that the economic structure of the country should be maintained and protected concerning small and medium industry, trade, and agriculture[22] The party supported the ideas of economic liberalism and thought that free competition should be maintained in the community.[23] The party was naturally opposed to the trusts, which were manifestations of some type of capitalistic feudalism.[24]

How, then, should the economic conditions be arranged in the country? asked the reporter and continued: A nationalized sector, a sector whose economy was controlled, a free sector, where the state could intervene and direct the production.[25]

The radical party also demanded a plan for the arrangement of the country's economy

so that our industrial production, our food production, and our exports would increase.[26] Worthy of its history, ... the radical party wished to contribute to the accomplishment of far-reaching reforms and to work for the integration of the French colonial empire into the economic system of the mother country.[27] On the financial plane, the doctrine was "a balanced budget". "All inflation should be rejected" and it was considered that such would be "a mortal danger to the structure of the country". The summing up ended by saying that, just as it was the Frenchman's duty to work, it was also his duty to pay taxes, and severe penalties should be imposed on all kinds of profiteers.[28]

Nationalization? Yes, but on one condition that the companies had an autonomous administration similar to S.N.C.F. and the nationalized tobacco industries, their own board, and their own budget, M. Laffarque said.[29]

There should be no nationalization for the sake of nationalization.[30] We observe similar arguments during the postwar years in, for instance, Sweden. The same tendency was felt there as it was anywhere else. The problem, the rehabilitation of France, however, demanded a far-reaching support from the state.[31] The Radical-Socialist party believed that Germany would play a big role here:[32] we demand that the government pays great attention to the economic aspect of the peace treaties. This would mean that France would have the use of part of

Germany's coal supplies (exploitation d'une partie du sous-sol allemand).[33] Big deliveries of heavy material are necessary for our industrial reorganization, for restoration of the railways, harbours, airfields, canals, and so on. Part ownership and share in the control of the big enterprises on the other side of the Rhine was also wanted.[34]

Germany was thus included as part of the Radical-Socialist party's postwar economic programme. The party also, as we have seen, wanted special support by the government for the small and the medium industries, but the government ought to organize itself to become stronger.[35] The farmers also ought to collaborate and create wholesale societies.[36] The importance of capital concentration for the accomplishment of big and effective investments was fully appreciated.[37] The trusts, of course, fitted this definition, but they had worked for their own interests.[38] They were described as: The objectives of the trusts are not national prosperity, but sales at high prices in order to gain increasingly large profits to become more and more powerful ...[39] The methods used by the trusts to attain this power position were described as corruption of the political environment and the press, price agreements with the object of eliminating competition, tax evasion, the creation of affiliations and holding companies, and so on.[40] If the trusts had obtained monopoly positions in the country, nationalizations must be resorted to.[41] "Problème toujours neuf, problème délicat aussi," as M. Laffarque stated.[42]

The Radical-Socialist party's economic programme presented at "the small party congress' 'in 1944 was thus a middle class programme. The idea of free competition was firmly adhered to.[43] The interests to defend were those of all businessmen, except those of high finance.[44] In other words, the party wanted to speak for small and medium industries, farmers, and tradesmen.[45] The trusts were suspected.[46] It was thought obvious that the state would intervene to help industry.[47] We can thus read the influence of the past on the economic policy of the Radical-Socialist party. The economic ideas of the resistance movement reappear here, they belong to the period, obviously they were generally embraced; had they not been brought out, votes would have been lost. The economic programme of the Vichy regime emerges and calls to mind that its representatives in their way wanted an economic regeneration in France.[48]

We have already discussed the German question.[49] M. Bastid during the congress outlined the following three solutions to this problem:

a. annexation of that part of Germany lying west of the Rhine.
b. a joint operation by the iron and steel sectors regulated by a series of agreements. This would result in parts of these industries working for France.
c. separation of the territories west of the Rhine and the formation of an independent state associated with France by an alliance.[50]

M. Paul Blanc, who discussed these propositions, believed the last to be the best.[51] Thereby an old French policy from the period before 1789 would be followed.[52]

The proposition under b. was completely useless, Blanc thought. That under a., he considered impossible because of the large German population west of the Rhine and what could happen.[53] According to Paul Blanc, there were two foreign policy alternatives for France:

1. An alliance with the Soviet Union, where France's 60—70 divisions together with the Soviet Union's 500—600 could provide protection against Germany.[54]
2. The second alternative should aim at taking from Germany important parts of its production apparatus situated on the left bank of the Rhine, particularly those to be found in the Saar district.[55]

The Radical or Radical-Socialist party, which had considerable influence before the war, thus introduced alternatives for the policy towards Germany into its discussion as early as autumn 1944; these were realized during the postwar period: the Saar was integrated within the framework of the French economy, but was later handed back; the Coal and Steel Community which was finally extended into the European Economic Community.

THE 1945 PARTY CONGRESS OF THE RADICAL-SOCIALIST PARTY

The following party congress took place on the 20 to 23 August 1945.[56] Its course was calmer than that of the previous one. No decisive change was made in the party executive. Herriot was political president.[57] Daladier and Theodor Steeg were appointed honorary presidents.[58] Dr Mazé became administrative president.[59] They were included in the executive committee of the party. This also numbered among its members: Monnerville, Delbos, Rucart, Bastide, Manent, Chauvier, Chuquet, and Kayser.[60] We will not go into the political questions; instead, we will consider the attitudes of the party congress to the big questions, especially those with economic aspects. They are shown in the party declaration of 23 August 1945.[61] The party defended "the middle classes in the community and their interests; the middle classes, small businessmen, and tradesmen were threatened with becoming employees", as M. Pierrot expressed it immediately after reading the declaration, which was quickly and unanimously approved.[62] Among other things, the following can be read about the general line of the party congress in the economic matters in 1945:

a. A long-term plan should be laid down to get the French economy in harmony with world economy.
b. The state should orient the production in the country, but in moderation.
c. The private initiative and free competition should be the basic prerequisite in industry.

d. The state's function should be to protect the citizens against actual monopolies.
e. The ideas expressed in the resistance movement were supported and consequently also "that those sectors in industry where competition no longer existed should be transferred to the community".
f. These latter sectors, according to the proposition of the party congress, should be given the character of co-operative enterprises, and this should take place "every time private operation threatened the general interest and the independence of the state".
g. The energy and transport problems were judged of great importance for the reorganization of French industry.
h. The money value must be maintained, "otherwise, the middle classes could become proletarian".[63]

There were a few more points, among others, concerning taxation. However, they are not relevant here.

Before this declaration was adopted, these points were discussed. The discussion was, in turn, preceded by a report, submitted by M. George Laffargue, about the party's economic and financial policy.[64] The resources of free economy were included in this report, as well as a long account of the present condition of French economy and its initial position that had strongly deteriorated through the war. What had happened? The production capacity of the U.S.A. had considerably increased during the war years. The Soviet Union, rich in manpower and raw material, had moved its positions "to the heart of central Europe" and as far as the Mediterranean. Great Britain had developed a strong industry. Helped by this and by exports, it could build up its former prosperity. Also the small and medium sized countries, which had not been touched by acts of war, had extended their production capacity. The mechant marine and the air lines had expanded considerably.[65] "The destruction, no matter how extensive, was highly compensated."[66] All this had been achieved, but France had taken no part in the progress. Instead, the country had lost some of its industrial equipment and some of its labour force.[67] It was also thought that some of the spiritual forces in France had broken down;[68] this can be illustrated by the following passage, which, however, seems exaggerated and rhetorical: "The French worker had lost his physical ability and his will to work, as well as his spirit of enterprise."[69] The industrialist mostly thought of the immediate profit, the businessman took no heed of his customers, the banker would undertake no risks, the number of middlemen had increased, and mediocrity had pervaded cultural life.[70] It was the function of the community, Laffargue said, to counterbalance the power concentration caused by the industrial expansion of the agrarian France.[71] M. Laffargue meant that a far-reaching social policy would guarantee the position of the workers.[72] "A minimum wage is all right, but other methods should also be available."[73] Which? M. Laffargue continued, "the profit interest".[74] It was "to think highly of the working class to give them means to emancipate".[75] An

examination of M. Laffargue's exposition suggests that he regarded the nationalizations with distrust.[76] His opinion was also that a totalitarian state could direct its economy, especially if it concerned a closed internal market, but for France, it was different because the country supported the idea of the open market.[77] There was also another danger, according to M. Laffargue. The power position of the government would fundamentally increase if it had these economic means available.[78]

This view is contrary to that of S.F.I.O. The socialists wanted a strong state, a strong government, which was essential if they were to succeed in carrying out their objectives.[79] The Radical-Socialists followed a bourgeois line with concessions on those points where the present situation demanded them. The Radical-Socialist party did not support capitalism without certain reservations.[80] The state would direct the economy, and with legislation and taxation, intervene against phenomena within industry that were judged harmful and that disturbed free competition.[81] The cartels must be controlled and their mutual agreements be published.[82] The threat of nationalization was judged to be a factor that hindered investments and savings.[82]

Among the many proposals for improvements contained in the report was: "Infuse new life in 'Conseil national économique'." Let syndicates, the labour movement, and farmers be represented there.[83] Let us have continuous information about the market development abroad.[84] To this were added a number of reflections about the importance of a stable monetary value with associated matters.[85] The presented programme can thus be characterized as bourgeois. M. Laffargue's report was followed by a number of contributions to the debate; these, however, did not change the appraisal and its conclusions.[86] The congress approved the report.[87]

It is of value to follow the congress's contribution to the debate because it gives some information of general interest and can also illustrate attitudes and opinions within the party. M. Laffay, for instance, found it necessary to indicate three points before the elections, which he thought important to present to the working class:

1. What did the radical party mean by economic democracy?
2. How ought the future of the employees to develop?
3. What ought to be done concerning the capitalistic profits?[88]

M. Laffay thought that economic democracy was not the same as complete equality and quoted a comment in that direction by Stalin at the 17th communist congress.[89]

The position of the employees was also touched upon.[90] There were those who were employees and worked in private and state enterprise.[91] However, there was a large group of workers who were not employees.[92] Speaking of these, M. Laffay said: In our country they are, fortunately, numerous. They constitute more than

half of the population.[93] He thereafter enumerated which workers they were: Independent farmers, craftsmen, professionals, and small tradesmen.[94] The communist and socialist parties were asked did they contemplate turning 60 % of France's population into a proletariat so as to obtain a result practically lacking in interest, i.e. transferring workers from the private to the state sector?[95]

The comments are interesting to the extent that they illustrate the special features of the French community still persisting at the middle of the twentieth century and contrasting to some extent with the conditions in other west European states. The French agrarian community was still, in parts, a reality. We can also see the extension of the worker concept to embrace social groups, which according to Nordic ideas are bourgeois in character.

Concerning the capitalistic profit, according to M. Laffay, this should be restricted because a new economic organization and a directed industry were advancing.[96] The defence of profit was the element of risk. In the economically directed community, the risk was restricted; thus the profits of the companies ought to be reduced.[97] The opinion of M. Laffay was also, coarsely expressed, that the country's economy was for the benefit of the people and that this was the system which produced most effect and which ought to be used.[98] He thought that if nationalization produced the best results, it should be resorted to; otherwise, the old should be retained.[99] M. Laffay also warned about the situation that could arise if the banks came into the hands of certain parties.[100] These could "strangle the social and economic categories they wanted to attack".[101] The speaker's attitude was thus negative, and this part of the exposition was received with applause from the audience.[102]

On the other hand, the nationalizations were insufficient. The country could not devote itself to protectionistic policy and create a closed internal market at the same time as it engaged in agreements with other powers along liberal lines. In the future community, the state should play a prominent and leading role: "Seul l'Etat est en mésure de concentrer l'économie, seul il peut retenir, centraliser, analyser, interpréter la documentation intérieure internationale sur la situation des marchés et les possibilités offertes à la production," M. Laffay continued.[103] The points of view expressed by M. Laffay to a large extent became political realities, despite at this time the party being persona non grata in the political world.[104] It seems to have been de Gaulle's views, or at least, to have lain close to them.[105] We also recall Blocq-Mascart's and Daniel Mayer's description of de Gaulle's first period of office in France; the big reforms did not materialize.[106] De Gaulle succeeded in protecting the strategic banking sector on important points from the state influence envisaged by the socialist phalanx.[107]

What was the target of the Radical-Socialist party in 1945? Naturally, prosperity for the country was wanted. Naturally, production apparatus must be built up by all available means, thus laying the foundation of a higher living standard and decent economic conditions for all social groups. The party wanted to defend mainly the interests of the petit bourgeois class.[108] The state interven-

tions, chiefly the nationalizations, do not appear to have been a direct expression of the intention and desire of a group that can possibly have shared M. Laffay's views. At the same time, a wish for a regeneration surged through the French community. There was an opinion in the country; the party had to align itself with the new conditions so as not to lose its power, position, or existence. A number of other contributions to the debate were made concerning the economic and financial policy at the 1945 Radical-Socialist party congress.

The report concerning the foreign policy, presented at the 1945 Radical-Socialist party congress established, perhaps with a sigh, that the world was dominated by three great powers.[109] The role of France in world policy, at least for the moment, had been subdued, but obviously the country had a role to play.[110] In the report, the party dissociated itself from a policy of isolation.[111] A policy of international solidarity was wanted.[112]

Reasonings, whose strains we recognize, occurred. The fate of Germany was of eminent importance for the future of France.[113] France, according to the reporter, must have three guarantees: political, territorial, economic.[114] Besides demilitarization, occupation, and control of the German industry, something more was demanded: a reorientation of the economic activity in the Ruhr, in the Rhineland-Westphalian region, and the Rhine valley.[115] The communications should no longer go towards Berlin but towards France, Belgium, Holland, and also Great Britain.[116] Here, we see something that recalls the idea of the European Economic Community, although perhaps at this stage, it referred to enforced collaboration.

A few months after Germany's unconditional surrender, France was possibly most anxious to take advantage of its position: "Ce n'est pas faire figure de mauvais Européen ou de nationaliste égoïste que de réclamer, avec le degré de priorité qui revient à nos initiatives et à nos sacrifices, des réparations importantes en nature et en main-d'oeuvre," as the reporter M. Kayser said.[117] Kayser also saw well into the future in another respect: U.S.A.'s role in the economic reorganization of Europe later more or less followed the lines he had suggested.[118]

Other more pessimistic accents were noted, but the resolution presented by Kayser was approved by the congress.[119] Among the many points discussed concerning foreign policy, we refer to those about Germany, particularly those that had some kind of economic significance in its widest sense for France. The main points in this context were:

a. The victorious nations should force Germany to give "des garanties physiques, territoriales, politiques et économiques". This would prevent German militarism and national socialism in the future.
b. The consequence of a. should be that France and its allies kept the left bank of the Rhine and the bridgeheads on its right bank. All German sovereignty should be forbidden in these territories.
c. All war-material manufacture in Germany should be forbidden.

d. German natural resources should be at the disposal of the other nations, as should the German labour force.
e. The Saar should be attached to the French economy.
f. All policy aimed at establishing a united Germany under Prussian leadership should be opposed.[120]

These glimpses show that the party at its summer 1945 congress maintained a quite severe line towards Germany, but the war had just finished. This attitude was fairly natural; it was so in France for a long time ahead. The French foreign policy—rather, perhaps, the colonial policy—would for a long time yet endure many hard blows and would possibly divert, to some extent, attention from the German problem. However, the responsible politicians did not abandon the principles laid down at the 1944 and 1945 party congresses in, for instance, the Radical-Socialist party, principles to be found in other parties and in the French resistance movement during the war.[121]

13. Attitudes in the communist party in France after the liberation 1944

Attitudes in the Communist party are of special interest for our study of the conditions, events, and motivations in France when the country was liberated in summer 1944 and during the next year. Since its beginning, the Communist party had had on its programme a change of the economic system of the community. The outcome of World War II, as well as the strong participation by the communists in the resistance movement during this time,[1] and naturally the example of the Soviet Union, contributed to strengthen and clarify the party's position in economic matters.

No stenographed minutes from the party congresses could be obtained in the Communist party archives in Paris. But a number of reports, speeches, and similar material that show the attitudes in the party were made available. The material provides information about how the recent events were regarded and how things were for the communists in France during the occupation. As long ago as July 1940, the Vichy police, collaborating with the gestapo, had arrested many communists of whom some had been shot in the Chateaubriand camp on 22 October 1941.[2] The paper "l'Humanité" was forbidden publication, but was printed and distributed illegally.[3] In a number from spring 1943, an appeal was published which said that the patriotic organizations should co-operate everywhere, armed units should be organized, and officers and petty-officers in the reserve should be assembled into instruction groups. Without a signal from any central leadership, the active groups should take up arms at an allied landing.[4]

All economic activity in the country should be paralyzed by general strikes.[5] Vichy loyal factions in the police and other places should be overpowered or imprisoned.[6] Political prisoners should be released from prisons and internments.[7] Patriotic groups should control food supplies and the administration apparatus.[8] In the main, this was most likely the general course of the development that followed. Reports from the Communist Central Committee for the tenth party congress also discussed communistic entry into the Comité-Français de la Libération Nationale, presided over by de Gaulle.[9] Among others, Billoux and Grenier became committee members, one as "ministre d'Etat", the other as "ministre de l'Air".[10] According to the report, this had been commented on by the central committee (North Africa) of the Communist party in a declaration that said, among other things, that the communist participation was wanted by a large majority in France (l'immense majorité des Français).[11] The latter expression, despite a conceivable expansive friendliness towards the communists after the liberation of France, must be considered against the background of the report being, in a manner of speaking, the message of the Central Committee to the tenth party congress. It is also seen that when Paris was liberated, Duclos was there and that Thorez was in Moscow where he presented the attitudes of the party over the radio.[12]

The documents that the French Communist party made available do not tell us anything about the internal attitudes in 1945, only which members occupied the leading position in the party executive: the Central Committee and the Politburo. The leaders of the Communist party and members of the Politburo were from before the war Duclos, Andre Marty, Frachon, the old Cachin, Monmousseau, François Billoux, and Arthur Ramette.[13] Several of these occupied positions of trust in the trade union C.G.T. or were chief editors in the party press.[14] The organ that appointed the Politburo, i.e. the Central Committee, had during its January meeting, moreover, appointed the following members: Tillon, who organized the communist resistance forces (now, in 1945, he was Minister of Aviation in the provisional government in office); Guyot, who organized the youth movement; Léon Mauvais, organization secretary; Dupuy, secretary of the Railway Employees' Trade Union; Fajon, training instructor; and Waldeck Rochet, who organized the population in the agrarian sector.[15] Despite the mentioned reorganization, the party was the only one in France that retained its leadership from before the war.[16] Thorez had been active as the party's general secretary ever since 1930.[17] Some communists were gone for ever, fallen in the conflict, liquidated, or gone in some other way.[18] Vodli, who had been secretary in the Railway Workers' Trade Union, was hanged in Alsace-Lorraine in Strassburg by the Germans;[19] the member of the Chamber of Deputies Catelas had been guillotined by order of Pétain;[20] and Ramier, a worker from Saint-Etienne who had been head of a resistance group, had been arrested, tortured, and murdered in the depth of a mine together with thirty other patriots.[21]

Thorez's report, presented at the tenth party congress, explained, not without

pride, that the Communist party was the party of the working class and the people in which workers, farmers, tradesmen, office workers, small-businessmen, and intellectuals were to be found.[22] The party congress which, in general, is the highest and the deciding organ in a political movement was not this in the Communist party, not at least as far as appointments to leading positions were concerned at the 1945 Communist congress, to judge from the report of Thorez.[23]

Here, the party differs little from other parties. It can be noted that the leading clique, the personified will of the party, was not unseated and that the party, at least according to available documents, had no hot-headed sections prepared either to usurp the power or to justify a much-discussed attitude. It is explained by the fact that the period 1940 to 1944 meant a time of struggle more intense for the Communist party than for other parties and factions. Such things can lead to a strengthening of the party organization and the party discipline.

According to Thorez, a tendency with many opinions would not be allowed in the party.[24] Naturally, discussions were permitted, but when they had ended and decisions reached, they would be respected.[25] Stand fast! Stand united! Divisions into directions and tendencies were branded.[26] The equivalent of the struggle between the two Edwards (Daladier and Herriot) in the Radical-Socialist party can have its correspondence in the Communist party, but the available material does not reveal such tendencies.

The material gives us a good idea, however, about the Communist party's attitudes in matters of economic and social development in the country. The Communist party showed a remarkable modesty, if the statement by Thorez can be regarded as representative, when it was necessary to obtain the dogmatic goal of the party.[27] On the other hand, it supported in full C.N.R.'s programme, which was far-reaching and if carried out would change the industrial structure of France.[28] The party line was: economic reforms, but in harmony with other political factions that had the confidence of the people.[29] In his report, Thorez emphasized the respect for the democratic rules.[30] His attitude in January 1945, demonstrated a month later in a speech to mine workers, seemed to have largely been that of the conservative: The lazy can never become good communists or good revolutionaries; never, never.[31] Earlier in this speech, Thorez gave a message that could equally well have come from the director: work, do not strike unnecessarily, do your work well.[32] The communists were afraid that the reforms would be sabotaged by the production apparatus functioning ineffectively or by the opponents of reforms being compelled to work ineffectively.[33]

In "Rapport du Comité central pour le X^{e} Congrès Nationale du parti Communiste français", a summing up was made of the reckoning with the past: Pétain began the campaign "retour à la terre".[34] This meant that the country should be de-industrialized and thus attain prosperity.[35] This policy, the report stated, was inspired by the Germans, but discontinued when, in 1941, Germany became involved in war with the Soviet Union.[36] Germany then needed products from the French iron and steel industry.[37] The report also established that French and

German insurance companies had collaborated, that the electricity trust had delivered electric power to the enemy, that the chemical industry had been handed over to the Germans.[38] The deportations of French citizens to Germany and the collaboration of the Vichy police with the gestapo were also criticized.[39] The blame for the misfortunes of the past and the material situation of the country in 1945, it was believed, lay not only with the leader of the neighbours in the east, but also with the big associations within the borders of the country.[40] According to the report, Pétain was merely the tool of these powers.[41]

It can perhaps be said that the above list of crimes, at least in some parts, can be thought to be an after-thought, as it agrees so well with the sectors that would be exposed to nationalization. The report presented a list of crimes against the nation, crimes that demanded punitive measures. For the communists and for C.G.T., the situation after the liberation was, of course, "the chance". If important and well-chosen nationalizations were carried out, the old goal of the party could be attained, control of the production apparatus. The banks were thought to be the most important sector to control.[42] If these were controlled, the rest would follow.[43] Declarations from the Communist party or from prominent party members during this period were naturally meant to clarify the communistic attitudes and to prepare opinions. The communist line was to indicate scapegoats in industry and state the penalty; this should be nationalization. The problem was simplified for the communists. C.N.R. and its programme was strongly radical. All that was needed now was to carry it out. After the liberation, the Communist party activities were aimed at precisely the banks, among other things, to show up their associations with the enemy.[44] The Communist principle in 1944—1945 was that changes in the country's economic structure should take place peacefully.[45] The party had shown itself willing during the period of occupation to co-operate with other parties.[46] This attitude, Daniel Mayer, S.F.I.O., thought was inspired by the Soviet Union, which was still at war with Germany and needed the largest possible assistance on its fronts.[47] This could be attained by, among other means, the maximum holding of German armed forces in France. If a well organized resistance movement was employed in France and national unity after the liberation aided the French war effort, this goal would be achieved. Other factors naturally also played a role: in its offers to help, the party must not overstep a certain limit in case it frightened large sections of the electorate. Nationalization of enterprises with fewer than fifty workers was perhaps regarded as "folie".[48] A proposal of this nature was provocative.[49] It could only result in the small and medium industries feeling threatened.[50] The trusts would be supplied with arguments that could be used in defence of their "positions antinationales contre les intérêts de l'économie du pays".[51] The Communist party position in January 1945 was thus that the C.N.R.'s programme should be supported.[52] This attitude can be thought to have been inspired from abroad, i.e. the Soviet Union, which wanted to get the greatest possible help on its fronts, and this would be achieved provided the communists co-operated with other French

parties. This does not exclude the possibility that the communists allowed their attitudes to be dictated by a number of other reasons, among them patriotism.

During spring 1945, Duclos presented a number of views about the economic and social situation in France as it then existed: away with the trusts, nationalize and reorganize the countries economy by, among other means, equalizing property by way of taxation.[53] His opinion was that it was necessary to reform French industry.[54] Thereby the conditions of the workers could be improved, and an increased influence by the state and the employees make itself felt. That the debate in France was severe and sometimes bitter against those who had done wrong and that the positions often were clearly delimited—as the case was in the settlement with the past in S.F.I.O.[55]—might in part have been a consequence of the times. The war was still in progress. The period of occupation was too recent. The class oppositions in the community during the recent period were more intensified than mitigated.

The leading industrial clans were exposed to violent attacks from not only the Socialist-Marxist side but also what remained of the bourgeois parties. The democratic rules, however, were respected by the Communist party.[56] On the other hand, a different attitude would probably not have led to results positive for the party. The accusations discussed by the Communist party concerning the activity of industry—or rather of its leading circles—and thought of as non-national were defined by Duclos at the 1945 January session in the Central Committee: in November 1940, the French trust Kuhlman had begun to collaborate with I.G. Farben.[57] This concern had taken over shares amounting to 51 % in the newly formed company Francolor (share capital 800-milion francs) whereas Kuhlman and Société des Matières Colorantes de St.-Denis et Saint-Clair-du-Rhône had 12,750 shares in the German company.[58] Duclos thought that this was a criminal association and should be penalized by the manager, who was also member of the board of a few other important enterprises, being committed for treason against the country.[59] This should also be the fate of his co-workers.[60]

According to Duclos, the iron and steel industry had its scapegoats: Schneider, de Wendel, and Théodore Laurent.[61] In 1918, these men had bought cheaply companies situated in departement Moselle, which was then made French.[62] In 1941, big businesses had been established when German interests, in their turn, acquired French plants, for instance those in Rombas.[63] Schneider sold Knutange to Kloeckner in Ruhr, the plants in Thioneville passed into the hands of Saarlander Roectling, &c.[64] Bring the guilty to trial! confiscate their property, pleaded Duclos.[65]

A European automobile cartel had been established in 1941 with the assistance of the French Minister of Industry, whose family was related to the Renault works.[66] Parts for four standard types of motor lorries would be made in France.[67] After the liberation, this company was confiscated by the state.[68] It was now necessary, Duclos thought, to be very much on guard against the trusts sabotaging the management of the confiscated companies.[69]

The insurance system was dangerous to the state because it had considerable sums at its disposal, Duclos added.[70] The economic position of these companies was so strong that it could be feared that they would put pressure on the state.[71] The leading people in the French insurance system belonged to well-known families: de Wendel, Schneider, and Hattinger, among others, and these had collaborated with German colleagues, Duclos maintained.[72]

The banks, for instance Crédit Lyonnais, had done profitable business with the Germans, not least concerning the payments of assistance to relatives of the French labour force working in Germany.[73] Because the families Gillet and Schneider were on the management of Crédit Lyonnais, "they had profited by the slavery enforced by Hitler".[74] The coal mines in the departments Nord and Pas de Calais should be confiscated, not nationalized; nationalization would only lead to the owners making big profits, Duclos stated.[75] Those who had delivered coal mostly to Hitler and had stopped production during the days of the Popular Front should be punished for high treason, he continued.[76]

The condition of the production apparatus was not so bad as could be expected, Duclos went on.[77] The mines were in good condition, the capacity of the textile industry not far removed from its position in 1938.[78] The iron and steel industry was 80 to 90 % of its prewar capacity, the cellulose industry was largely intact, as was also the glass and paper industry.[79] That is how the situation was appraised by the Central Committee of the Communist party at the beginning of 1945.

Six months later, the party members assembled at the party congress, which body normally makes the important decisions and commissions the Central Committee to follow a certain definite line until the next congress. It is obvious that a camarilla can direct the fates of a party and perhaps also a people. It can consist of a small group which, aided by its connexions, insights, and opinions, rules an entire congress. We have seen proof of this in other parties. The Communist party in France was no exception. The international nature of the party is, moreover, well known. This does not mean that the declarations issued and the speeches held at the summer 1945 congress are not of considerable interest.

The picture of the economic position of France then outlined was almost pessimistic.[80] There had been no rapid economic upswing.[81] Thorez thought that this was due to the import of machine- and spare parts being restricted.[82] His idea was that this was the counter of the business side to the plans fostered in the Communist party.[83] At the congress, he examined industry branch by branch and its situation.[84] The main points were: a French protectionism had appeared.[85] It was the employers who lay behind this.[86] It was shown in recommendations to the building workers' trade union to protest against a monthly import of 40,000 tons of cement from England.[87] The building workers had replied that this import could hardly embarrass the French cement factories and had refused to cooperate at the same time as they accused the cement trust of wanting to prevent the reorganization of the country.[88]

At the summer 1945 party congress, Thorez discussed especially the following sectors in industry: coal, iron and steel, and cars.[89] Coal was the strategic factor in French industry.[90] If this sector developed positively, it would be the prerequisite for a favourable development in many other branches.[91] However, it was difficult to speed up coal production. It lacked labour because of, e.g., mobilization, unsatisfactory wage rates, and the unpleasant nature of the work.[92] Thorez demanded better housing, better wages, pension, and insurance; these would increase the influx of labour.[93] Set German prisoners of war at work in the mines; that would help to increase coal production.[94] Mechanize the operation was a third alternative.[95] Expand electric power production generally, not only that based on coal.[96] That would produce the essential power base for developing industry.[97] In both cases, nationalization should be resorted to for the benefit of the interests of the country.[98]

The condition in the iron and metal industries was partly dependent on the situation in the coal sector, Thorez continued.[99] France had large resources of bauxite, but aluminium production in the country had been insignificant before the war.[100] Through exports to Germany, it had flourished during the war years.[101] In 1945, production had been strongly reduced.[102] The iron production experienced difficulties. Only 14 out of 207 blast furnaces were working, according to Thorez.[103] These supplied the country with a production that was one-tenth of the 1929 production, France's peak year during the first 50 years of the twentieth century.[104] The engineering trade union, however, had evolved plans that should get 38 blast furnaces and five coke series operating, based on the material resources of the country in the form of coal, lime, oil, and other accessories necessary for the production.[105] The state had not wished to follow this plan, Thorez continued, and added: "The metal industry is not functioning because of shortage of coke; the mines cannot produce the needed coal because of shortage of tools. This circle must be broken!"[106]

The motorcar industry had deteriorated in France during the 1930s, Thorez pointed out. The decline between 1929 and 1938 amounted to 20 %. During this time, car production in Germany increased sixfold. The war had caused this production sector abroad to expand powerfully. It was thus necessary to reorganize completely the French car industry for it to be able to compete effectively with foreign countries. The many types of cars should primarily be reduced in number (169 before the war). There were also 2000 different wheel types, and so on, which diversification resulted in long amortization periods for the installation and production materials; this did not correspond to the needs of that time. Rationalization, specialization, reduction in the types of cars, reorganization of research, and help for small and medium companies, Thorez advised this branch of industry at the Communist party summer 1945 congress. The companies, however, were presumed to be hostile to these plans, as they had profited considerably from their deliveries to Germany during the war.[107]

A long section was devoted to the reasons for the decline in production, dis-

organization on account of the military operations in the country, perhaps a planned sabotage of the production efforts by the groups that had led the country towards destruction and humiliation in 1940, i.e. the trusts and the administration apparatus, which still had elements from the Vichy time in leading positions, with connexions in the employers' organizations.[108]

The solution of the problems, Thorez explained, was to apply C.N.R.'s programme in the economic sphere.[109] The Vichy spirit should be swept away.[110] Away with bureaucracy, which sat there and pulled the strings! away with what was called "directed economy"![111] He asked: "Directed by whom and to whose advantage?"[112] By that, he meant that the industrial organizations extended their influence also in this spere.[113] If the nationalizations had been carried out immediately after the liberation, the present position would not exist, Thorez said.[114] The large state enterprises would have been controlled by delegates elected by workers and clerks and by those appointed by the government; the influence of the trusts had been eliminated.[115] He emphasized what he had said six months earlier in the communistic Central Committee: The nationalizations we require are not characteristic of the socialist and communist ideas, they have been written into the Radical party's programme for the past fifty years and have an altogether democratic character.[116] The nationalizations should work for rationalization and development in all parts of the country's economy. There were those who developed the theory that the nationalizations could not be realized because suitable administrative personnel were lacking. Nonsense! Thoraz said. Those who had managed the companies before could continue to do so. The state changed the management, which after a time, if it proved necessary in order to safeguard the independence of the company, could change its personnel.[117]

It has already been pointed out that the agricultural sector was important for the accomplishment of the reforms.[118] How was the situation of the agrarian population? France was agrarian to a considerable extent. The country's industry was, and still is towards the end of the 1960s, concentrated to a few districts or regions. The lack of a fairly evenly distributed industry in the country contributed, and contributes, to a worsening of the situation of the agrarian population by reducing their possibilities of obtaining extra earnings and by the difficulties of finding work not too far from home. The yield per acre, according to Thorez, was rather low in 1945 compared with other west European countries.[118] Agriculture suffered from a shortage of material necessary for the operations; new horses, new machinery, and new tools were required.[119] The labour force had to a large extent been drafted by the Germans. Thus, more than a million hectares of arable land lay idle. There was no fertilizer; moreover, agricultural mechanization had not been especially developed before the war.[120]

Thorez suggested the following measures to speed up agricultural production: rationalization to reduce production costs, make available agricultural machinery, superphosphates, fuel, and other products essential for agriculture to the farmers at reasonable prices, co-operation of all kinds, and a price improvement on agri-

cultural products.[121] The middlemen had recently had their margins increased; this, the producers had not enjoyed.[122] These views show a strong agreement with corresponding sections in C.N.R.'s programme and with other previously referred to works prepared during the period before the liberation.[123]

The public appearances of Thorez during 1945 after the party congress came at regular intervals: in Waziers in July, in Limoges in August, twice in October, and twice in November, besides others.[124] Almost every time, he dealt with the country's economic problems.[125] It was obvious that French production should benefit by the German coal resources in the Saar as well as by other resources: Give us the timber we need from Germany; give us back the cattle they have stolen.[126] Twelve months later, speaking of Germany, he says The Ruhr should be internationally administered, the Rhineland should have a special regime, and the Saar should be connected to our economic and monetary system.[127] His line in the question of foreign policy agreed with that of other important political parties, as indicated in the foregoing.[128]

The eleventh party congress, which assembled in June 1947, again discussed the world's big problems.[129] Now two years after the end of the war, Thorez has two chapter headings: the problem of Germany, and American expansionism;[130] two headings that characterize something of the development of the world and of Europe during the next two decades. Perhaps the expansion of the U.S.S.R. or the security policy ought to be aded. However, in this context, we will not deal with those questions; we will, instead, establish that C.N.R.'s programme was an element in the Communist party line at the end of the war in 1945, and that the party appears loyally and nationally oriented among other parties in France. The Communist party was and is mainly the party of the workers, the correspondence of the Nordic Social Democratic parties. It had, and has, strong positions in the trade union world; it dominates C.G.T.

Otherwise, the labour movement is splintered and disorganized. This has contributed to the development not having fulfilled its promises, despite the objectives on the social plane during the war 1939—1945. What lay behind the labour movement's lack of success in France? It might be related largely to the fact that the country still has not finished its industrialization process: big sections of the densely populated areas of the country are still only market centres for an agrarian population. It possibly results from, among other things, the country's patriarchal atmosphere having persisted here and there in the community, and from the distribution apparatus being in many respects old fashioned, although from a tourist point of view, this can be attractive.

14. The economic objectives in France immediately after the end of World War II

We have already dealt with ideas of how to achieve economic renewal in France during the period after 1945.[1] We have discussed some of the groups that tried to influence the trend of events on this plane.[2] We have seen that the proposals were aimed at far-reaching state intervention in industry, which was inspired, as shown, by the socialistic ideas that spread wide throughout the French community during 1944—1945.[3] In June 1945, this theme was discussed in the consultative national assembly.[4] In July 1945, the assembly approved a resolution requesting the government to carry out nationalizations as rapidly as possible of "les grandes entreprises et sociétés de banques d'assurances, d'électricité, de sidérurgie, de l'industrie chimique et de la marine marchande".[5]

Before the resolution was finally approved by the consultative national assembly, M. Chaumié took the floor and showed as a warning example the costs of a state electric plant and a few private plants of corresponding kind. In the example, the state costs were twice as high because the engineers who worked for the state had not done enough preparatory work and calculations.[6] The philosophy was that the construction of profitable enterprises was now met by a requirement from the state for cost control. M. Chaumié was not allowed to speak against the resolution undisturbed: "C'est une plaisanterie" (M. Pierre Le Brun), "Il y a des responsabilités à rechercher" (M. Robert Pimienta), "Vous savez bien que... les sociétes anonymes sont contrôlées par des actionnaires qui ne représentent que 10 p 100 du capital." (M. Pierre Le Brun). The reasons for the attitudes were largely due to the tragic events during past years in France; ultimately, they must have been due to the fact that the country during the whole of the 1930s never succeeded in recovering from the economic crisis that, with the industrial countries, France was involved in around 1930. The economic crisis brought with it a social crisis, resulting in, among other things, tension between the social groups.

Towards the end of 1945, L'Assemblée Nationale Constituante was founded. This meant that parliamentary life became normal, the national assembly was no longer consultative. As a sign that General de Gaulle enjoyed great confidence he was chosen to form the new government. De Gaulle, however, did not stay long in office. In January 1946, he resigned as head of the government.[7] His demission caused surprise because he was supported as leader of the government.[8] General de Gaulle, in his memoirs published much later, explains his action. Because he did not belong to any special party, he could easily have been involved in a situation where the wishes of a political group could be decisive for his political actions.[9] He writes: "On comprenait que, si de Gaulle se résignait à cette situation pour tenter de rester en place, son prestige irait à vau-l'eau, jusqu'au jour où les partis en finiraient avec lui ou bien le reléگueraient en quelque fonction inoffensive et décorative."[10]

Up to the end of the war and during 1945, de Gaulle had led France with merely a consultative assembly at his side. Towards the end of 1945, the nationalizations of big banks and the gas and electric sectors were voted, and the economic planning was prepared.[11] In this situation and with a national assembly of delegates by his side, who were elected during autumn 1945, de Gaulle preferred to resign.[12] Thus he would be free to present and to fight for his opinion concerning how the new constitution should be formulated. He considered that the constitution prepared during 1945 was unsuitable.[13] Therefore he resigned. Not until 1959 did he make a come-back, and then, after many years of silence. The new republic, the fifth in France, was prepared by the General. Through Blocq-Mascart's testimony, we know that it was he who formulated a proposal for the constitution, which was realized during the Fifth Republic.[14] Blocq-Mascart declared that he wrote the proposal, except § 16, and this constitution probably goes back to the work carried out during the time of the resistance movement. The present study should perhaps follow the development of the constitution question immediately after the war from the strict proposals, one of which, that of André Philip, we have discussed in detail, up to the reality resulting in the weakness of the French central power during the postwar period. Although this question is intimately connected with this whole study, we will not discuss it; instead, we will, to some extent, aim at describing the economic and social situation in the country after the end of the war.

During summer 1945, Pleven functioned as Minister for "économie nationale et des finances" in the French government. It can perhaps be of interest to see how he presented the nationalizations: "nous voulons non pas nationaliser contre qui que ce soit, mais pour la nation. Pour nous, la nationalisation est une réforme essentiellement positive..." This pronouncement made at the debate in the consultative national assembly on 4 July 1945 was followed by the observation, perhaps intended as a calming gesture, that nationalizations took place in Anglo-Saxon countries, for instance, the Tennesee Valley Project was a state intervention. Pleven also quoted a British slogan: "export or die". For France, it was necessary, according to Pleven, to modernize or die.[15] The following words are of interest and tell how the situation was appraised: "l'âge moyen de l'équipement industriel de la France est de trente ans, alors que l'age moyen de l'équipement industriel de tous les pays avec lesquels nous serons en concurrence dans le monde est de huit ans."

The modernization must apply to all sides of French industry and also to the attitude of the French people. It is obvious that those responsible tried to concentrate all strength and mobilize and administer the country's resources to avoid this dangerous situation. It is against this background that French efforts to retain the colonial empire after the 1939—1945 war and the prolonged military engagements that continued for year after year must really be assessed. A means for carrying out the economic objective was "the plan". Already earlier, we have discussed and localized the origin of these thoughts. Jean Monnet, who was one

of the originators, was also apponted by de Gaulle's government as "haut-commissaire au Plan". In a memorandum dated 4 December 1945 and sent to the French Premier de Gaulle, we can see how the economic reorganization of France was to be carried out.[17] Monnet wrote that the country should be not only reorganized but also modernized. It was important in view of the rapid technical development that had taken place in other countries. The population's living conditions should be improved by stable prices and fairly fixed wages. The target was high production in order to ensure large internal consumption and through exports to pay for imports of goods vital for France, e.g., coal, petrol, machinery, and so on.[18] Here, are the ideas we have already met in the material from the resistance movement. The French production costs should also lie on the same level as, or below, those occurring in most branches abroad if it was to be possible to effect a trade interchange. The modernization should be done quickly, and if credits were obtained from foreign countries, France could reorganize its production apparatus more rapidly. Monnet also considered it necessary that the plans of the various branches and sectors should be deliberated in connexion with one another and be co-ordinated. Thus it would be possible to avoid some projects having a too extensive formulation at the cost of the development in others. To achieve all this, co-operation between all social groups was desirable. It was necessary for the representatives of the public administration, the trade-union movement, and the employers to meet and discuss the conditions. These groups or committees would then submit proposals in the important matters and indicate objectives for the future. The results of these meetings and deliberations would be presented in reports that would be collected, examined, concentrated, and interpreted; a plan for the whole country would then be evolved. This entire work should be carried out under the leadership and control of the state planning bureau in co-operation with a number of committees, subcommittees, and special committees, organized according to a pyramidal system and always with a representative of "le Haut-Commissaire" present as secretary, reporter, or chairman. The committees would be asked to express their opinion about the level of production that would, in future, be reached, having in mind the internal need, the exports, and the maximum production already achieved in France. How many workers, technicians, how much energy and other factors would probably be needed so that the French production problems would be satisfactorily solved? Monnet wrote finally that "le Haut-Commissaire" would be in continual contact with "le conseil du Plan" so that this body would always have a clear idea about the country's economic situation, about the results achieved, and of the target set up.[19] Decisions regarding the setting up of this organization were made in January 1946.[20] "Le conseil du Plan" met for the first time in March 1946.[21] As stated earlier, the entire objectives were related to the ideas and work carried out in various places by the resistance movement in France, in Algiers, and in other parts, as the study has tried to show in the foregoing.[22]

THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN FRANCE AS INTERPRETED BY THE GOVERNMENT IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE END OF THE WAR

Before negotiations that were to take place in Washington at the beginning of 1946, statistical data were collected concerning France's economic and social situation to serve as basis for the French pleas and attitudes. The information that the compiled material provided shows that the population of France had been reduced to 40.1-million. In 1939, this was 41.5-million. Of this large loss, civilian and military, 320,000 were killed during the war, 300,000 also died in Germany, and 160,000 left the country. Because of the deportations to Germany, which included the younger reproductive age classes, a surplus was created in France of the number dead in relation to the number born. This surplus amounted to 600,000.[23] The French losses in human life through World War I amounted to 1.4-million. This shows that, during the thirty years that elapsed between 1914 and 1944, France suffered great losses. The country's situation was particularly poor because many of those who lost their lives belonged to the active population. During this part of the twentieth century, France was of necessity handicapped, especially as—besides the loss of labour—a large part of its territory, with many towns and villages, had been affected by the military operations during the two wars.

The total value of the material losses during the period 1939—1945 was estimated to correspond to two years gross national products. In France in 1939, there were about 10-million houses. During World War II, 440,000 of these were totally destroyed, 1,340,000 damaged. The total capital loss during this period was estimated at 768-milliard francs according to the 1938 value.[24] It was not always a matter of destruction in the military sense; the losses could be due to dismantling and removal of machinery, other equipment, and transferring of raw material to Germany.[25] All these losses to the French production apparatus naturally affected the country's economy negatively. The following table of the gross national products in a few countries over a few years shows that France's estimated gross national product in 1945 lay about 40 % under the 1938 level.

The gross national product according to the French report[26]

	France	Great Britain	U.S.A.
1938	100	100	—
1939	106	106	100
1940	90	107	108
1941	70	114	118
1942	65	119	134
1943	63	122	156.5
1944	54	123	164.5
1945	58	—	—

The table shows that the war should have furthered the production development mainly in the U.S.A., but also in Great Britain. For France, the figures show that the fall in production was catastrophic.

During 1941 to 1944, the production in the agricultural sector amounted to a mere 70 % of the 1939 level. In 1945, this result was not even achieved. The arable land in France in 1945 amounted to 16.3-million hectares; in 1938, the corresponding figure was 20.2-million hectares. The number employed in agriculture in 1945 was about 6-million; in 1938, 7.1-million. However, the number of horses had not been particularly reduced during the period in question. The shortage of fertilizers, on the other hand, was severe.

The result of the 1945 harvest was poor compared with that in 1938. Wheat was less than half; other cereals, one-third; potatoes, less than one-third; wine, half as much; sugar beets, somewhat more than half.[27]

The investigations of the French Institute of Economic Research show that industrial production in the country had been reduced continuously during the occupation. Compared with the situation in 1938, the industrial production in 1941 lay 20 to 30 % below the 1938 level, and in 1943, it was even lower. The lowest industrial production level was reported as having occurred in August and September 1944, i.e. during the liberation period, which is not surprising.[28] The production level was then 30 % of the 1938 figure. From here, production rose continually and a year later, in October 1945 when the war had ended in Asia and Europe, it was 75 % of the 1938 figure.[29]

At the beginning of 1946, coal production had almost reached the 1938 level; iron production was twice as much as it was at the liberation in 1944, but still only one-third of the 1939 figure.[30] The railway network was completely recovered, at least concerning the length of track, and the harbour capacity was two-thirds of the 1938 figure.[31] Industrial production level, however, was already low in France in 1938, there was thus much to make up for.[32]

The report we have referred to was, as mentioned, intended to serve as basis for the negotiations in Washington. The purpose of this meeting was to ask for money for economic reorganization. The directives to the French delegation stated: First and foremost, our country must use its own resources. In 1946, we shall try to reach the production level of 1938. The second stage is to create prerequisites for the recovery of lost capital and try to exceed by 25 % the maximum production of our country, which was achieved in 1929. We hope to reach this target in 1950. If the world political conditions were favourable and all objectives followed up, it was estimated that it would take 10 to 12 years for French economy to recover fully.[33] This means that they expected the country to have a soundly functioning industry by 1960 or 1962. To reach this target, it was judged necessary to have sufficient supplies of coal, i.e. energy for the expanding industry. The labour force problem also belonged to the picture. It was expected that after having exceeded the 1938 production level there would be a shortage of manpower. This could be accommodated by importing labour, mainly from North

Africa, a very important reservoir of workers for use in both peace time and war time. France's neighbours could also be expected to supply manpower. The re-organization programme was summarized in the following three points:

1. to ensure that the country had a satisfactory supply of energy. This could be accomplished with German resources; Germany was largely responsible for the destruction in France,
2. to make it possible for French products to be put on world markets, especially on the U.S.A.'s home market,
3. to enable France to buy raw material and equipment necessary for the recovery and modernization of industry, credits must be obtained. There is also in this context reason to emphasize the agreement in the objectives, broadly speaking, between the resistance movement and the general lines in the document referred to.[34]

Naturally, point 2 was to some extent inspired by the negotiation partner they were to meet. It also reflects the U.S.A.'s strong dominance in world trade and the need for a good relation with them in that respect. The importance of the American market for French products needs no emphasis. Point 3 predicts the American initiatives shortly to be taken on this plane. The French colonial empire, according to the examined documents, was considered important for the recovery of France. It explains the attitude of the French government to these problems over a number of years.

The application of the reform ideas

15. Economic planning and economic development in France

THE FIRST PLAN IN FRANCE

Despite the fact that only a few months had passed since decisive decisions were reached, a large number of planning commissions were already organized and at work by March 1946.[1] They followed the plan broadly outlined by Monnet in the exposé he gave, referred to in Chapter 14. Already at the beginning of 1946, it proved valuable to be able to co-ordinate the objectives and investment programmes of various branches.[2] The commissioner's office had to work quickly; it had barely 6 months until it must show results. The objectives of the first plan have already been mentioned: to achieve by 1950 25 % more than the 1929 production level.[3] Otherwise, features largely related to the previously mentioned objectives can be noted.

France was faced with big difficulties after World War II. Would it be possible to produce sufficient energy? Were the means of transport adequate? How was the supply of labour and of financial resources?[4] In 1945, German prisoners of war worked in French coal mines and coal was also imported from the Ruhr and the U.S.A.[5] A wish was expressed for an increase in deliveries from the Ruhr.[6] It was calculated that 20-million tons of German coal was needed annually for French industry to be able to expand.[7] This gives a clear idea of the importance of the German energy supplies for French economy. The transport system must be extended.[8] This created a demand for such goods as rubber, timber, iron and steel, and cement, necessary items for the country's economic expansion.[9] It was estimated that it would take two years to restore the country's internal waterways.[10] To reach these targets, the commissioner's office judged it necessary to have a further 2-million workers active in France. It was thought that this could partly be managed by transferring persons from nonproductive sectors to productive enterprises and branches. Attempts should also be made to bring more women into the labour market than had been done before. German prisoners of war were still available to go into French production. However, these could not be relied on to stay for any length of time; therefore France must attract foreign or colonial labour on a large scale. One- or one-and-half million workers were thus deemed necessary and should be allowed to immigrate into France over the next 5-year period.[11]

The French production apparatus demanded much raw material, which had to be imported. That meant large resources of money and credits. How much? The

imports between 1946 and 1949 were estimated to cost 11-milliard dollars, and it was also thought that the annual imports from 1950 would cost 2.25-milliard dollars. It was decided that production must be rationalized in order to reduce production costs and thereby obtain competitive strength on the world market for the country's products. The planning office, at the beginning of 1946, also thought that Germany should help by paying part of these costs.[12]

The report concerning the first modernization plan was printed in November 1946.[13] It was an account covering about 200 pages. It had been compiled by the work of 18 commissions with 337 members; 79 subcommittees with 480 members had also been involved. In addition, there were a number of working groups; in all, roughly 1000 people had jointly tried to solve the prescribed tasks. The leading organ was much smaller. Le Commissaire Générale, Jean Monnet, had at his disposal a deputy and about 35 officials, 5 of whom occupied higher positions. Over this organization was "le Conseil du Plan", in which the Government sat with the Prime Minister as Chairman. However, the members of the Government did not form a majority on the planning council, this was constituted by representatives of the industrialists, the trade-union movement, farmers, colonies and territories, the representative of science, and some higher officials belonging to the civil and military administration.[14]

After the preparatory works, it was possible to view the problems a trifle more clearly. Four targets had been set up. They were:

1. to develop production in the country,
2. to increase production *per capita,*
3. to ensure full employment,
4. to raise the living standard of the population.[15]

It had been observed that a country's living standard is not necessarily related to the existence of resources, for instance, coal and iron ore. This concept, it was thought, was rather due to the degree of technical development that was found in various sections of a country's industry.[16] Besides the big loss of labour, the material destruction, and the prolonged use of industrial equipment—already mentioned—the report referred to other factors that caused difficulties for France after 1940: food shortages, mortality, especially that of children, shortage of all kinds of fuel, and shortage of housing. All these factors combined influenced one another in one or other way and made existence difficult and hard for large parts of the population and thereby affected the economy negatively.[17] The plan mentioned the objectives earlier referred to, but now it was decided that attempts must be made to achieve by 1948 the production results of 1929. During the period up to 1950, coal production should rise from 50-million tons in 1946 to 65-million tons.[18] The production of electricity by water power should increase from 13-milliard KWH to 24-milliard KWH, but even with these values, France woud lie far behind the U.S.A. and Great Britain in the production of energy.[19]

The need for iron and steel was naturally essential for France, just as it was for other industrial countries. It was thought that France, which has considerable iron ore resources, could satisfy its own demand for iron and steel, the report states: "Notre sidérurgie restera néanmoins pour de longues années dépendante du charbon et du coke de la Ruhr dont un approvisionement régulier est un des impératifs de la politique extérieure de la France."[20] We see here, as in many other places in the material, the bases for the French actions on the foreign political plane during future occasions.[21]

The production targets are indicated clearly and decisively for coal, electricity, iron, steel, cement, agricultural machinery, and transports.[22] They were indicative for the other production. Those branches whose production results were established beforehand for 1950 and which were thus under direct state control were chosen with the idea that their growth was a prerequisite for an increase in production in French industry and agriculture. The guaranteed expansion of the chosen sectors meant possibilities for increased production of, for instance, cars, building material, and textiles.[23]

The French production targets in greater detail

For the coal sector, the intention of the first plan was naturally an increase in production, a modernization of the production methods, and also a large number of investments. In 1946, it was expected that 115-milliard francs would need to be invested for these purposes over a 10-year period. One of the more important problems in this sector was the labour supply. Would it be sufficient for the future? In 1946, 326,000 workers were active in the branch, but about 60,000 of them were prisoners of war, a labour supply that would soon be lost. The need for labour in the coal industry, despite the prisoners of war, was not altogether satisfied; a further 50,000 were required.[24]

The electricity production was expected to increase by 3—4-milliard KWH annually. The annual number of new employees was estimated at 2000. The labour force was anticipated to amount to 86,000 during the final year 1950. The investments in this sector would cost 50-milliard francs annually, according to 1946 value. Thus 200-milliard francs would be invested between 1947 and 1950. This sum would be used for the extension of power lines, for transformer stations, and especially for hydro-electric plants and thermal power stations based on coal; these should therefore be situated at suitable sites. For the building of dams, 22,000 workers were employed, but these were not included in the above-mentioned figures; it was expected that this figure would be tripled during the next two years. Carpenters and bricklayers were the two most needed categories. These must be partly satisfied by immigration, it was considered.[25]

The increased productions of iron and steel would mean that in 1950 the branch would provide employment for 170,000, i.e. an increase of 53,000 over 1946. The production of "*acier brut*" would rise from 4.2-million tons in 1946

to 11-million tons in 1950, and "*fonte de moulage*" from 0.5-million tons in 1946 to 2.7-million tons in 1950. The investments in this branch were expected to cost 33-millard francs over the period 1947 to 1950. The production targets of 1950 would be achieved with the aid of existing means of production, reorganization, modernization, and rationalizations. The plan for the next seven years was expected to cost 70-milliard francs, and the emphasis of the investments would be on "*laminoires*".[26]

The number employed in cement production in 1938 and 1946 was given as 12,000. This figure was expected to increase to 20,000 in 1950, dependent on the expansion of production. In 1946, 3-million tons of cement were produced; in 1950, the figure should be four to five times that amount, i.e. 13.5-million tons. The investments for the period 1947 to 1950 were estimated to cost 18.5-milliard francs. By modernization and rationalization, the commission thought it would be possible to reduce coal consumption and raise the productivity from one ton of cement per six working hours in 1938 to one ton per 3.5 working hours in 1950.[27]

In agriculture the interest lay mainly in its mechanization, and the industrial prerequisites for this. Those branches that produced tractors and agricultural machinery would expand to employ 84,000 in 1950. In 1938, 40,000 were employed; in 1946, 27,000.[28]

In the transport engineering sector, particularly the state railway company, S.N.C.F., an increase in the number employed was expected: from 485,000 in 1946 to 510,000 in 1950. This figure can seem enormous; actually, it was a reduction. In 1938, 521,000 worked in this sector. Canal traffic within the French borders employed a modest 30,000 in 1938, and no big changes were anticipated during the period up to 1950, when the figure was 33,000. This corresponded to the greater activity desired for the entire country. The road transports were expected to become more important. The country's stock of lorries, which totalled 890,000 tons in 1946 should in 1950 be 1,470,000 tons. This meant an increase of 30,000 in the number employed, the total being 205,000 in 1950. These investments would amount to 78-milliard francs.[29]

We have now glimpsed some of the more important sections in the first plan, where the targets are clearly indicated. However, there were other spheres: petrol imports, textile and car industries, branches for the production of machinery and machine parts, and other mechanical engineering industry, the electrical engineering industry, chemical industries of various kinds, consumer goods industries such as the paper industry and shoe and leather goods branches, where no directed economy could be applied. At the second planning council meeting, there were commissions for only part of these industrial branches.[30]

One of the prerequisites for the French economic reorganization after World War II was the supply of labour. This could be obtained from French territories in North Africa in abundance and from other European countries that had surplus supplies of labour, such as Italy. Large parts of France, however, had and

have a low degree of industrialization; the industries are localized to a few zones. There were and are thus reserves of labour available. From the standpoint of personnel, the prospects for a good upswing in French economy therefore existed. On the other hand, skilled labour was the chief requirement, and the introduction of the necessary labour could also be thwarted by the lack of housing facilities.

Another important prerequisite for the carrying out of the plan—as pointed out in a number of places in this study—was the guaranteed supply of energy. The plan points out that for long periods France had imported coal. It was deemed necessary to import 20-million tons of coal annually up to 1950. This coal had to come from America, Poland, and the Ruhr. Referring to this, the report states: "des arrangements internationaux doivent être conclus pour nous assurer aussitôt que possible en provenance de la Ruhr, des approvisionnements réguliers de 10 à 15 millions de tonnes par an, particulièrement en coke et fines à coke pour la sidérurgie."[31] It adds that if the Saar became economically integrated into France, it would be possible to obtain 5-million tons annually from there.[32] France's dependence on Germany for rehabilitation is clearly emphasized here. How it could be carried out, was a political matter. The above-mentioned principles presented in the plan were earlier encountered in the French resistance movement and in political circles during the end-phase of World War II, as the present work has tried to show in the foregoing.[33]

THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN FRANCE DURING 1945 TO 1950 AS REFLECTED IN SOME OFFICIAL AND SEMI-OFFICIAL COMMENTARIES

French economic development after World War II is in a way reflected in the variations shown in the employment statistics. If the figures under the heading "demandes d'emploi non satisfaites" are considered, a situation favourable from the standpoint of the employees seems to have developed in the labour market up to the middle of 1947.[34] This was succeeded by a somewhat worse period with its trough in 1950, followed by an improvement that lasted until the middle of 1951. Thereafter, a deterioration ensued which continued until 1954 and was, in turn, replaced by an improvement up to 1957. This gave way to a deterioration that lasted out the decade.[35] Despite this information and without a more detailed access to the basic figures, no firmer conclusions can be reached in this matter, but the study is not intended to investigate these questions more thoroughly.

A considerable number of interesting studies have been made of the time in France after World War II. Some of these have been published in "Etudes et Conjuncture", a publication connected with Ministère de l'Economie Nationale. It discusses how the birth-rate rose rapidly after 1945, a rise that actually began in 1941.[36] During summer 1945, the large contingents of French prisoners of war had returned to France from imprisonment and work in Germany. This also

referred to the compulsorily recruited workers that Germany got at the expense of France.[37] The homecoming of the productive age classes and their return to a normal existence naturally influenced the demographic development, but a number of other factors must also have played a role and affected the population development. However, as we have pointed out earlier, France had large resources of personnel available, or could at least count on such. We can assert that in summer 1945 the labour force was there, and therefore, from that aspect, there was no hindrance—at least, not in the long run—to an economic expansion.

The price development and the control of this was, as we recall, an important chapter in the programme writing concerning the economic reorganization in France.[38] How did this develop? There is an exposé of this too in "Etudes et Conjuncture". It presents the following picture of the development: using the 1938 price level as 100, we get an index for "prix de gros" for foodstuffs in September 1944 of 275. The value was 944 twentyseven months later. The price development during the same period for highest quality meat was even bigger. After standing at 284 in October 1944, the price index rose in September 1946 to 1656. Other foodstuffs, for instance eggs, also showed high values.[39]

With the same basic year (1938 = 100) the price indexes for coal, cement, iron, and newsprint were 170, 208, 216, and 264 in July 1944. Two years later, the price indexes for these groups had the following values: 766, 511, 552, and 598 in September 1946.[40] Thus we see that the situation the research departments of the resistance movement had wanted to master had not been coped with, at least in the light of the quoted examples. "Etudes et Conjunctures" comments on the price increases: "progressivement, avec la reprise, la psychologie du consommateur, beaucoup trop influencée par la période d'occupation, où il achetait n'importe quoi à n'importe quel prix, commence à subir une certaine évolution."[41] The price situation in the hotel branch was taken as example. The high prices were avoided by using "amis à la campagne, pension chez des particuliers, choix des hôtels les moins chers".[42] The publication adds: "il en est résulté dans quelques régions un certain marasme de l'hôtellerie."[43]

These hopes were futile. The inflation continued, and towards the end of 1947 was thought to be a serious threat to the French economy. According to the opinion of "Etudes et Conjuncture", the inflation was due to "le gel, la sécheresse, le manque de dollars, les charges nées de la guerre, la modernisation de l'industrie, la Sécurité Sociale, les exportations, le déficit budgétaire, la consommation excessive, le système de distribution pléthorique, l'illogisme de la population qui demande à la fois des hausses de prix et de salaires, le stockage et la rétention des marchandises par les producteurs et les intermédiaires... etc.[44] The reasons for the unpleasant situation were thus considered to be many.

The situation of the population is perhaps partly reflected in the variations in the food prices. In 1940, one kg bread cost 3.15 francs; in 1944, the price was 3.96 francs; in 1947, 15.82 francs; in 1949, 35 francs; in 1951, 43.3 francs; in 1952, 56 francs; from that time, the rising trend stopped.[45] There was a similar situa-

tion for meat, Gruyère cheese, potatoes, milk, and red wine, to mention a few foodstuffs typical of the French people.[46]

The information given in "Etudes et Conjuncture" about agriculture and its relation to industry during the postwar years is worth noting. The plan had anticipated a large number of new tractors annually for agriculture. It had been thought necessary to have seven types of tractors in the country. However, in the event, eighteen types of tractors were produced in France. The number of foreign types imported was 76.[47] Because at this time the country obviously had insufficient resources in this sphere, a considerable variety of agrarian machinery was forced upon it. This unquestionably led to big difficulties in the matter of repairs.

Summer 1947 was exceptionally warm in Western Europe. This meant poorer harvests (75 % of the average for the period 1934 to 1938). This necessitated continued bread rationing. At this time, the ration was 200 gr/day/person. In 1948, the crop yield resembled that obtained before the war. Wine-growing, however, did not produce more than it did in 1947, and in amount, lay on a level far below that before the war. Excellent results were obtained from vegetable and fodder crop cultivation, to give a few examples.[48] The development in French agriculture during these years can be illustrated by the following figures (the period 1934—1938 = 100):[49]

1944	82
1945	65
1946	84
1947	75

The report of the French economy presented at C.F.T.C.'s 25th congress in June 1949 contains some points of view that will be discussed here.[50] It said, among other things, that it was a pity that our country does not have a satisfactory statistic accounting system. The information is often fragmentary and tardy, and that the farmers are badly informed about the real situation concerning agricultural production. However, it was pointed out that these persons were partly responsible for the shortcomings, because "systématiquement ils avaient l'habitude de faire des déclarations de récoltes inférieures à la réalité". In earlier years, surplus production had been sold on the black market at good prices. Sooner or later, however, a fresh situation would arise when more normal conditions applied, a condition under which agricultural production would be greater than the demand.[51] These observations give us reason to examine the agricultural production figures during and after the war with some reservation, an attitude that perhaps should be adopted to some degree in other branches.

We now regard the reactions in the National Assembly in face of the development on this plane. M. Jean-Raymond Guyon towards the end of 1948 said that

the basic industries were reorganized and that the country was well on its way to recovery, but there was the matter of inflation . . . He was perhaps right when he said the following, which has possibly been thought demagogic: "ne serait-ce,..., pas faire preuve d'un certain cynisme que de penser que les frais de la reconstruction et du rééquipement du pays peuvent être exclusivement supportés par les salariés, par les fonctionaires et par ces petits rentiers, ces titulaires de créances fixes qui sont les victimes principales de l'inflation ?" Business also was undoubtedly disturbed because of inflation, which was actually the opinion of the speaker.[52]

In 1948, the French trade-union movement commented on the fact that a change-over to a more free economy had taken place. It was true, C.G.T. suggested, that industrial production had developed, but inflation had dramatically reduced the purchasing power of the workers. This had led to strikes and unrest in the labour market.[53] At the beginning of 1949, the economic situation in France improved. During the first three months, for instance, the quotation on the black market for dollars and Swiss francs fell.[54] "Etudes et Conjuncture" reported a stabilization of monetary value and prices.[55] This was a phenomenon that could also be seen in other countries. Inflation in France had come to a halt, industrial production had reached the 1929 figure, and unemployment was fairly low compared with the situation before the war.[56] In short, the situation seemed to have become quite advantageous, despite such happenings as the war in Indo-China. The good position lasted also through 1950. During the autumn of that year, the conditions were characterized by "reprise très nette de l'activité économique" and by "tendence à la hausse des prix". Thus, in some way, France had reached the end of the first period after the war, the dangerous crisis was over, and a new epoch was to follow.[57]

THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST PLAN[58]

The first plan ran from 1947 to 1953. It was followed by a second plan from 1954 to 1957, and a third from 1958 to 1961. The period after 1960 is not dealt with here, but at that time too, there was, as is known, an economic planning and an organ for its administration, the commissioner's planning office. From the time allocated for plan number one, 1947 to 1953, we see that the maturity date was extended. This agrees well with the objectives laid down for the plan; it would be possible to modify or change as necessary.

If we take the figure for the total industrial production of 1949 = 100, the result for 1952 = 116. This is an increase in production that is quite substantial; none the less, it was below expectations, it should have been 125. The objectives were *circa* 93 % fulfilled, but this figure is global and means that we cannot break it down and distribute it on great success, medium results, or stagnation. If we regard agricultural production and take its level during the period 1934 to

1938 as initial value = 100, the result for 1952 = 109. The expected figure was 116. The objectives in this sector were 94 % realized.

Those sectors that specially interest us are the ones where the state had control, according to what we have discussed in the foregoing. We use the French terms: charbon, électricité, carburants, acier, ciment, tracteurs (production), tracteurs (stock on hand), engrais azotés, all strategic goods and utilities in the struggle for better material conditions for the French people.

Energy: coal production peak 1929 = 55-million tons; 1938 = 47.6-million tons, 1946 = 49.3-million, a somewhat higher value. The expected figure for 1952—1953, 60-million, was not achieved, but production managed 96 % (57.4-million) of the objectives calculated at 1946 level.

Electricity: this production was naturally relatively modest in 1929, 1.6-milliard KWH. This is connected with the tehnical level. During the 1930s, an expansion obviously occurred, perhaps followed up during the war. If the electricity production for 1938 is compared with that of 1946, the latter is somewhat higher. The 1952 figure = 40.6-milliard KWH; an increase of 77 % over the 1946 level. Thus these are the results achieved within the framework of the plan. The objectives for electricity production were 95 % fulfilled. The extension of water power supplies play an essential role here. The objectives were 100 % fulfilled. The capacity in this sector was doubled between 1946 and 1952. Rather more than 50 % of the country's electricity was based on water power in 1952.

Carburants expanded powerfully between 1946 and 1952: 668 %. Somewhat more than the expected: 115 % of the objectives.

Acier (iron and steel) increased by 6.5-million tons, i.e. 148 %, between 1946 and 1952. An 87 % fulfilment of the objectives. (1929 = 9.7-million tons.)

Cement: a 132 % increase in production up to 8.6-million tons from 1946 to 1952. Somewhat more than 100 % fulfilment of the objectives.

Tractor production, modest before 1946, increased by 1230 %. In 1952, 25,300 tractors were produced. The objectives were higher here; only 63 % of the intended 1952—1953 figure was achieved in 1952.

Tractor stocks had increased by 300 % between 1946 and 1952. In 1952, there were 200,000 tractors in the country, 100 % fulfilment of the plan.

Nitrogenous fertilizer production reached 95 % of the intended first plan figure. In 1952, 285,000 of the 300,000 tons expected were produced.

Thus, broadly speaking, the objectives were fulfilled. The group iron and steel (acier) lagged a trifle, and even more so tractor production. During the 1950s, France and the rest of Europe lived in conditions of shortage, where demand for products characterized industry.[59]

16. The second and third plans

THE SECOND PLAN

The publication "La Situation en France", prepared and published in July 1952 by the bank Crédit Commercial de France, presented the following perspectives on the development: "retraçant, l'année dernière, l'évolution économique et financière pendant la période juillet 1950—juin 1951, nous constations que la guerre de Corée, qui avait éclaté quelques jours avant le début de la dite période, avait provoqué sur le plan international un retour offensif de l'inflation."[1] The war in Korea had inspired the quoted texts about price increases in raw material in the western world. The Korean prices seem thus to have stimulated the economy of the U.S.A. and Western Europe.[2] However, the various countries had their problems. In France, the currency problem dominated, as we will see from the debate in the country on the economic and political plane.[3] "Devant la poussée inflationiste déclenchée dans le monde par la crise coréenne, l'économie et la monnaie françaises apparaissaient, dès d'abord, vulnérables."[4] The publication briefly recalled the weaknesses of the French economy at this time: 1) before 1949, instability; from and including 1949, a certain balance; 2) an extremely sensitive opinion resulting from "la profonde dépréciation du franc survenue dans les années qui avaient précédé le retour à cet équilibre relatif"; 3) too high taxes and social costs in view of the economic structure of France, i.e. a considerable proportion of the population tied to the agrarian sector.[5]

The present study is not meant to investigate in fuller detail the causes of the economic development taking the form it did. Instead, the object is to follow up a few factors that perhaps influenced the course of the development and to describe a few characteristics. The beginning of the 1950s saw changes. A more liberal attitude towards industry seems at this time to be predominant in leading political circles. C.F.T.C., the Christian trade union in France, characterized these circles at its congress in May 1951 as: "ils nous ont plongés dans un état de pré-crise caractérisé par une sous-production et une sous-consommation parallèles... Ils ont favorisé la mise en place d'un néo-dirigisme d'intérêts corporatifs étroits et égoïstes au seul profit des possédants."[6] A similar attitude was also adopted by C.G.T.[7] The relations between the State and the enterprises, on the one hand, and the workers, on the other, seem to have been less satisfactory, if "comrade" Benoit Frachon's account is to be believed. It was quoted in C.G.T.'s organ "La Voix du Peuple" in 1951: 13 workers were killed by the police . . ., several thousand injured during strikes and demonstrations, 1200 sent to prison.[8] These features naturally do not belong to the general picture of French industry. However, it is to be expected that a trade-union organization would display and examine less satisfactory aspects of working life. The quoted conditions indicate organized features in French communal life, phenomèna that are connected to the weak position of the workers, and this was perhaps not solely due to the

divisions among the people, but also to the patriarchal and other traditions of the country, to the incompleted industrialization process, and to large reserves of labour within the French spheres of influence.

According to "La Situation en France", stability in French communal life, from an economic and monetary aspect, characterized 1953 and the beginning of 1954. The results of the past two years were pleasing. The satisfactory situation was due to the relative stability of prices and wages during that period, to the good position of the franc in the exchange market, to the improvement of the balance of trade, to the increased saving in the country, &c.[9]

The favourable economic development continued during 1954 and the beginning of 1955: "ce qui a principalement marqué la période écoulée depuis le début de l'année passée, c'est l'expansion de l'activité économique. La stagnation à laquelle des branches importantes de cette activité s'étaient trouvées en proie au lendemain du renversement de la tendence des prix et de l'élimination des ferments a pris fin."[10] The publication also expressed the opinion that, to a great extent, the upswing was due to the reforms carried out and maintained by Pinay and his successors.[11] The upswing continued to be reported in the 1956 and 1957 issues of "La Situation en France".

We can now look at the second plan, which ran from 1954 to 1957, and summarize what was achieved. First, we notice that the size of the production was anticipated for the final year, but no further. In total, a powerful increase in production was achieved; this exceeded expectations. The group "mechanical engineering industry and electrotechnical industry" expanded considerably (1957 index = 155, 1952 = 100), the industrial production as a whole rose to index 146 (1952 = 100); 125—130 had been expected. The production of coal, electricity, gas, steel, and cement lay around the values expected in the plan. So did agricultural production. House building exceeded expectations, 270,000 flats ready, 240,000 expected.[12]

In the commissioner's planning office, the period of the second plan has since been characterized as a time when it was necessary to improve production, i.e. put the emphasis on quality and price.[13] France must abandon its isolation attitude and prepare its industry for foreign competition. The second plan had considerably wider objectives than the first, more profound, more extensive with an eye to the development of agriculture, house building, and the colonial territories. In other words, it was a period when the French were introduced into a more normal situation from a West European standpoint, in the matter of satisfied demands for living standards and so on. The powerful economic improvement naturally resulted in expansion in certain sectors, which created a changed economic structure in the country of a type perhaps not anticipated from the beginning.[14] A coming chapter discusses in more detail the development in French industry during the 1950s.[15]

The 1958 edition of "La Situation en France" was sub-headed "September 1958". A foreword gave the following explanation of the delay: "la grave Crise politique que traversait alors la France nous a paru faire obstacle à la diffusion de cette brochure. Même après l'installation au pouvoir du Gouvernement présidé par le Général de Gaulle, les lendemains paraissaient encore si incertains que nous n'avons pas osé faire paraître une étude qui, analysant les divers éléments de la conjoncture économique et financière, comportait trop de points d'interrogation pour l'avenir."[16] The economic expansion during the 1950s and the achieved, previously indicated, stability were not corresponded by a political stability. The Fourth Republic ended suddenly. Despite the economic progress in the country, an economic crisis occurred which caused the political change. If we refer to the drafts of the constitution or the general outlines of it that were drafted before the liberation and found among André Philip's papers, we see there that a strong government was thought to be necessary to carry out the big economic reform programme.[17] André Philip with friends of the same opinion failed to gain a hearing for his views. It can perhaps be explained by the fact that immediately after the end of the war the feeling was that there had been too much autocratic government. The bitter years of the Vichy regime laid the foundation for a reaction that resulted in a dictatorial parliament, which because of the party split during the postwar period, and because of the rather general individualistic attitude, does not appear to have functioned completely satisfactorily. At all events, the crisis that occurred in 1957—1958, shown by, among other things, a considerable increase in imports and also in exports, but with an import surplus, does not seem to have been contained. The French monetary preparedness failed to function as it should have done, to judge from the text of the publication by Crédit Commercial de France in 1958.[18] A political crisis hastened the course. Here, we do not follow this course, we merely point out that, towards the end of the 1950s, France was on its way to becoming what it ought to be—a welfare state, where the attention of the government and the people was oriented on their own country and, among other things, its introduction into the Western European Economic Community, a community that, to judge from the thesis of Claude Prêcheur, for instance, seems natural on this plane.[19] Thereby the economic control of raw material producing spheres, necessary for France, could be transferred to a plane other than that which had been connected to the imperialistic system. The development can perhaps be interpreted as a rationalization measure in step with the demands of the times.

The issues of "La Situation en France" published in 1959 and 1960, and in the last year of the present investigation, 1961, are to a greater extent than before occupied with political matters. This is natural, in view of the measures undertaken by the new regime on the economic and political plane.

The new constitution was actually identical with that presented by one of the

leading personalities of the resistance movement, Blocq-Mascart, "except for § 16". Now there was, or should be, a strong government in France. It would give the country political stability, a supplement—although not a necessary one, to judge by the development during the 1950s—to an economic expansion. The power concentration that the resistance movement in France and the Algiers group around André Philip and others had outlined, however, was justified then by the big economic and social programme that had to be carried out during the postwar period. The Fifth Republic was a reaction to the Fourth Republic in the matter of constitution. However, the economic objectives under de Gaulle were not now based on state interventions, but more on the concept of free enterprise. Actually, the state intervention in industry was already considerable.

The third plan ran in periods from 1958 to 1961. If we consider what the basic sectors were expected to achieve—for instance, coal, electricity, other fuel, steel, cement—the results were satisfactory. The production results in those branches were largely what had been intended. Production and consumption of natural gas, however, was many times larger in 1957 than had been expected, and that can also be said concerning the production of chemical products: 1961 index rose to 188, whereas the final figure for 1961 in this branch had been estimated at 145 (1956 = 100).[20] Mechanical engineering industry and electrotechnical industry combined failed to fulfil the predictions, although they came close to it: objective 142, achievement 137.[21]

These lumped figures, however, conceal a large and medium success, and also, of course, stagnation in a great number of important branches that employed big teams of workers. The group "appareils radio-électriques et électroniques", for instance, forged on to the unit 190 instead of the expected 150. Industries électriques reached 150, expected value 144. The car industry, sensitive to international trends, achieved 140 in 1960, six units below predictions. In 1960, however, this branch had shown better results. The group "tracteurs et machines agricoles" showed 106 instead of 141. What does this indicate? Let us presume that some of the following factors lay at the back of it: the poor profitability within French agriculture, the previously big investments in this branch, and the considerable foreign competition.[22]

Other branches showed varying, but in general good, results. The plastic industry naturally made great progress, the timber production was above expectations, 137/119, as was the paper industry, 155/136. The leather industry followed the pattern mainly intended, 122/120. The final result for the whole group processing industry, "industries de transformation", was 134. The third plan asked for 136. This group or sector of industry, the most important from the aspect of employment, thus fulfilled expectations.[23]

Agriculture also showed a number of results concerning the amount of production. The factors that played a role here are, apart from the degree of industrialization of the country, the "clerk of the weather", marketing possibilities, price structure of agricultural products, and so on. It is put that way in order

to avoid having to enumerate the production results, which in general followed the objectives. France is a rich farming country. It can easily produce large amounts of foodstuffs of the highest quality, but the French market, with its 50-million, is too small. Big problems exist in this sector, but also great possibilities for the future after perhaps sometimes painful structural changes[24]

Housing: 320,000 flats were ready for occupation in 1961; 20,000 more than hoped for.[25] However, we know that the housing sector is one of the most severe problems in France. This is related to the big concentration of industry to a few regions.[26] In this respect, the situation of France is shared by a large number of other industrial countries, and the social problems connected thereto unfortunately are not lacking in other directions.

What was important for the economic development of France after the end of World War II? Was it the economic ideas of the resistance movement and the political parties? On the whole, they probably had little importance for the development in the 1950s. Here, however, the plan or plans played some role and the idea of the plan came, as we have seen, from the Algiers group and Jean Monnet.[27] In an interview on 4 June 1964, Bertrand de Jouvenel explained it by stating:

> Clever people formulated the plan, and it was above all important that the plan should define the investment targets. The chief or commissioner of the plan did not have the power he claimed, but in the course of time he became increasingly stronger. The governments were weak. The first thing that happened at the change of government was: The commissioner was summoned: "Manage your affairs so that nobody can complain", the President said, "see that all are satisfied, farmers, syndicates, everybody." The commissioner for the plan could thereafter go around and say: "See, this we will do, this we will achieve, . . ." All this created a climate favourable for investments, which in turn produced the upswing . . ."[28]

So far, Bertrand de Jouvenel. The wish that existed in leading French circles to control in some way the economic potential of Germany in order to avoid conflicts of the type World War I and II has gradually—in association with a number of factors—resulted in the founding of the European Economic Community. However, this also sprang from those ideas originating in the resistance movement and other French political circles during World War II.

The concept of French industry and its development during the 1950s that we have so far gained is not particularly profound. We will therefore discuss the French industrial structure in more detail.[29] It is reasonable to draw attention to the resemblance between the industrial structure of the German Federal Republic, the country France wished to control, and that of France towards the end of the 1950s. These two countries are now even more firmly connected to each other in the attempt to create a great European market.

17. Economic planning during the postwar years—Summary

The prolonged economic and social depression and stagnation in France, begun in 1930 and still making itself felt in 1938, led to a foreign affairs debacle during the initial phase of World War II. Not even during World War II was there any general new thinking in economic and social matters. The economic structure of the country bore a certain agrarian quality. The demographic picture had for a long time differed from that of its neighbours: lower birth rate, lower population increase.[1] On the other hand, France had established connexions with large and densely populated territories of North Africa, whose labour force could be exploited in the productive process, mainly localized to the mother-country. France was also an immigration country for Europeans, for instance, Poles, Spaniards, and Italians.

There were thus resources, personnel and natural. It was necessary to emerge from the prevailing situation. The research sections of the French resistance movement thought that this could be accomplished by

1. carrying through a directed economy
2. the introduction of worker influence in the companies
3. socialization of the large basic industries.[2]

This radical programme was initiated both from socialistic and from republican circles. Léon Blum, as we have noted, was initiator or, at least, the inspirer. His ideas won approval or perhaps he was the first, or among the first, to interpret a current in the times, to propose changes in the French society, which increasing numbers of persons judged necessary. Some parts of the programme, the nationalizations, were judged by, for instance, René Courtin, conservative-liberal, not as economically necessary, but as politically necessary. For the socialists, the outcome of the war provided an opportunity to carry out a programme they had nursed for a long time. Brooding over all, loomed the collective figure of General de Gaulle, whom one had to have or to take, as there was none other.[3]

The research department of the resistance movement does not seem to have made it clear or discussed how the directed economy would be achieved; at least, M. François de Menthon's testimony gives that idea.[4] But the Algerian group, which included André Philip, Jules Moch, and Jean Monnet, thoroughly investigated this matter. The result of their deliberations was that there should be a plan. This was the beginning of the economic planning in France during the postwar period.[5]

The immediate objectives on the economic and social plane after the war were obviously:

1. Development of production in the country
2. Increase of production per capita in the country

3. Full employment
4. Improved standard of living.[6]

The preparatory work for realizing the first plan resulted in the formulation of these four points. Jean Monnet, a businessman on a large scale and active in the Algerian group, was now the planning commissioner.[7]

It was believed that a country's living standard depended on the degree of its technical development, which took place in various sectors of a country's economy. This, it was, that ought to be changed. Many factors played a role: shortage of foodstuffs, mortality, shortage of fuel, and shortage of housing. These had to be overcome in some way. Through a structural change in the technical productive process, it would be possible to attain this goal. Coal, electricity, iron, steel, cement, agricultural machinery, and improved transport were most needed.[8] They should be encouraged by investments in order to achieve the French production peak reached in 1929, which had never so far been surpassed. That was the target for 1948. The production goal of the mentioned branches was established in the first plan. It was essential to reach it. The goals for the other production were indicative. Not only the 1948 production, but also that up to 1950 was determined. Those branches whose production result was established beforehand for 1950, and which were thus directly controlled by the state, were chosen with the fact in mind that their expansion was a prerequisite for a production increase in French industry and French agriculture. The guaranteed expansion of the chosen sectors was intended to bring about possibilities for increased production of, e.g., cars, building material, and textiles.[9]

The first plan, as far as concerned the coal sector, naturally specified a production increase, a modernization of production methods, and also a large number of investments. In 1946, it was calculated that during a 10-year period investments of 115-milliard francs would be necessary for these purposes. One of the most important problems in this sector was the supply of labour. Would there be sufficient for the future? In 1964, 326,000 workers were employed in the branch, but about 60,000 of these were prisoners of war, and it had to be faced that this labour force would soon no longer be available. The demand for manpower in the coal industry, despite the prisoners of war, was not completely satisfied; 50,000 more workers were needed.[10]

It was estimated that the electric power production would increase by 3 to 4-milliard KWH annually. The number of new employees annually was assessed at 2000. The labour force was calculated at 86,000 during the final year 1950. The investments in this sector would amount to 50-milliard francs annually at the 1946 value. Between 1947 and 1950, 200-milliard francs would thus be invested. This would be used for extending the power lines, transformer stations, and especially hydroelectric plants and thermal power stations based on coal and which consequently ought to be located on suitable sites. For the construction of dams, 22,000 men were employed; these were not counted in the above figures. It was estimated that this figure would treble during the next two years. Carpenters and bricklayers were mainly required for these works, a need that was expected to be partly met by immigration.[11]

The increased production of iron and steel would result in the branch in 1950 employing 170,000 workers, i.e. an increase of 53,000 over 1946. The production was estimated to

increase very considerably: "acier brute" from 4.2-million tons in 1946 to 11-million tons in 1950, and "font de moulage" from 0.5-million tons in 1946 to 2.7-million tons in 1950.[12]

The investments in this branch were calculated to amount to 33-milliard francs during the period 1947 to 1950. The production level of 1950 would be reached by the available technical equipment. Moreover, rebuilding, modernizations, and rationalizations would be undertaken. The plan for the coming seven years was anticipated to cost 70-milliard francs, and the emphasis of the investments would be on rolling mills (laminoires).[13]

The number of employees in cement production was quoted for 1938 and 1946 at 12,000. It was presumed that this would increase to 20,000 in 1950, dependent on the expansion of the production. In 1946, this was 3-million tons of cement; in 1950, the figure would be almost five times as high, i.e. 13.5-million tons. The investments for the period 1947 to 1950 were expected to amount to 18.5-milliard francs.[14]

The interest in agriculture lay primarily in its mechanization and the industrial prerequisites for this. Those branches that produced tractors and agrcultural machinery would expand to give 84,000 workers employment in 1950. In 1938 and 1946, the number of employees in this sector was 40,000 and 27,000, respectively.[15]

In transport engineering, particularly in the state railway company S.N.C.F., the number of employees was anticipated to increase from 485,000 in 1946 to 510,000 four years later. This can seem an enormous number of workers. In actual fact, it is a reduction. In 1938, 521,000 worked in this sector. The number employed in canal traffic within France's borders was much more modest: about 30,000 in 1938 and no great changes were visualized during the period up to 1950. The road traffic was naturally also expected to expand.[16]

We have now had a few glimpses of the more important parts of the first plan, where the targets are clearly indicated. However, there are other spheres: the petroleum industry, the textile industry, the car industry, branches for the manufacture of machines and machine parts, and other mechanical engineering industry, the electro-technical industry, various kinds of chemical industry, paper industry, the shoe and leather-goods branches, where no directed economy should be introduced.[17]

It can be seen that one of the prerequisites of the French economic rehabilitation after World War II was the supply of labour, and it was evidently believed that this would be available from the French controlled territories in North Africa and from other European countries that had a surplus labour, for instance, Italy. Large parts of France, moreover, had—and still have—a low level of industrialization, because a very large number of enterprises are located to a few zones of the country. Thus there were big reserves of labour available. On the personnel side, there ought to be good conditions for a French economic upswing. But naturally, it was primarily skilled labour that was wanted. The insufficient housing resources could also be a form of restriction. The other condition was the certainty of the supply of energy. For a long time, France had been importing coal. Poland, America, and Germany were suppliers.[18] It was believed that the Ruhr would be a regular source of supply, 10 to 15 million tons of coke intended for the French iron and steel industries. The Saar ought to be economically integrated with France, and should deliver 5-million tons annually.[19]

France's dependence on Germany for its rehabilitation is obvious here, irrespective of how it should be regulated: by occupation, by treaty, by union, or by some other means. It must be the duty of the politicians to decide how.

The first plan had an extended maturity date up to 1953. This agrees well with what was anticipated earlier—to be able to modify or change as required.[20]

If we let the total industrial production in 1949 = 100, then in 1952 = 116. It is a production increase of substantial character; none the less, it is below the expected. The result

ought to have been 125. 93 % of what was expected was reached, but we cannot with this figure, which is total, as basis see this distribution as great success, medium results, or stagnation in industry. If we consider the agricultural production and take its level during the period 1934 to 1938 as initial value = 100, in 1952 = 109. The expected was 116. 94 % of the expected was reached in agriculture.[21]

What was the situation in those sectors where the state had control? The coal production amounted to 57.4-million tons in the year 1952—1953. The expected figure was 60-million tons. This means that the expected was almost achieved. The same concerns electric power production. Here, the expansion of the supplies of hydro-electric power played a fundamental role. Somewhat more than 50 % of the electric energy in the country was based on water power in 1952.[22]

Iron and steel production did not quite come up to standard. Here, 87 % of the expected was achieved. Cement production followed the programme by more than 100 %.[23]

Tractor production was heavy in 1952—25,300 units—but more had been expected. Only 63 % of the programme was fulfilled. The stock of tractors increased, however, through imports. Here, 100 % accomplishment of what was written into the plan was realized. Nitrogenous fertilizer production was responsible for 95 % of the expected.[24]

We thus see, in the main, an accomplishment of the first plan. During the 1950s France—and indeed the whole of Europe—would live under conditions of shortage, where the demand for products would characterize industry. For France, this first period must to some extent be described as protectionistic; the growing industry must be protected from outside competition.

The beginning of the 1950s brought changes. A more liberal attitude in economic affairs seemed to predominate in leading political circles. When the second plan, which ran from 1954 to 1957, succeeded the first, there were no longer any directives; instead, the size of the production for the final year was estimated.

In total, a considerable increase in production was achieved, exceeding what had been expected. The group mechanical engineering industry and electro-technical industry showed a powerful expansion (1952 = 100, 1957 = 155). The overall industrial production went up to index 146 (1952 = 100). It had been expected to reach 125—130. The production of coal, electricity, gas, steel, and cement lay close to the values anticipated in the plan. So did agricultural production. Housing, too, showed higher figures than expected. The plan called for 240,000 completed flats; the final figure was 270,000.[25]

During this period, it was necessary to improve production, to put the emphasis on quality and price. France must also abandon its isolationistic attitude and prepare its industry for outside competition. The second plan had a considerably wider target than the first; more profound, more extensive, aimed at the development of agriculture, housing, and the colonial territories. In other words, it was a period when the French people—from a West European standpoint—were faced with a more normal situation, at least concerning demands for higher living standards and so on. The powerful economic expansion was naturally reflected in a growth of certain sections and branches, as well as in wages. This brought about a changed economic structure in the country of a type perhaps not anticipated in the beginning.

Towards the end of the 1950s, France was on its way to becoming what it ought to be, a welfare state, where the attention of the government and the population was focused on their own country. This meant a lowered interest in the colonial world and an increased interest in its entry into the West European community.

During this time, France was characterized by a certain economic stability and a political instability. The latter was due to the fact that the proposal of André Philip and the Algerian group for the creation of a strong governmental power was not followed. The intention of the proposal was to guarantee the accomplishment of the great economic and social reforms.

The Fourth Republic ended suddenly. Despite the economic advances in the country, there seemed to have occurred an economic crisis that brought about the political change. The years 1957—1958 were also marked by a considerable increase in imports as well as in exports, but with an import surplus. The French monetary preparedness did not function here as it should have done. A political crisis hastened the course.[26]

The new constitution is identical with the proposal of Blocq-Mascart, except for § 16. The political stability that his proposal wanted to introduce was motivated by the economic and social reforms that were to be put into force. The economic objectives under de Gaulle, however, were not based on new state interventions, but more on the idea of a free economy. Actually, the state intervention in industry was considerable.

The third plan ran during 1958 to 1961. If we consider what was expected to be attained within the basic sectors, for instance, coal, electricity, other fuel, steel, and cement, the results were satisfactory. The production results in the mentioned sectors were, in the main, as anticipated as were those in a number of other branches. Actually, higher values were often reached.[27]

What did the economic and social ideas of the resistance movement mean for the postwar period in France? The question is difficult to answer precisely, but in general, it can be said: They meant that French foreign policy was directed, i.e. that the German-French economic collaboration was established. Instead of occupation, there was collaboration. It can have been due to the high political balance of power after the war, to Germany and France being forced into each other's arms. We have observed the occurrence of French protectionistic policy and perhaps the break away from a European isolationism of an older time. With the new ideas came a considerable state influence on the economy this has remained. The powerful French administration strove to bring about a renewal of the economic structure in the country. In the long run, it was perhaps obvious that the colonial world would become independent, but it is not altogether certain that this was quite clear during World War II and immediately afterwards. For instance, the colonial empire was counted on in the reconstruction of the apparatus of production. A French birth-rate policy was also outlined. Perhaps child allowances and such like have had positive results in this. However, as can be observed, the French birth-rate rose already during the Vichy regime, i.e.

immediately after 1940. Did the state investments in production play a positive or a negative role for the development during the 1950s? The question is not easy to answer. Each branch must be studied separately. The planning idea and the plans have undoubtedly played a part; the idea of a plan came, as we saw, from the Algerian group and Jean Monnet.

Point 1 and point 3 on the programme of the French resistance movement: the accomplishment of a directed economy and socialization of the large basic industries. These were thus carried out completely or partly. The directed economy ended at an early stage, but an expansion of industry came about. The big chance for the employees, point 2, the introduction of worker influence in the companies, what happened here? The results did not reflect the hopes. French labour movement failed to assert its rightful interests.

18. Aspects of the French trade-union movement during the postwar period

We recall the position, envisaged in wartime investigations, that the French trade-union movement would occupy in the post-war period. It would be strong, and the influence of the trade unions would be great.[1] How did the course and development in this sector turn out? We know that the French trade-union movement did not have the influence that rightly belonged to it. Why? One of the leading politicians who took part in drawing up the policies of the economic and social reforms after the 1939—1945 war, André Philip, considered that the failure of the anticipated successes to appear in this sphere was because the workers in general were incapable of utilizing the possibilities given to them.[2] Did this result from the trade union disagreements in France?

There is little doubt that the French workers could fairly easily have reached a better position if they had appeared united. "We Frenchmen have a lot of ideas, too many excellent ideas, but we never succeed in fully realizing them, and thus the best of these ideas is discredited", was stated, among other things, at the C.F.T.C.'s 26th Congress in May 1951.[3] This statement is naturally an exaggeration. However, it is impossible to dissociate oneself from the following, which is a continuation of it: "Unless we have a lever for our actions, we will not get far with our doctrines and ideas."[4] The occurrence of trade unions competing with one another in the labour market has thus led to a weakened position for the workers. The central organizations C.F.T.C. and C.G.T., to mention two influential unions, ought to have combined for action. This, in general, did not occur. Controversy on some matter between two unions could result in the different unions starting the next strike action at different times. Added to this, quite a large number of persons, during the period immediately after World War II, were not organized. This attitude was frequently adopted to emphasize

an independent status. It would be difficult to find out how many persons were trade union members. At least, this is true for C.F.T.C. The figures of membership are never reported, they are secret. The following table exemplifies this. The figures are taken from one of the C.F.T.C. publications:[5]

Evolution des effectifs C.F.T.C.

	1955	1961
Secteur Privé Industrie	24.50	36.01
Secteur Privé Employé	20.17	15.50
Secteur mixte	4.93	6.52
Secteur Fonction Publique	24.95	21.77
Secteur Nationalisé (Sauf Banques-Assurances-S.S.)	20.72	17.45
Divers	4.73	2.75
	100	100

The table shows displacements in the relative distribution of the membership in 1955 and 1961. However, it does not report the number of persons that belonged to the organization. The publication "Les Etudes Sociales et Syndicales" shows an estimate of the number of members in C.F.T.C. at this time.[6] The presentation calculates that each person present at a conference represented 25 voters. As 12,471 were present on this occasion, the membership on the basis of the calculation totalled *circa* 310,000. The following result was obtained:[7]

	Index submitted by C.F.T.C.	Number of members
1956	100	310,000
1957	110	341,000
1958	113.3	351,230
1959	111.4	345,340
1960	118.9	368,690
1961	122.5	379,750
1962	128.6	398,660

To judge by the above table, a rapid increase in the organization's membership took place during these years. With the active French population (about 20-million) in mind, the number of members is small. Enquiries from representatives of C.F.T.C. have confirmed that the calculation represents approximately the real situation. The church and the communist party were, and are still partly, involved in the French trade union movement; naturally, this competition has not strengthened the French labour movement.

Within C.F.T.C. in 1953, the opinion was that the difficulties in reaching acceptable living conditions for the French employees originated in the "muddled state of French economy".[8] The organization expressed it: "There occurred over-production and underconsumption at the same time."[9] Therefore co-ordination was needed in industry. The car companies produced cars that were too expensive; the companies—both state owned and private—worked without planning and followed only their own development; the textile companies suffered from a structural crisis where no cure was to be found. Poor mines could not be closed down because the workers could not be found fresh jobs . . ." Personal interests had too much scope in French society, and the worst danger was "l'anarchie de dirigismes privés ou publics". There was also a great deal of talk about parasitism, by which was meant the different income levels in society. The importance of a stable money value was also emphasized, so that "the common people" had their savings protected.[10]

C.G.T.'s congress the same year, i.e. in June 1953, naturally showed a left-wing attitude, which was also partly hostile to the other trade-union organizations. At this congress, it was said: ". . . La lutte pour les revendications a été dure." In the struggle against C.G.T., all available means had been employed, and the capitalist side had had the help of Force Ouvriére and of C.F.T.C., it was said.[11] Prime Minister Pinay was characterized as l'homme du Conseil national du Patronat francais and the attitude of the C.G.T. towards him was negative.[12]

The C.G.T.'s position at this time is also illustrated by the arrest of the leader of the communists, Jacques Duclos, during demonstrations in spring 1953 against the American General Ridgeway. This was commented on by C.G.T. as follows: "C'est le coup classique du complot utilisé par les gouvernements capitalistes aux prises avec l'opposition grandissante du peuple à leur politique de seule exploitation et la guerre."[13]

How sincere was this attitude? On the basis of studied material, it cannot with certainty be established, but it can be said, on the other hand, that the relation to the authorities at the beginning of the 1950s must have been bitter in many quarters, as the following information also proves: "13 workers were killed by the police, several thousands were injured during strikes and demonstrations, 1200 were sent to prison for such actions."[14]

The economic planning in France, from the beginning, aroused the greatest interest among the trade unions. This was a way in which the trade-union interests could get control of production and thereby an improvement in the living and working conditions of the employees. Nationalizations were therefore given trade union support; nationalization had for a long time been one of the main planks in the socialist programme. As we saw earlier in the section about the objectives of the economic and social reforms, it also advocated state control of the big business banks. This failed. Had it succeeded, it would have been possible to control the entire industrial production apparatus, according to what has been stated at an interview with spokesmen for C.G.T. De Gaulle, however, declared

that he would resign if this sector was nationalized. For these and perhaps for other reasons, the matter was abandoned.[15]

The representation of the trade-union movement in the French planning organization became weak from and including the second plan during our investigation period. Within C.F.T.C., it was pointed out in 1959 that there was not a single trade union representative as chairman or reporter on any of the 19 existing planning commissions.[16] The few representatives of the workers meant in reality that this group had lost a part of its influence in an important sector of the French social system. However, there remained a control possibility for the citizens; through the National Assembly, the influence of the citizens could make itself felt on the plan. In this context, C.F.T.C. in 1959 expressed the following: "Le Parlement ne peut que l'adopter (the plan) ou le rejeter totalement sans pouvoir y changer un iota... et sans pouvoir proposer une autre solution..." At the same time, the plan was considered in C.F.T.C. thus: "dans le système français actuel... le plan n'est qu'un document très souple qui ne constitue pas... le cadre de références des décisions économiques prises au cours de son application. « Le pouvoir économique » détenu par les dirigeants des grosses entreprises industrielles et établissements bancaires est nettement distinct du pouvoir politique, détenu en principe par les répresentants élus de la nation."[17] It can, of course, be asked where did the reforms go? But then, certain realities are perhaps obscured. The reforms were planned in a desperate situation after a long period of stagnation in a number of spheres. The situation, however, had changed, the economic growth was in full progress during the 1950s. Under those circumstances, an insistence on the old objectives prevented a sound development, perhaps, in French industrial life. None the less, there must still have been advocates for state directed economy. Blocq-Mascart, for instance, at an interview in 1964, insisted on that course.

What was the attitude of the employers to the economic planning in the country? M. Barjonet, secretary of C.G.T., in an interview in 1964 gave the following opinion on the matter: At first, the interest of the employers was not particularly developed. In time, however, it became obvious that treatment of the production problems was valuable, and thus the attitude of the employer group changed. Barjonnet and his colleagues on the same occasion expressed C.G.T.'s views on the question of nationalization. The nationalized sectors benefited private industry to a considerable extent. The Barjonet group maintained that S.N.C.F. (the State railways), E.D.F. (the State electricity company), and the nationalized coal sector sometimes provided services and products at prices that lay below the production costs. How the state price calculations were arrived at was, in the opinion of C.G.T., extremely complicated and an increasingly secret chapter. The possibilities for public insight were thus reduced in these respects during the course of the period. The big trusts got energy and so forth, provided by the state enterprises, at prices even lower than those charged to smaller enterprises. Barjonnet mentioned that there were perhaps some exaggera-

tions in the trade organ's standpoint on this matter, but he said that they were not large. The private enterprises buy cheaply from the state-owned sector and resell products at prices not in the least advantageous.[18]

Obviously, it is the duty of an organ such as C.G.T. or C.F.T.C. to keep a sharp and critical eye on what takes place in those sectors in society that concern the worker. Here, negative or positive sides can, more or less, claim attention. To draw general conclusions without deeper investigations into these matters is impossible. This does not necessarily mean that Barjonet's opinion would be less valuable. What does the other side say? In an interview (on 10 June 1964) with former Cabinet Minister Robert Buron (M.R.P.), some of the views submitted by Barjonnet were presented to him. Buron stated, about the price policy of the state enterprises that: He who buys much always gets a rebate, as is obvious, and it is a principle applied even in socialist countries . . . The enterprises buy cheaply where they can. This also applies to Russia. The behaviour of the enterprises is conditioned by the circumstances under which they exist.[19]

However, we will not venture into these problems; instead, we return to the power position of the trade unions movement during the period after World War II. Here, too, we will pause at the interview with former Cabinet Minister Robert Buron.

— What role did the trade-union movements play during the period after the war?

— They played a big role, but unfortunately their views were restricted. Well, perhaps a few leaders had vision, but in general, it was lacking.[20]

The trade-union movement seemed to become divided. The workers had failed to carry into effect the "closed-shop" principle. Their tactics aimed at local strikes within, for instance, the Paris communication system, strikes that often lasted for only one day, and which, because the trade-union membership and the distribution on different unions was less than 100 %, often did not lead to total paralysis of transports. A spokesman for C.F.T.C. has stated that this type of strike was justified by, among other things, the wish of the trade unions to show that they were active. A better proof would perhaps have been a demonstrable improvement in the wage packets. However, we must not overlook the great difficulties encountered on various levels in France. The reform planners had actually envisaged an expansion of the production apparatus with the help of the workers, i.e. by their wages and benefits being kept down to some extent.[21] The severe inflation towards the end of the 1940s naturally did not favour the efforts and interests of the workers. It is obvious that a more profound investigation concerning the events in 1948 would bring into the light of day facts that threw a light on the later development.

It might be of interest to discuss how the wage rates were set during the period. The period after World War I introduced into France the law that regulated working conditions. During the Popular Front, other similar legislation came into being. It was stipulated that the most representative trade unions would take

part in the wage negotiations and sign the agreement. Here it was obligatory that, to have the right to sign, the syndicates must fulfil a number of conditions. It must have a certain minimum membership; during the war, its behaviour must have been patriotic, a stipulation that was valid far into the years after 1945, and so on. The Minister, by decree, could stipulate agreements concerning all employers in a branch; also those who did not belong to the syndicate that had signed.[22]

During the period 1936—39, agreements of this type were made. At the outbreak of war, wages and prices were frozen at 1939 level, and these conditions still obtained during the time of the Vichy Government, although adjustments were made. From 1944—45, thus after the liberation, a directionistic policy was carried out in France up to 1950. Wages and prices were fixed.[23]

At Ministère de Travail, documents are kept that show that everything was regulated in detail concerning how much the different worker categories would earn. Various stipulations existed for the different branches in industry, for the metal industry, for the chemical industry, and so on. The workers were distributed on a number of categories, starting from the lowest paid groups:

Wage index	Wage group	Occupation
100	M 1	Street cleaners and similar
	M 2	
	OS 1	Skilled workers, for instance, fitters on assembly lines
	OS 2	
	OP 1	Skilled workers with diploma
	OP 2	
170—200	OP 3	

As can be seen in the table, the skilled worker was paid twice as much as the least qualified worker. Similar stipulations and distribution existed for office and administrative personnel. The earnings of the typist and the draughtsman lay from 100 to 350 on the wage scale; for the engineer, the figure was higher, 300 to 600 to 700, according to qualifications. There was a basic level and a ceiling. All wages were set according to this system, and Ministère de Travail decided the wages.[24]

Cost of living index regions also existed. This was decided for the various regions by a committee headed by a prefect. The municipalities were graded according to the living costs. It was naturally more expensive in a place with 250,000 inhabitants than in one with 2500. The three factors investigated were: the number of inhabitants, the pricing system in the region, and the degree of industrialization. Thus the Paris region was separated into four zones.[25]

This was the position up to 1950; thereafter, freer conditions were demanded. Actually, from 1948 a more liberal regime was on the way. The law of 1 February

1950 allowed the syndicates to negotiate. C.G.T., C.F.T.C., and others were permitted to appear as negotiators, as already described. Gradually, the wage system became complicated with additions, deductions, and so on.[26] We thus see that the trade unions through state measures in the wages sphere during the years that followed immediately after the end of the war had a weaker position than they would otherwise have had. Moreover, the trade union disagreements contributed to the failure of the workers to obtain sufficient control of the wage development.

Were these conditions decisive when it was necessary to find a reason for the relatively poor position of the workers in France? Let us see how André Philip interpreted the course:

> ... The Comité d'entreprises (the joint industrial council), which came into existence after the war, contained a trisection: one-third consisted of representatives of the state, one-third technicians, and one-third worker representatives. Gradually, the workers representation was reduced. They were wanted, but they were insufficiently educated to be able to continue. The nationalizations became an economic success, but a social setback. This was because of lack of professionally skilled workers. Les Comités d'entreprises are wealthy, especially where the manager is a strong personality. They are allowed to manage the lunch service, the day nursery, and the holiday home themselves, but on condition that the manager personally looks after the business side. I do not know why the workers have not taken more responsibility.
>
> — Perhaps it is a matter of wages. If the wages were increased, perhaps the feeling of belongingness and of being able to make decisions would develop.
>
> — Hardly. It is tradition that plays a very big role in this connexion. High wages cannot take the place of tradition. Nowadays, there are many more skilled workers in industry than there used to be. It is specialists who are needed to control and supervise with great attention and so on. 80 to 90 per cent of this part of the labour force belong to the trade unions. Of the unskilled workers, however, only 10—20 % are members of the trade unions.
>
> C.F.T.C. has now been reorganized. I believe it will have great importance that it no longer appears as a Christian syndicate ... I also believe that the new syndicate can attract large crowds. The big battle, however, must be fought on the company level. We have no national or regional agreements in the country; instead, each enterprise arranges its own. The Renault Company, which is state owned, leads the way. Quite recently, it initiated a four-week paid holiday for its workers. Such things create an example. M. Dreyfys, the director of Renault, carried this through despite the big competition in the car market. The tendency is thus successes here and there. The central organization of the trade unions does not bring about an improvement in the conditions. The initiatives, instead, come from les comités intersyndicales or from the local organizations ...[27]

An examination of André Philip's statement discloses the troublesome situation that competition between the trade unions brought about, and that the trade union disagreement has been a weak point in the French system, at least, judged from our standpoints. In the main, we must establish that the reforms planned during the war succeeded in some parts and failed in others. Why was this so? To illustrate the question further, we must renew our study of the Algerian group's reform programme.

19. Aspects of the Algerian group's reform programme

In the foregoing, we have studied the economic reform recommendations of the Algerian group (André Philip, Jules Moch, and Jean Monnet).[1] We have examined a few questions through this period, and we have witnessed a partial failure of this group's ideas.[2] Perhaps this sounds pessimistic. Much of what was intended was realized. Had one thought rightly? The answer to that question must, in many cases, be "yes". Had one thought rightly when it concerned finding a cure for the economic weaknesses of France that were exposed during the 1930s? This problem is dealt with to some little extent in the last part of this dissertation.[3]

The following problems facing France at the end of World War II were important to the Algerian group: food supplies, supply of raw materials, the securing of the possibilities of industrial production, the guaranteeing of production priorities, population policy, investment policy, influence on behalf of the employees, socialization, administration of the State-owned industries, price and control policy.[4]

Jean Monnet, as François de Menthon pointed out, was the one who believed that France's share of heavy industry should be expanded. This could provide better conditions for an economic and social upswing. Therefore the economic planning, the so-called planification, was created.[5] We gather from this that the Algerian group must have considered it of the greatest importance that the conditions existed for carrying out the mentioned programme. However, the circumstances that prevailed in France during the latter part of the 1930s made it imperative to carry out considerable changes in the political life. To be able to control commerce and industry, the state must be strong and be able to act rapidly, which was the view of the Algerian group.[6] It put forward a proposal for political reforms, its main points being: It was important for the State to be able to act rapidly; whereas the National Assembly passed laws, the Government had the right to issue decrees, which were controlled, however, by a Commission that could demand that the subject be debated in Parliament; it was necessary for the government to be stable if it was to control economic life; the economic plan should run during the same election period as the government was in office; the government should thus be appointed for a definite period. Here, perhaps, can be traced an influence from England, where the members of the group and many other Frenchman lived during the war and where a system of this nature existed, and still exists.[7]

There was a risk that this powerful position of the government would exist at the expense of a free society. This question was given special attention. It is also pointed out in Blocq-Mascart's material, which indicates that the Algerian group pursued its discussions in concert with like-minded people in occupied France.[8] Bicameral system was thought to be unsuitable. During the Third Republic, it had led to unstable governments, which were undesirable.[9]

Thus, preference was for a unicameral system with large constituencies, instead

of small ones as before, where the delegate could be dependent on certain persons or factions in society. It was also felt that it would be suitable to have three or four large parties that conformed to the more important tendencies expressed by public opinion. These parties should enforce what had been lacking before; party discipline. Within the National Assembly, groups should be formed that corresponded to the political parties. A delegate who was excluded from his party should be forced to retire from the Assembly.[10]

The popularly elected member should, moreover, be paid a high salary and an additional representation fee of 20 %. Extra incomes would not be permitted. A special organ, Cour des Censeurs, would be appointed for the purpose of carrying out all kinds of investigations concerning the economic circumstances of the members of parliament and pronouncing judgement.[11]

The American system of a President with executive power was considered unsuitable by the group. There should be a President of the Republic elected for a period of 7—10 years by an electorate consisting of the National Assembly, Municipal representatives, and representatives of syndicates (Organisations syndicales interprofessionelles). This President would represent all the non-political elements in the country and, with certain exceptions, not interfere in political affairs.[12]

The leader of the political majority in the National Assembly should be Prime Minister. He should be elected by the Assembly at the beginning of each election period, whereafter he would form his own government. The Prime Minister could elect both members of parliament and others who stood outside the elected Assembly.[13]

The administrative personnel must be reliable if a controlled economy and socializations were to be effected. Bureaucratic thinking must be discouraged. The influence of the experts should not be too great. High military and civil officials therefore ought not to be members of the government. Instead, they would serve it.[14]

The heads of the administration could be exposed to purges in order that the public mind should feel confidence in the new regime. Representatives of the resistance movement would have the possibility of serving in the administration, but not until after 3—5 years of steady employment.[15]

France's great problem in the face of the future was judged to be how the working class would replace the bourgeoisie, which "had broken down in disgrace and treachery". It also said: "Le malheur est que la classe ouvrière n'a pas encore réussi à dégager une élite suffisamment nombreuse et suffisamment formée pour être capable de prendre la succession."[16]

This put a finger on a sore spot. The Algerian group saw the danger, and according to André Philip, this was also the outcome.[17] The working class, despite the actions of its representatives within the resistance movement during World War II, was obviously too clumsy in this refined society where a high price is set on culture and education, wealth, and position. That the working class should

replace the bourgeoisie is an anachronism, based possibly on history. In 1789, the bourgeoisie replaced the nobility; in 1945, the workers ought to replace the bourgeoisie. It was rather a matter of advancing towards a more classless society.

These things demanded a new school system, which was also planned. School attendance would continue to the age of 16, be free, and so forth. In this sphere too, influence from England could be observed. A relaxed school environment on the British model was aimed at.[18]

This school should contain three lines: the classical line (Latin, Greek), the modern line (science, languages), and the technical line (industrial, agricultural, and trade). From each of these, it would be possible to advance to higher education.[19] It meant that the path of upward progress would be free. This does not seem to have been the case for France in the period up to the 1960s, for a variety of reasons. This is a weakness in French society during the postwar period. One suspects André Philip's pen behind parts of the proposals.

We can now clearly see why the entire large reform programme was not carried out. It is related to the fact that the constitution of the Fourth Republic provided no scope for governmental power of the kind that, among others, the Algerian group had visualized. Its political influence, or rather the influence of the socialistic group, was not—and did not become—sufficiently great. To return to what was said by our sources: Daniel Mayer: When de Gaulle came into power, he did not use his position. His intention was to do nothing in the way of reforms. In this way, he hoped to pacify the bourgeoisie and to conduct the country through a sensitive period of transition.[20]

Blocq-Mascart expressed an opinion similar to the one he had expressed before.[21] The opinion in France in 1944—45 seems to have been left wing, to judge from the party material studied in the foregoing.[22] When it was suitable to carry through reforms, the Algerian group wrote: "tout peut être fait dans la première année qui suivra la libération donc avant même les élections à la Constituante. Ce qui ne sera pas fait la première année ne le sera jamais..."[23] Why the delay? Why did the powerful leaders of the resistance movement and others let the opportunity slip by, and a previously fairly unknown general delay, if we are to believe D. Mayer and Blocq-Mascart? It was Léon Blum who inspired many of the ideas put forward by the resistance movement, which we have described in the section about S.F.I.O. Léon Blum on 28 August 1942, in a letter intended for the French socialist leaders in France, wrote that we must put the French economy on its feet. Immediately after the war, those measures that have been consistently advocated in the socialist doctrine must be implemented. The key industries, the credit system, the exchange, the distribution of raw materials and necessary foodstuffs cannot again be entrusted to private enterprise and free competition. Blum also wrote that his wish was that the socialist party should work to create a programme that all could rally round.[24] Léon Blum supported de Gaulle with all his authority. De Gaulle followed Blum's programme and thus strengthened his own position in the western world.[25]

We see that state interference in the French industrial life after World War II originated to a large extent with Blum, who intermediated social ideas and plans, which had for a long time been in mind.[26] Jean Monnet thought and acted practically.[27] He, it was, who took part in and formulated the planning ideas.[28] De Gaulle, as head of the government, seems to have participated in moderating the programme.[29] The socialization of the banks was not carried out as had been intended. He could not altogether avoid the nationalizations, because general opinion expected them. They were announced in the idealistic programme submitted by the resistance movement and which resembled, in the main, that of the Algerian group. It was—as has been shown—political decisions that, to some extent, seem to have lain behind the efforts to change rapidly the industrial structure in France.[30]

The industrial production apparatus

20. France and the German Federal Republic. Comparison survey of the industrial development during the postwar period up to about 1960

France and the German Federal Republic are very similar. Geographical position, size of population, educational level, and so on agree well in both countries. Together, they constitute an economic power factor of considerable strength, with a market of 100-million inhabitants.

The French population development between 1900 and 1959 has not been significant, as the following table shows. The population of the German Federal Republic, on the other hand, has almost doubled during that period.[1]

Number of inhabitants (millions)

	France	German Fed. Repub.
1900	40.9	27.6
1910	41.5	32.6
1920	38.8	34.9
1930	41.2	36.7
1938	41.1	38.9
1950	41.7	46.9
1959	45.1	51.8

The increased population numbers in the Federal Republic possibly represent the transfer of people from the eastern parts to the western. In itself, this must have stimulated the economic upswing there. The French figures reflect the drain that took place in connexion with the World Wars and with low birth-rates since the middle of the nineteenth century.

France and the German Republic wanted to go their separate ways in the matter of rehabilitation. France had "direction", Germany had the opposite. We quote the former Cabinet Minister Buron: "He (Dr. Erhard) considered that all progress was founded completely on finance. It is possible that thereby he created a German miracle, but we considered Erhard's idea shocking."[2] However, natural conditions can have been involved here. For a long time, France has been centralized, everything is centred in Paris, which favours an economic central direction. Germany was divided into a number of territories without any joint statistics. This was the situation after 1945: the victorious powers would have it so and these conditions did not favour an economic central direction.

A review of the industrial development in the two countries during the postwar period shows that, if 1938 is taken as initial value and the industrial production then = 100, the results show similar values in the two countries. Obviously, Germany started its industrial production later than France. In 1947, its position is quite inferior. The U.S.A.-curve is put in the diagram for comparison. At the end of the war, the U.S.A. had a vastly greater industrial production than it had in 1938.[3]



Diagram No. 1 (Index 1938 = 100). Industrial production in France, the German Federal Republic, the Six States area, and the U.S.A. Source: O.E.E.C., Industrial statistics 1900—1959, Paris 1960, p. 9. Semilogarithmic scale.

With 1950 as initial position, the picture is somewhat different. Then, the industrial production development seems to go more rapidly in the Federal Republic than in France during the first part of the 1950s. From 1955, the increase in industrial production is similar in the two countries. Based on these figures, we do not want to question whether it is good or bad with some economic direction of industry. The reported material does not permit that question to be answered. Instead, we ask what were the real power relations between French and German industrial production. Here, the O.E.E.C.-statistics can be used. They indicate that France, the German Federal Republic, and Great Britain were responsible for 70 % of the industrial production of the 18 countries—the building industry not included.[4]

France's share of industrial production in the O.E.E.C.-area in 1959 was 15.2 %, that of the Federal Republic 23.1 %, and that of Great Britain 35.5 %.[5]

We notice the strong position of Great Britain. Is that the basis for the French scruples against Britain's entry into the European Economic Community? The German industrial production, as we see, was larger than the French in 1959.

The percentage distribution of industrial production in the main branches in Germany was very similar in 1959 to that of France. Mechanical engineering was most important in both countries; the relative share of chemicals was the same as was the textile industry. Food and tobacco industries were less developed in France than in the Federal Republic, which appears to have been the more essential difference. How the actual position was between the industrial productions of the two countries, distributed on the main branches, is shown in the following diagram.



Diagram No. 2. ——— France - - - - - German Federal Republic. The mutual importance of the main branches in France and in the Federal Republic in 1959 calculated according to the industrial production. Source: O.E.E.C., Industrial Statistics, p. 4, Paris 1960. 1. mining and quarrying, 2. food, beverages and tobacco, 3. textiles, 4. basic metals, 5. metal products, 6. chemicals, 7. others, 8. gas, electricity and water.



Diagram No. 3. ——— France - - - - - German Federal Republic. France's and Germany's share of the total industrial production in the O.E.E.C.-area in 1959. Distributed on branches. Source: O.E.E.C., Industrial Statistics, p. 4, Paris 1960. 1. mining and quarrying, 2. food, beverages and tobacco, 3. textiles, 4. basic metals, 5. metal products, 6. chemicals, 7. others, 8. gas, electricity and water.

The diagram shows that what is colloquially called West Germany was superior in almost all main branches, except for mining, where both countries were equal. The result of French State investments in this sector possibly?

The number employed in industry can also be used to compare the two countries.

The number employed in industry in 1959 (in 1000)[6]

	France	The German Federal Republic
1. Mining	348	703
2. Food, beverages and tobacco	468	749
3. Textiles	523	683
4. Wood and furniture	196	527
5. Chemicals	326	433
6. Basic Metals	426	538
7. Metal products	1,431	3,045
8. Other manufactures	1,163	1,838
9. Electricity, gas and water	151	162
10. Construction	1,176	1,972
	6.2-million	10.7-million

There are similarities in the textile branch, the chemical industry, and the basic metals group. Otherwise, Germany was superior; in some branches, extremely so (the engineering industry). Why should there be this difference when the populations are so similar? It could be because France had not yet achieved the same degree of industrialization as Germany had. Many towns, mainly in the west of France, are still to some extent market centres for the rural areas. Thus, in 1959, compared with Germany, France lacked some global industrialization as well as some regional industrialization.

THE DEVELOPMENT IN THE MAIN BRANCHES OF INDUSTRY IN FRANCE AND IN THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC DURING THE POSTWAR PERIOD UP TO 1959

After having obtained some idea of the size of the industrial potential and of the main features of development, we take a more detailed look. We begin by investigating the Mining and Quarrying branch in both countries. The diagram (index 1938 = 100) shows that a similar development in this branch occurred in both France and the Federal Republic. However, in France, a prewar level was reached before Germany (1948—1949 in France; 1951—1952 in Germany). The development curves are given a somewhat different appearance if the value for 1950 = 100. The picture of the latter half of the period shows an upswing for France and at the same time a stagnation for Germany in this branch.

For the group "Food, beverages, and tobacco", based on 1938 values, we get the following information. Both countries reach prewar level in 1950. The Federal Republic shows a fairly even expansion, but in France, there is stagnation after 1950. With index 1950 = 100, the German production increase appears clearly during the 1950s. French textile production did not appreciably develop during the period 1947 to 1959. German production development, however, was more positive, but showed some flagging for 1952—1958.

The diagram for the group Basic metals during the period 1947 to 1959 shows that after the war France fairly rapidly reached the 1938 production level (1947—1948). Thereafter, there was in the main an upswing. The curve for the Federal Republic follows a similar course, but the prewar level was not reached until a little into the 1950s. With index 1950 = 100, we find that the development in the German Federal Republic and France is similar.

The postwar period is characterized by a powerful increase in production in the "metal products" sector, i.e. the mechanical engineering industry. With 1938 as basis, the industrial production development in this branch seems to be the same in both countries. The increase in production was almost three-fold. With 1950 as basis, Germany shows a more rapid development than France; this, however, is quite natural in view of Germany's low level of industrial production after Warld War II. In this sector, Germany was actually the stronger country.

For "chemicals", the curves show considerable agreement irrespective of whether 1938 or 1950 is used as basis. As in other main branches, the production was low in 1947 in Germany, but in a few years, the production results of prewar years were achieved.

This sector showed a powerful expansion during the 1950s both in France and in Germany. In O.E.E.C.'s statistics, 1953 was used as basis for an index series. The value for the chemical industry in 1959 was 159 for France and 196 for the Federal Republic. Thus, both countries showed a similar development; and as the foregoing has shown, this applies also to size, at least as far as the number employed is concerned.

The heterogeneous group "Gas, electricity, and water" shows the following index series (Index 1938 = 100):

	France	The German Federal Republic
1947	131	60
1948	143	92
1949	150	112
1950	163	127
1951	182	149
1952	191	163
1953	193	174
1954	211	192
1955	226	214
1956	246	238
1957	265	256
1958	291	260
1959	334	279

The French figures show to some extent the recovery brought about by State initiative in the basic sectors, but in considering the series, the standard of each country in the particular sphere during the period must be borne in mind.


174
a
120
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211
206
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1947
1950
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

Diagram No. 4. The industrial development in France and in the German Federal Republic in 1947 to 1959. Main branches (1938 = 100). Source: O.E.E.C., Industrial Statistics 1900—1959, Paris 1960, p. 8—17. ——— France - - - - - German Federal Republic. Semilogarithmic scale, a b c ... France, $a_1 b_1 c_1$ ... Germany (F.R.) a a_1 mining and quarrying, b b_1 manufacturing, c c_1 food, beverages and tobacco, d d_1 textiles, e e_1 basic metals, f f_1 metal products, g g_1 chemicals, h h_1 gas, electricity and water.

ASPECTS OF THE ECONOMY OF FRANCE AND OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC PRESENTED IN O.E.E.C.-REPORTS DURING THE POSTWAR PERIOD

The O.E.E.C.-organization and its successor O.E.C.D. annually carry out a study of the economy of the member countries. For France, the results are reported since 1953 in a series called "Situation et Problemes de l'économie française". There is a similar publication for the German Federal Republic. The reports make recommendations to the member countries that have often stimulated the economic and political debates in those countries. We will glance at those reports.

From the middle of the 1950s (1954 report) the French economy was characterized as being, among other things, "trop protégée et par suite, trop statique et rigide".[8] It was also thought that the war in Indo-China had a braking effect. Now that it was ended, it would be possible to utilize the resources in another way.[9] The general opinion in France was expected to be directed more on economic problems and the efforts to solve them. If that was to be the case, the report said, France was on the road to recovery.[10]

The situation of the German Federal Republic at the beginning of the 1950s was characterized in the economic sphere by, among other things, a strong influx of labour to the country, largely to industry. Between 1949 and 1952, the number of workers increased by *circa* 1.7-million.[11] The O.E.E.C.-report for the Federal Republic in 1953 summed up: "production is still expanding rapidly. Considering the high volume of investment, the availability of unemployed manpower, and the high level of potential demand, it can be expected that , provided the world economic climate does not deteriorate, expansion will continue at a rapid rate compared with other countries."[12]

1953 and the first 8 months of 1954 were characterized by a rapid economic progress. The review from 1954 states: even though industrial production *per capita* and productivity have not improved much compared with 1938, a peak year in Germany, total production has increased substantially, chiefly as a result of the growth of the population and a corresponding rise in employed manpower. It continues: at present there is no sign of any reduction in the rate of expansion, and it is unlikely that the German economy will within the next few years face any difficulties due to lack of international demand. But Germany is probably approaching a point at which the direction of expansion will change, owing to a slower growth of manpower and the increase and changing nature of defence expenditure. In these circumstances, the further expansion in output will depend more on increasing productivity than has been the case in the past few years.[13]

Production in France increased rapidly in 1955. The 1956 report also mentions that from now on, the active population will not increase. An increase in the production will, to a growing extent, depend on the transfer of labour from sectors such as agriculture and retail trade to the industries in which productivity is greater—a trend that should be helped by the decentralization of industry—

and of course of productive investment.[14] The report for 1957 says: the rapid growth of industrial output continued during the first half of 1957, despite the fact that factors of production (particularly labour) were fully employed.[15] The 1958 report mentions: productive capacity has substantially increased following the rise of investment. Further, despite the long period of military service, the shortage of labour has become less acute.[16] The 1960 report speaks of the increasing demand: overall demand was sustained during the year by increased government expenditure, particularly capital expenditure, and by the remarkable expansion of exports which were 30 per cent higher in volume in 1959 than in 1958.[17] The report for July 1961 ends as follows: in many respects the French economy appears to be evolving satisfactoritly. The policy of stabilization has been a success, the foreign exchange reserves have grown continuously, the franc has unquestionably become a hard currency, and there is no doubt about the determination of the French authorities to resist any return of inflation. It continues: production has made rapid progress and consumption has once more been able to expand appreciably ... Since the pause in 1958—1959 and the success of the stabilization plan, the revival of industrial expansion has been largely dependent on the expansion of exports. Internal demand began to increase again in 1960, but this rise has not exhausted the potential of the apparatus of production. The increase in production since autumn 1960 has continued at a modest rate and still leaves considerable room for expansion.[18]

With those final words, we leave the French situation and turn to the O.E.E.C.-reports concerning the German Federal Republic at the middle of the 1950s. At the middle of the decade, a feature that became permanent appeared in the German economy. An export surplus arose.[19] Towards the end of the 1950s, the expansion that had begun declined. In 1958, it said: the labour force is growing less fast, and total demand has been rising less steeply.[20] There was some doubt concerning the future development in summer 1958: although the considerable improvement in the capital market will facilitate the financing of future investment, it is too early yet to judge whether production is again expanding vigorously in Germany.[20] However, the report for 1959 begins with the following words: The German economy is expanding strongly.[21] During 1960, there was some flagging in the production increase, but Germany entered a trade boom.

The comparison between France and Germany is difficult to make, because 1938 was a good year for Germany and a mediocre one for France; this should be borne in mind when examining the submitted curve material. Concerning the discussed O.E.E.C.-reports: these present a few general phenomena in France and Germany, phenomena of some importance, but not sufficiently significant to call for a more detailed treatment here.

Some businessmen's views on the French development

The picture of France in 1950 was that of a decrepit community. Most houses were in need of maintenance and repair. Railways and transport apparatus were worn out and old-fashioned. Things in general were of an older type. Some of the suburbs of Paris showed lack of planning and bore signs of destitution. In short, the material condition of the country seemed to be unsatisfactory. The causes of the foregoing are not discussed here. They were connected with the demographic circumstances that existed earlier; for instance, low birth-rates, lack of local initiative, and the relative strength of the agrarian sector.

Director Gösta Wassbo, Flygt-France (pumps) earlier VIM, experienced the change during the 1950s thus:

> When I came to VIM (French subsidiary of S.F. Products Inc.) in 1952, we had a turnover of 3.5-million. When I left there around 1962, it was 35-million. The development was not special to us. It was something that took place with our largest French competitor ... Frenchmen nowadays (1964) no longer stand back for any country, but have much to show. The French industry early began to manufacture under licence from America and in this way overtook the lead the other states in Western Europe and America had over France. Frenchmen today are considerably more keen on travelling than they were. Nowadays, we frequently hear it asked "Can we go to Holland and Germany to see the arrangements in those districts where pumps are most in use?". They are no longer afraid of going abroad. "Why should we go to other countries?" used to be heard, "all foreigners come here; therefore it must be best here." The new attitude is naturally associated with the self-confidence of the country's inhabitants inspired when things began to go well, that is obvious.[22]

Another businessman was interviewed on 10 October 1964. This was Rikard Svensson, area sales manager, Sunds Verkstäder AB, with address in Paris. This company is apparently associated with the Swedish Cellulose AB. Svensson's function was to sell cellulose plants. The merging of smaller and medium enterprises into large units, then going on, was a feature of his branch in France. Foreign companies, mainly American and Scandinavian, that dominated the market bought up their customers. The private family undertakings in France were more and more absorbed into the big companies. Svensson's number of customers, those he could count on, had been reduced to half since 1955 by the formation of large combines. Svensson also said that the French credit system was very important in business life. This credit system enabled small companies to join together in the matter of capital and play a big role in order-taking and deliveries that could benefit French industry. It is obvious that both Wassbo and Svensson, in their views of the conditions, spoke only of what they knew and had experienced. They do not give any general picture, but perhaps a few symptoms of the changes.

The referred to figure material gives a definite but rough idea of the course of industrial expansion. It is difficult to make a correct comparison of the German

Federal Republic and France in view of the fact that the arrangements of the statistics in the two countries were still not co-ordinated during the main part of the period. The production results of 1938, partly the basis for the appraisal, differed in the two countries. For Germany, as pointed out, it was a good year; for France, mediocre. To get a better idea of these matters, we must make a more detailed investigation.

21. French industrial development during the 1950s in more detail

French industrial production showed a powerful upswing during the 1950s. Based on index 1950 = 100, 1960 = 180. The distribution of this upswing on the various branches in the country can be obtained by studying production indexes and systematizing them. Here, about twenty branches are involved. We find an almost total upswing in French industry during 1950 to 1961, but the strength of the upswing is not the same in all the branches. It is therefore fitting to divide them into four groups: powerful development, strong development, rising trend, and stagnation or instability.

Because the rising trend is general, it is easiest to pick out those branches where success was less or least. The group that on the diagram or in the table is given No. 3 and which is termed rising trend includes the branches "bâtiment et travaux publics, tabac et allumettes, industries textiles et industries alimentaires". On the basis of the submitted material, we still do not know more precisely why the curves for this period have exactly this appearance; we suppose, however, that the extent of building activity can have been due to the housing policy carried out during the 1950s and the legislation concerned with it. The branch "tabac et allumettes" expansion probably is not in general wanted by the government, at least not if fiscal and thereto related causes are excluded. The upswing that exists here can have been due to rising consumption on account of improved living conditions throughout the country. The branch designation "industries textiles" naturally covers a number of sub-branches and specialities in production that can have different profitability, but it is not surprising to find the textile group as a whole far down the scale. On the textile front, the 1950s was a poor decade in a number of countries. "Industries alimentaires" is the last branch in group 3. Here, on the basis of the submitted material, we cannot draw any positive conclusions, but we can wonder whether the conditions at that time were connected to the relatively great importance of the agrarian sector in France.

The four poorest branches formed group 4, called "stagnation or instability". The branch "corps gras" certainly shows expansion up to 1956, but thereafter a


517
Group 1
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1950
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

Diagram No. 5. The industrial developemnt in France 1950—1961. 23 branches. Production index. Source: Annuaire statistique de la France. a gaz, b pétrole et carburants, c industries chimiques, d électricité, e extraction de minerais métalliques, f extraction de matériaux de construction, g extraction et préparation de mineraux divers, h production des métaux, i transformation des métaux, j caoutchouc, k céramique et fabrication de matériaux de construction, l industrie du verre, m presse-edition, n papier — carton, o bois et ameublement, p bâtiment et travaux publics, q tabacs et allumettes, r industrie textile, s industries alimentaires, t corps gras, u houil et lignite, v habillement et travail des étoffes, x cuirs. Semilogarithmic scale. 1950 = 100.

decline, the only branch of the groups considered here that did so. It justifies the inclusion of "corps gras" in group 4. Other branches that show stagnation are "houille et lignite", i.e. coal, "habillement et travail des étoffes", and "cuirs". Corresponding situation with poor result for these branches was found in some other countries at this time. It can thus be supposed that these results are concerned with structural or similar change.

To consider the other extremity, the "powerful development": this concerned three branches that formed group 1. They are "gaz", "pétrole et carburants", and "industries chimiques". Group 2, showing good results, defined as "strong develop-

ment", includes electricity, metal mining, metal production, mechanical engineering, rubber, building materials, glass, paper, timber and furniture, as well as the press and publishing industry.

The picture of expanding French industry in the 1950s is thus bright. The debacle seems to have occurred in some cases in 1953. Was it connected with the change-over to a freer economic policy? The question is difficult to answer in full, but most of the reported branches already before 1953 lay outside State direction, although perhaps not outside State control. It is probably a more general Western European economic upswing that occurs. France is affected by it, as are the Federal Republic and other countries. A detailed study of the various branches provides more information about these things.

How much of the French production apparatus was affected by the upswing? By using a production table, we can find an answer to this. There we can see the relative value of each branch, as follows:

Group	Contains branches	Characteristic	%
1	a, b, c	Powerful development	9
2	d—o	Strong development	49
3	p—s	Rising trend	31
4	t—x	Stagnation or Instability	14
		Total	103

Circa 85 % of French industry was affected by the economic expansion of the 1950s.

INDUSTRIAL EXPANSION IN MORE DETAIL

The statistical material gives an even more nuanced picture of the course during the period 1950 to 1961. Here, too, the index figures can be used and systematized. It was found suitable to divide the 93 branches into 10 groups according to the achieved result. To define the development with a label for each group did not seem suitable. Instead, the approximate index figures during the end phase of the period can serve as reference at the division. The appearance of the various curves was used as basis for placing the branch in question in the table. In some cases, a group term was used, for instance, 2 b. Here, it refers to branches whose development curve was broken or whose development declined, but which had earlier achieved very good results and should therefore be included in successful context. In the example, 2 b, there is much to argue that the term 1 b could have been chosen; this was not done, however, as it was felt necessary to mark to some extent the decline. The table as a whole, of course, must be regarded as an aid, a way to obtain a survey. Group division follows:

The approximate index figure of the branches in 1961, 1950 = 100

Group	1	More than 1,000	a_1, b_1, c_1
	2 a	400	d_1—i_1
	2 b	500	j_1
	3 a	300	k_1—t_1
	3 b	300	u_1
	4	240—260	a_2—j_2
	5	200	k_2—c_3
	6	160	d_3—v_3
	7	120	x_3—i_4
	8	110	j_4—m_4
	9	instability	n_4, o_4
	10	decline	p_4—s_4

a_1 extraction de pétrole brut, b_1 motoculteurs-mototreuils, c_1 gaz naturel, d_1 abrasifs, e_1 chlore gazeux, f_1 lessives, g_1 sables, h_1 aluminium, i_1 electrodes, j_1 tracteurs à roues et à chenilles, k_1 matériaux de viabilité, l_1 minerais de fer, m_1 pétrole traité, n_1 etirés, o_1 ferro-alliages, p_1 bauxite, q_1 automobiles, r_1 grosse forge-gros emboutissage, s_1 construction électrique, t_1 glaces brutes, u_1 motocycles, a_2 cuivre et alliages (transf d. metaux), b_2 zinc, c_2 produits finis laminé, d_2 grès et ceramique sanitaire, e_2 aluminium et alliages légers (transf d. métaux), f_2 ampoules et verrerie de laboratoire, g_2 peintures et vernis, h_2 papier paille et emballage, i_2 carbare de calcium, j_2 pâte à papier, k_2 fonte, l_2 potasse, m_2 sel, n_2 acier, o_2 tubes d'acier, p_2 tréfilés, q_2 chaudières, moteurs mécaniques et pompes, r_2 optique-lunetterie, s_2 verre à vitres, t_2 plâtres de construction, u_2 chaux et ciments, v_2 acide sulferique, x_2 oxygène comprimé, y_2 pneumatiques, z_2 surfaces sensibles, a_3 caoutchouc industriel, b_3 fibranne, c_3 papier journal-impression-écriture, d_3 gaz d'usine, e_3 cuivre, f_3 plomb, g_3 fonderie (ferreux), h_3 machines outiles, i_3 construction de machines et materiel pour l'industrie, j_3 boites et emballage metalliques, k_3 décolletage, découpage, emboutissage, l_3 chaînes mecaniques, m_3 briques et tuiles, n_3 verre creax et moulages, o_3 faïence, p_3 acétylène dissous, q_3 tabacs, r_3 phosphate trisodigue, s_3 huilerie-margarinerie, t_3 cartons, u_3 allumettes, v_3 bonneterie, x_3 fûts et tournelets métalliques, y_3 pyrites, $z_3$wagons, a_4 goudrons et benzols, b_4 carbonate de soude, c_4 produits réfractaires, d_4 parfumerie, e_4 filés de coton, f_4 filés de laine, g_4 rayonne, h_4 soierie, i_4 tissus de coton, j_4 porcelaine, k_4 outillage à main, l_4 colorants, m_4 tissus de laine, n_4 construction aéronautique, o_4 materiel traction, p_4 pierre à batir, q_4 ardoises de couverture, r_4 tungstène, s_4 voitures, t_4 sulfate de cuivre, u_4 savonnerie, v_4 cuirs. See p. 231 ff.

During the period 1950 to 1961, France had three really successful branches: "Gaz naturel, extraction de pétrole brut, et motoculteurs-mototreuils." These results are excellent, and the branches are therefore placed in group 1.

Group 2 a also shows excellent results and a rapid expansion. "Abrasifs, clore gazeux lessives, aluminium et electrodes" belong here. Group 2 has been specially subdivided with the branch "tracteur à roues et à chenilles" which, of course, underwent a powerful expansion, but declined after 1957. Because a decline of this type is rare in French industry, the branch was referred to group 2 b. What underlies the appearance of the curve? Was it production reorganization?

Group 3 a shows a good and strong rising trend. The group contains the branches "tracteurs à roues et à chenilles, matériaux de viabilité, minerais de fer, ferro — alliages, automobiles, construction électrique et pétrole traité. A special group, 3 b, has only one branch: motorcycle production. Here, there is a change in consumption in the French community.

Group 4 shows rising trend, and a good one. In this group, we find metal, paint- and varnish production, &c.

Group 5 also shows an obvious rising trend and a heterogeneous composition. "Fonte, chaudière, moteurs-mécaniques, optique-lunetterie, pneumatiques, papier-journal — impression — écriture et chaux, et ciments."

Group 6, on the whole, shows a rising trend during the period 1950 to 1961 after, in many cases, a decline at the beginning of the 1950s. The group contains "briques et tuiles, faïence, bonneterie, machines-outiles, boïtes et emballage métalliques, &c.".

Group 7 contains branches with a weak rising trend. Here are certain textile branches and also some parts of the engineering industry (railway materials) and the chemical industry.

Group 8 shows stagnation and a slight decline for, among others, porcelain and wool production.

Group 9 shows strong variations: railway materials and airplanes (matériel de traction, construction aéronautique). Does the variation in State orders cause the appearance of the curves?

The last group, 10, shows branches with decline: building stone (native stone), railway carriages, the soap industry, fur industry. In some cases, the decline must have been due to innovations or the introduction of new materials.

We earlier observed that 85 % of French industry was affected by the economic expansion in France during the 1950s. However, it is clear that we must examine a number of branches to get a deeper insight into French industrial development and problems during the postwar period.

22. The French industrial structure during the postwar period

The material at our disposal for judging and assessing the French industrial potential during the postwar period consists in the main of the large inventories of the production apparatus during the postwar period, in this case, records of the number employed in 1954 and 1962 and the record of the number of work-places in 1956. These investigations give a total picture of the structure of the French industry. It is true that the various branches—or rather, their organizations—have a more detailed material, but the situation being such that the investigator must find his material in a number of places, it seems obvious that

the mentioned investigations must be systematized. First, the whole of this official material must be rearranged. This has been done so that the figure information has been transferred to maps that reproduce the departmental organization of France. Each branch has been allotted its own map. Special maps have been drawn up for both employees and workplaces; the latter have been grouped in three sections: 50—200 workers, 201—1000 workers, and more than 1000 workers. We are interested in the big working units. Diagrams for each branch have been constructed of the workers employed and counted in 1954 and 1962 concerning the regional and departemental distribution. This material was supplemented with a systematization for the period 1950—1959 of information about paid out and declared wages in each branch with sub-branches. We are therefore able to survey the branches and their regional distribution as regards the labour force and the concentration and localization of the workplaces. We also get an indication of the course on a large scale interpreted in variations of the employment. However, with this material, we cannot get an idea of multiple companies or other links between the workplaces. Variations of employment can also be cyclical. This means that we get a fairly rough idea of the situation; despite this, however, we have a useful survey. This can be supplemented by examining the material of the various branch organizations through which a more detailed concept can be obtained. In some cases, such branch examinations will be accounted for in this work. In the description of the French industrial structure, we follow the statistical arrangement of the country with indication of branch number and branch designation and with the use of the numerical indication and distribution of the departements in economic regions.

We begin with branch number 06—08, *Electricité, gaz, etc.,* and find that establishments of this kind are concentrated to urban industrialized districts or regions, with special prerequisites. In employment, Paris dominated the branch, followed by the big industrial region, the Nord region, then by the Lyon region, Provence, and others. If we compare the employment figures for 1954 with those for 1962 and look at the regional distribution of the labour force, we find that it increased in almost all regions of the country, except for Paris, where a reduction took place. However, the increase was not particularly important. In most places, it was a matter of two or three hundred persons.

Because branch No. 06—08 has a heterogeneous composition, it is difficult to draw any general conclusions. However, the dominant sub-branch was *Electricité de France* (060). We find that Paris attracted a large body of labour; almost 35,000 were employed in this branch in the departement Seine. In this sector of Paris, there were six workplaces employing more than 1000 workers, 33 with 201—1000, and 79 with 51—200. This strong concentration of labour and large workplaces to the centre of France can be seen in branch after branch.

Branch No. 10, *Pétrole et carburants,* was strongly concentrated geographically to Haute Normandie and Paris. There were also establishments in departement No. 44 at the Atlantic coast, in South-western France (Aquitania) and at the



Economic regions (———) and administrative units (departements) (. . . . .) of France.

Mediterranean coast. The most important sub-branch during our investigation period, i.e. during the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, was No. 104, *Raffinage de pétrole brut*. The branch employed about 30,000 in 1954, distributed in 1956 on workplaces with more than 1000 employees in nine places, four of which were in departement No. 76, Seine Maritime. At a comparison of the employment in 1954 with that of 1962, it was found that it increased in most places in the various regions. We thus note an increase in Paris of the number employed in the branch by about 2000, from about 8000 to 10,000. The increase in Southwestern France, in Aquitania, was naturally considerable (departement No. 64): about 2500, from about 500 in 1964 to about 3000 in 1962.

The values of the coal sector are mainly reported in branch No. 11, *Combustibles minéraux solides*. This branch was chiefly geographically concentrated

to the Nord region, to the Champagne-Lorraine region (departement No. 57), the Lyon region, and others. In 1954, the branch employed about 260,000. When we compare the employment figures for 1954 and 1962, we find a downward tendency in nearly all departements. In a few cases, it concerns a total discontinuance of the operation. As an example of this downward tendency in employment, we can consider departement No. 62 in the Nord region which reduced its figure from about 100,000 in 1954 to about 87,500 in 1962. This rate of decline seems to be fairly usual in the branch.

Branch No. 12, *Extraction de minerais de fer* is heavily geographically concentrated. It primarily refers to enterprises situated in the north-east corner of France in departements No. 55, 54, and 57, with many employees, especially in the two latter. Two workplaces in 1956 had more than 1000 workers; more than forty workplaces belonged to the middle group, i.e. 201—1000 active workers. If we compare the employment figures for 1954 and 1962, we find an increase in departement No. 54, where in the north-east of France, about half of the workplaces of the branch with more than fifty employees were situated. In other departements with employment in the branch, there was a decrease, or in some cases, no change at all. A rather marked reduction occurred in departement No. 14 in the Basse Normandie region.

Branch No. 13, *Extraction de minerais métalliques autres que fer,* naturally played some economic role in the French economy, but this role is difficult to measure. If we look at the employment figure, the branch was less important. For this branch, the total number employed in France was about 6600 in 1954. The three sub-branches, *Extraction de bauxite, de terre alumineuse* (131), *Extraction de minerais de métaux communs non ferreux (s.a.i.)* (132), and *Extraction de minerais d'uranium* (136) played about the same role at the end of the 1950s, to judge from paid out and declared wages.

The workplaces were mainly located in the southern part of France. A few were situated in the central region, and the main part in those departements that lie alongside or close to the Mediterranean. Most workplaces belonged to the group 51—200 (about 20 of them), six belonged to the group 201—1000.

Branch No. 14, *Extraction de matériaux de construction,* had a big geographical distribution and was fairly generally represented throughout the country from the standpoint of employment figures. It employed about 60,000 in 1954. The two dominant sub-branches in 1961 were No. 142, *Carriére de pierre (n.d.a.)* and No. 143, *Extraction de sables, galets, silice graviers et cailloux,* based on paid out declared wages. Of these, branch No. 142 was represented by workplaces fairly evenly situated across the country. Branch No. 143, on the other hand, had its workplaces with more than 50 concentrated to the Paris region with surrounding departements. If we compare the employment figures in branch No. 14 in 1954 with those in 1962, we find no particular differences, although there were regional differences. Quite a few departements had lower employment figures in 1962. Higher figures are found in, among others, departement 78, 49, and 17.

Branch No. 15, *Extraction et préparation des minéraux divers,* employed about 20,000 in 1954. The workplaces that employed more than 50 were distributed across the country, with a concentration to the east. Branch No. 15 has a number of sub-branches, but No. 151, *Extraction de sels de potasse,* strongly dominated from the aspect of paid out declared wages.

The labour force in branch No. 15 was mostly located in departement No. 68 in the Alsace-Franche-Comté region with about 13,000 workers in 1962, in departement No. 54 and No. 57 in the Champagne-Lorraine region, in the Paris region, and others. The variations in employment between 1954 and 1962 present no uniform picture. In departement No. 68, where there are a large number of big workplaces, nine of the group with more than 1000 workers, the number of employees increased by about 1000. In other places, for instance, the departement Seine, the situation was fairly unchanged, whereas in, for instance, departements 11, 40, and 64, it was reduced.

Branch No. 16 and 18 refer to *Sidérurgie* and *Métallurgie générale.* In 1954, these branches employed about 190,000 workers, of whom the main part were active in the Champagne-Lorraine region (about 86,000) and in the Nord region (about 30,000). The 1956 investigation of the workplaces in France shows that the companies with more than 50 workers were mainly located east of a line drawn from the mouth of the Seine to the south-west corner of departement No. 63, and from this corner towards the east. Within this region, we can record about 50 workplaces with more than 1000 workers, as well as a large number of the other two groups. A big concentration of labour was found in departement No. 54 and 57 (about 40,000 and 50,000 workers, respectively, in 1962) in the Champagne-Lorraine region; in departement No. 59 (about 30,000 in 1962) in the Nord region; in departement No. 71 (about 15,000 in 1962), and in departement No. 42 (about 15,000 in 1962) both in the Lyon region.

The most important sub-branch of branch No. 16, *Sidérurgie,* in 1961 was No. 162, *Fabrication de fonte et d'acier,* if we consider paid out declared wages. Thereafter follow with about the same importance No. 163, *Fabrication d'acier sans fabrication de fonte,* and No. 164, *Laminage à chaud ou relaminage.*

Branch No. 18, *Métallurgie générale,* in 1961, had as more important sub-branches No. 183, *Métallurgie générale des métaux ferreux,* and No. 181, *Sidérurgie et première transformation de l'acier, fonderie.* Comparison of the employment figures in 1954 with those in 1962 shows the general picture to be positive in those various departements where the branch was represented. However, in some individual cases, the opposite prevailed with lower employment figures; for instance, in departement No. 52 in the Champagne-Lorraine region.

Branch No. 17, *Production des métaux non ferreux,* employed about 16,600 in 1954. This labour force was mainly located in the Nord region with the Paris area, as well as in the Alpine region—if we may call the economic regions No. XI and XII by that name. In 1962, departement Seine dominated with about 4000 employees, followed by departements 73, 13, 62, and 74. Workplaces with more

than 1000 workers were found in 1956 in departements 73 and 62. Branch No. 17 had about ten sub-branches of the first dimension, i.e. indicated by three-figure code. These can be divided into two groups: No. 171, *Production d'aluminium et autres métaux légers,* which is the dominant group from the standpoint of paid out wages, and 172 to 179, none of which is directly dominant.

An increase in employment in the branch occurred in some places, as can be seen by comparing the 1954 and 1962 investigations. Departement No. 73, where the number of workers rose from about 800 to about 3000, had the biggest increase. In Paris and other regions, there was also an increase. In other places, the branch showed a decline in the employment figure in departements 52 and 38.

Branch No. 19, *Première transformation des métaux,* offers a relatively interesting aspect. It is mainly located to the northern and north-eastern parts of France, in other words, to the regions Nord, Picardie, Champagne-Lorraine, Haute Normandie, Alsace-Franche-Comté, and Paris with surroundings. The districts around Lyon also belong here. Only about ten workplaces had more than 1000 workers in 1956. The employment increased almost everywhere between 1954 and 1962. The only local exception was the Lyon region, which showed reduced figures.

The positive picture presumably reflects the general economic upswing in the country, but we can also see the many gaps in our material. Most departements lack this kind of industry, but this can be due to lack of local prerequisites. However, the country's regionally skewed economic development is clearly obvious, which is by no means a unique phenomenon. Most countries find themselves similarly situated.

Branch No. 19 was dominated by three sub-branches with more or less the same proportion of paid out and declared wages in 1961: No. 191, *Première transformation des métaux non ferreux;* No. 192, *Tréfilage, étirage, laminage à froid du fer et de l'acier;* and No. 193, *Fabrique de tubes d'acier (s.a.i.).*

Branch No. 20, *Fonderie, grosse chaudronnerie, moteurs mécaniques et pompes,* employed about 225,000 workers in 1954. The most important sub-branch was *"Fonderie"* (201) immediately followed by *Fabrication de chaudières, chaudronnerie, tôlerie (s.a.i.)* (202) and others, judging from paid out declared wages.

The employment in Paris considerably dominated, but almost all departements had some kind of production in the branch. The country as a whole was well provided with workplaces of more than 50 workers, providing we disregard the south-western sector of France. This localization is also largely valid for the two sub-branches No. 201 and No. 202. The variation in the employment in the main branch was not big to judge from a comparison of the 1954 and 1962 investigations. If a change did exist, it concerned in the main a slight increase.

Branch No. 21, *Construction de machines pour agriculture, l'industrie, les transports ferroviaires,* has created considerable employment: 183,000 workers in 1954. In 1962, Paris dominated with about 55,000 workers in the branch, the Nord region had 30,000, but thereafter, the values in the other regions were

considerably lower. Large companies in the branch seem mainly to be located in the industrial regions of the country. The branch was weakly represented in the southern half of France. Important sub-branches are: *Fabrication de machines-outils* (213), *Fabrication d'appareils de levage et de manutention* (211), and *Fabrication de machines agricoles* (214). What is valid for the location of the previous branch is also valid for this, i.e. a bigger proportion of the branch in the north of France than in the south. Throughout the country, there was an increase in employment measured between 1954 and 1962, except for a few less central regions.

Branch No. 22, *Mécanique générale,* is fairly well distributed across the country. In 1954, this branch had about 148,000 workers. Employment was strongly concentrated to Paris (40,000) but there was also a considerable concentration of labour in the Lyon region. Production in Branch 22 is largely heterogeneous. The most important sub-branches were in succession "*Ateliers de mécanique générale* (220), *Usines de construction mécaniques à activités multiples* (225), and *Revêtement et traitement des métaux* (222), to judge from the paid out wages.

Sub-branch No. 220, in 1956, had only one workplace employing more than 1000. This was situated in Paris, where there were also 20 workplaces with more than 50 workers. Workplaces with between 200 and 1000 workers were relatively rare. There were ten of these located in the western, south-western, eastern, and central parts of the country. The most common type of workplaces, 51 to 200 workers, was represented throughout the country. Sub-branch 222 was geographically much more concentrated to the Paris region, to the two departements that lie at the mouth of the Rhone, to the central region, and the Nord region.

Employment in branch No. 22 was not subjected to any great changes, to judge by the branch figures from 1962 compared with those from 1954. In some parts of the country, there was less employment (departement No. 44), in others, an increase (departement No. 03 and 31), changes that we can establish without going more deeply into the material.

Code No. 23 and 24 refer to the branch *Articles métalliques divers.* In this group, the number of large workplaces is rare. After the commercial census of 1962, there were about five with more than 1000 workers. In Paris, there were about 157 small workplaces (51 to 200 workers). To judge by the departemental distribution, the number active in the branch was largely the same in 1954 as in 1962, but with a slight general increase.

There were some regional deviations, for instance, a very strong increase in employment in departement No. 58, the Orleans region. This can be due to new establishments or transfers from other places.

Towards the end of the 1950s, no special sub-branch dominated. There were then nine sub-branches showing similar figures according to paid out declared wages. Among these we notice *Fabrication d'emballage et de conditionnement métalliques* (245), *Fabrication de quincaillerie* (237), *Décolletage, tournage, boulonnerie, visserie décolletée* (232).

Branch No. 25, *Construction navale,* had large plants along both the western coast and the Mediterranean. Loire Atlantique had the biggest employment of any departement. Provence Côte d'Azur-Corse had the biggest regional employment. The most important plants were concentrated to departements Bouches du Rhône and Var. Brittany was naturally well provided with shipyards, as were the districts round the mouth of Garonne. Employment does not appear to have appreciably changed between 1954 and 1962. A strong upswing was recorded in departement Manche, but in its sister departement Calvados, there was a considerable decline. *Construction navales maritimes en acier* (252) was the dominant sub-branch.

Branch No. 26, *Automobiles et cycles,* created considerable employment. In 1954, the number of workers in this branch amounted to about 300,000, almost half of them in Paris. No other regional economic concentration was found in this branch, except for departements No. 42 and 69, lying close to each other in the Lyon region, with about 9000 and about 15,000 workers, respectively. Branch No. 26 was dominated by the sub-branch for production (261) and car parts production (*Fabrication d'accessoires et pièces détachées pour l'automobile,* 263). Also the car-repair branches (264, 262) were important. The sub-branch for the production of cycles and motorcycles, in this connexion, was relatively insignificant (266).

In 1956, the car industry was mostly concentrated to Paris, with 17 establishments employing more than 1000, in departement Seine, and two establishments of the same size in the Paris region. The number of workplaces lying outside this region and employing more than 1000 was five.

A comparison of the employment figures in branch 26 for 1954 and 1962 shows that employment in general increased in the various regions. A rather strong increase took place, for instance, in Picardy in departements No. 60 and 02. In the Alsace-Franche-Comté region, a very heavy investment was made in departement No. 25, which resulted in an increase of 20,000 new workers. In the Lyon region (departement 69) there was also a strong concentration of labour, but there the increase in vacant jobs seems to have been normal. Departement 72 in the Pays de la Loire region also had many workers, about 10,000, in 1962. Outside these regions, employment in general showed some slight increase.

In the Toulouse and Languedoc regions, however, there was scarcely any increase. Here, there are strongly agrarian districts with a great need for more differentiated industry. In some directions, a certain decline in employment occurred, for instance, in the Savoie region and in some parts of Brittany.

The location of branch No. 27, *Construction aéronautique,* is characterized by concentration to the Paris region and by some investment in south-western France. Furthermore, there were large plants in the branch in the vicinity of the mouth of the Loire, in the centre of France, and at the Mediterranean in departement No. 13. It is possible that the location to south-western France was dictated by strategic considerations.

Among the sub-branches, No. 270, *Usines d'aviation construction aéronautique (s.a.i.)* dominated during the entire 1950s, as did No. 272, which towards the end of the 1950s was designated *Construction de moteurs d'aviation.* Employment in branch No. 27 was concentrated to a few regions, mainly the Paris region and thereafter departement 31 (the Toulouse region), departement 44 (Pays de la Loire), departement 13, and others. A comparison of the employment figures for 1954 and 1962 shows a general regional increase of about 30 per cent.

Branch No. 28, *Construction électrique et électronique,* was up to 1959 called *Construction électrique.* In 1956, the workplaces of the branch were located in most parts of France, except for Brittany, western Normandie, and the south-western parts of the country. Concentration to Paris and the Paris region was conspicuous. This area had 21 workplaces with more than 1000 workers. In other parts of France, there were 15 workplaces of the same size. Among the sub-branches, *Construction de gros matériel* (281), *Construction d'appareils radio-électriques et électroniques* (283), and *Construction de petits appareillages électriques d'installation* (284) dominated.

Totally, employment in branch 28 expanded considerably; this was valid for the entire country. Concentration to Paris is conspicuous of this branch, as it is of many others. In 1954, Paris had about 100,000 workers in branch 28; in 1962, the figure was 140,000. Departement No. 69 in the Lyon region had the next highest employment with 14,000 workers in 1954 and 18,000 in 1962. There was also large employment in departement 59 in the Nord region, where great investments evidently were made in the branch between 1954 and 1962; this can also be noted in other places, in departement 61, Basse Normandie.

Branch No. 29, *Précision, horlogerie et optique,* was concentrated to the Paris region, but there were also some industries of this kind in those departements that border Switzerland. The branch is otherwise sparsely represented in the country, at least concerning workplaces with more than 50 employees. The more important sub-branches were *Fabrication de machines de bureau* (297) and *Fabrication d'instruments de précision et d'optique* (293) judging by paid out declared wages. In those regions that were large from the standpoint of employment in branch No. 29, the increase of workers between 1954 and 1962 was not particularly great, although this could be so in regions less important from the standpoint of employment, for instance, departement No. 02 (Picardy).

Industrie du verre (30) is mainly located to northern France and in and around departement No. 69, the Lyon region. There are only a few sub-branches: *Fabrique de verre* (301) and *Transformation du verre sans production* (302). Among French departements, Seine dominated with the greatest number of workers (about 9500 in 1954; the total in France in that year was about 47,500).

Other regions with extensive employment in the branch were Nord, Picardy, Champagne-Lorraine, and departements 69 and 42 in the Lyon district. Employment shows some increase almost everywhere in the country, to judge by a comparison of 1954 with 1962, but branch No. 30 is conspicuously weakly developed

outside the mentioned regions. It can be wondered why it was so, but the location was probably determined by natural resources in the form of fuel and perhaps also waterway transport possibilities, factors that nowadays would not play any great role since oil became more common as fuel.

Industries céramiques (31) is a heterogeneous branch. It employed about 71,000 in 1954. Its sub-branches are *Fabrication de produits rouges: briques, tuiles, poteries* (311), *Fabrication de grès du bâtiment, grès cérames, de produits céramiques pour l'industrie (s.a.i.)* (314), *Fabrication de produits réfractaires* (313), *Fabrication de faïence de mobilier, de vaisselle de faïence* (316), and others in succession, according to paid out declared wages in 1959. The entire branch is distributed, with some concentration in the north-eastern parts of the country.

In view of the heterogeneous character of the branch, we should investigate in more detail the sub-branches. No. 311, *Fabrication de produits rouges: briques, tuiles, poteries,* has a wide-spread localization. No workplaces with more than 1000 were found in 1956. Most workplaces belonged in the smallest group, i.e. 51 to 200 workers. The number of workplaces in the group 201 to 1000 workers was few. In 1956, they amounted to about 15.

Large workplaces, on the other hand, were found in the sub-branch *Fabrication de faïence de mobilier, de vaisselle de faïence* (316). Workplaces with more than 1000 were located to the departements 57, 45, and 71 (a total of three). Otherwise, branch No. 316 had a few establishments in the Nord region and some in central France. In 1956, *Fabrication de porcelaines de mobilier, de vaisselle et d'objets en porcelaine* (317) was concentrated to central France. Most of these enterprises employed between 51 and 200.

In total, branch 31 shows that the largest group of workers was active in departement 59 in the Nord region. In 1962, it amounted to about 8000 (in 1954, about 5000). There were a number of departements that had between 1500 and 2500 workers. These departements lay in the north of France and in the Lyon district. In other parts of the country, Basse Normandie, Brittany, Pays de la Loire, Aquitania, Languedoc, and so on, except for departement 87, the number of workers was about 500 and the variations in employment small or none. In departement 87, employment regressed rather strongly.

Branch No. 32, *Matériaux de construction,* was distributed across the country with some concentration to the Nord region and the Paris area. This distribution concerns both workplaces and employment. The branch, taken as a whole, increased employment to some extent. The sub-branches were dominated by No. 326, *Fabrication d'agglomérés divers,* and No. 325, *Fabrication de chaux et ciments.* Sub-branch 326 had a general distribution. There were no enterprises with more than 1000 workers in 1956, and the workplaces in the group 201 to 1000 were few, only 6. Sub-branch No. 325 was also distributed across the country. There were no workplaces with more than 1000 workers in 1956; the middle group, 201 to 1000, was sparsely represented, only 6.

Bâtiment (No. 33) employed a large number of workers (in 1954, about

770,000), had a large number of workplaces, and paid high wages. In the departemental grouping of employees and workplaces, it is easy to distinguish the industrial regions. In Paris, for instance, there were 110,000 workers; in the Nord region, 30,000 + 50,000. Building construction was association with departements of industrial character, as the following table shows:

Dept. No.	Number employed		
	More than 1000	Between 201 and 1000	Between 51 and 200
62	1	17	72
59	—	28	138
75	—	83	481
57	—	7	49
54	—	7	47
42	1	4	38
69	—	10	76
38	1	4	36
34	1	3	15

Concerning variations in employment between 1954 and 1962, no far-reaching conclusions can be drawn. The economic trend plays a big role in these values, and the special orientation of the building industry means that the branch is not fully comparable with other industrial branches.

Among the sub-branches, *Entreprise de terrassement, de maçonnerie pour le bâtiment* (331) and *Bâtiment, Entreprise de bâtiment (s.a.i.)* (330) were leading. Whereas No. 331 showed an even spreading throughout the country with workplaces with more than 50 employees, No. 330 showed an obvious concentration to the north part of the country and also to the south; central France had few workplaces of this type.

Building construction created employment for a number of craftsmen such as painters, plumbers, electricians, carpenters, &c., and all these were corresponded by sub-branches which were not, in general, provided with a significant number of larger establishments.

Main branch No. 34, *Travaux publics,* was organized in about ten sub-branches, where No. 340, *Entreprise de travaux publics et de génie civil* was the most important with regard to paid out wages. The next largest group, but much smaller than No. 340, was sub-branch No. 346, *Entreprises de réseaux et de centrales électriques.* It was followed by *Travaux de routes et d'aérodromes* (343) and others.

The total employment in branch 34, in 1954, was 230,000 distributed across the country, with concentration to the northern and north-eastern parts. This

distribution is also reflected in the 1956 commercial census, which shows that many and big workplaces were placed in the mentioned districts.

These conditions naturally reflect the localization of population and the used natural resources, and also lack of industrial investment in some parts of the country. This distribution of the resources is not directly a result of the objectives of the postwar planning investigated up to 1962, but more of the activity in the country over long periods, when the infrastructure of the country was developed.

Branch No. 35 and 36 were the chemical industry, which could be found in almost every departement in France at the time of the investigation. The Paris region dominated because it attracted a large part of the labour force. The Seine departement had about 80,000 out of 230,000 workers in the branch in 1954. Other departements with a larger share of the labour force were No. 69 (about 14,000 in 1954) in the Lyon district, 62 (about 11,000 in 1954) in the Nord region, 38, 13, and 31 each with about 9000 workers in 1954 (the Savoie region, the Mediterranean area, and the Toulouse region, respectively). The list of enterprises in 1956 shows a concentration of large establishments in these regions, as well as in adjacent regions. Otherwise, the workplaces with more than 50 workers seem to have been relatively few.

The 1962 investigation of the active population of France shows that employment had not appreciably changed since the investigation in 1954. The same picture is met with almost everywhere, but with some increase for the Seine departement (plus about 10,000) and departements 69 and 76.

The chemical industry had many sub-branches. The most important, according to declared wages, was 359, *Fabrique de produits pharmaceutiques.* Other important sub-branches, in rank order according to declared paid out wages, were 351, *Grande industrie chimique minérale;* 354, *Industries de la synthèse organique;* 364, *Fabrique de peintures, Vernis et encres d'imprimerie,* &c. The sub-branch *Parfumerie* (369), for which France is famous, did not play such a prominent role as is, perhaps, generally thought; however, the sub-branch was not insignificant: quite the contrary.

Branch No. 37, *Caoutchouc et amiante,* is a less complicated branch with two dominant sub-branches, 372, *Fabrique de pneumatique et de bandages,* and 374, *Fabrique d'articles en caoutchouc, en gutta.* In 1954, the main branch employed 65,000, of which 16,000 were in departement No. 63 (autour Clermont-Ferrand) and 14,000 in the Seine departement.

The branch is mainly located along a broad diagonal drawn through France from departement No. 76, Haute Normandie, down towards the Alps. We record relatively many large enterprises, but employment is particularly concentrated to the two mentioned regions. The employment in the branch did not change appreciably between 1954 and 1962, except for the mentioned departements (75 and 76).

Branch No. 38, *Tabac et allumettes,* is insignificant as far as number is concerned, about 16,000 employed in 1954, and insignificant too in the matter of

paid out declared wages. The branch did not have that concentration to Paris that we noted in many other branches; instead, the localization is very widespread. The number of establishments is relatively small and the change in employment in the branch relatively insignificant between 1954 and 1962.

Branch No. 39, *Industrie des corps gras,* in 1954, had about 25,000 workers in Paris and the departements north of it and those situated at the mouths of the Seine, the Loire, the Garonne, and the Rhone, which suggests the import of raw material. The most important sub-branch, to judge by declared wages, dealt with soap production: No. 393, *Savonnerie, fabrique de savon. Fabrique de corps gras d'origine végétale, huilerie (s.a.i.)* (391) had about the same importance and produced peanut oil, which is used in cooking, especially in France. Margarine production is also relatively important (395, *Margarinerie*). The workers were found mainly in departements 75, 13, and 59. In 75 and 59, the number of employees increased; in 13, they decreased. Otherwise, the regional changes in employment seem to have been slight.

Branch No. 40, *Travail des grains et farines,* employed about 40,000 in 1954. The branch is represented throughout the country, but with some concentration of workers to the Paris region, to departement 59 in the Nord region, and to 13 at the Mediterranean coast (about 3000 in each departement). Large workplaces are thinly distributed in the industrial regions. The dominant sub-branch is No. 401, *Meunerie, fabrique de semoule.* Employment suffered no great changes regionally between 1954 and 1962, but some development occurred centrally, i.e. in the Seine departement. This tendency, however, can be seen in several branches.

Branch No. 41, *Boulangerie pâtisserie,* had about 105,000 workers in 1954; about 20 per cent of them in the Seine departement. Otherwise, the labour force was fairly evenly distributed across the country. Dominant sub-branches were No. 412, *Boulangerie—Pâtisserie,* and 414, *Biscuiterie et produits de* régime. The localization of workplaces with more than 50 workers was in the north, although others were found in the periphery of the country too. We note that sub-branches 411 and 412 combined, Boulangerie and Boulangerie-Pâtisserie had only eight enterprises with more than 50 workers in the whole country, four in Paris. Production of this kind of product towards the end of the 1950s thus mostly occurred in small units, from the standpoint of personnel. There is a statistical heading, No. 415, *Boulangerie industrielle,* with information that confirms this form of production to have been poorly developed in 1959. The regional change in employment in the branch was insignificant between 1954 and 1962. Centrally, i.e. in Paris, some increase occurred in the employment.

Branch No. 42, *Sucrerie, distillerie, fabrication de boissons,* is heterogeneous. According to paid out declared wages, the most important sub-branches are 421, *Sucrerie,* 425, *Brasserie-Malterie,* and 428, *Distillerie de liqueurs, fabrique d'apéritifs,* in that order. The entire branch employed about 100,000 workers in 1954. Employment was concentrated to the Nord region, the Seine departement, and departement 51 in the Champagne-Lorraine region. Otherwise, employment

in the branch was fairly evenly distributed over the various departements, but in most instances, the employment figures were modest. At a comparison of employment in 1954 with that in 1962, no big differences are apparent, except for departement 16 in the Poitou-Charente-Limousin region, where a powerful increase was recorded. Sub-branch 421 is located to the sector in France where there is modern farming, i.e. on the plains around the north of Paris and towards the Belgian border. Here is found a rather large number of workplaces of large size. In other sub-branches, the large enterprises seem to be very few.

Branch No. 43, *Industries du lait,* employed about 40,000 in 1954, being the most developed in the matter of employment in the region Basse Normandie and the Seine departement. Otherwise the branch was well represented in almost all France. Normandie had quite a lot of workplaces with more than 50 workers. Considered as a whole, the branch was fairly well represented in the north of France. However, it was more sparsely represented by workplaces with more than 50 workers in the south of the country. In general, there was some increase in employment in the branch, as can be seen by comparing 1954 with 1962.

Branch No. 44, *Conserverie,* in 1954, employed nearly 60,000 and was represented almost throughout the country, with concentration to Brittany with its extensive fishing, to Paris, and to some extent to departement 85 in the Pays de la Loire region. At the end of the 1950s, the important sub-branches were 442, *Conserves de viandes, foies gras, plats cuisinés;* 444 *Conserves de poisson (s.a.i.);* 440, *Conserves (fabrique de conserves alimentaires, de conserves de toutes sortes);* and 441, *Conserves de fruits et légumes* A comparison of 1962 with 1954 shows no big changes in employment, except for Paris and departement 56 in Brittany.

Branch No. 45, *Industries alimentaires diverses,* has as important sub-branches No. 451, *Confiserie;* 452, *Chocolaterie;* 456, *Fabrique de produits pour l'alimentation des animaux;* and 454, *Préparation de café, thé, chicorée, &c.* The main branch employed about 45,000 in 1954. The activity must be considered to be modestly developed regionally. Employment was concentrated mainly to Paris, to departement 59 in the Nord region, to departement 67 in Alsace, and to departement 30 in the Mediterranean region. Workplaces with more than 50 workers are generally located east of a diagonal cutting France from the mouth of the Seine down to departement 34 at the Mediterranean coast.

Branch No. 46, *Industrie du froid,* was modest in proportions during the post-war period up to the end of the investigation period, 1962. In 1954, a large part of the labour force was concentrated to Paris. This was the situation in 1962. No particular changes had then occurred regionally. The number of workplaces with more than 50 workers was 11, of which two were in the 201 to 100 group. All 11 were situated in five departements. Sub-branches worthy of note are 462, *Entrepôts frigorifiques,* and 461, *Fabrique de glace.*

Branch No. 47, *Industrie textile,* employed large bodies of workers mainly located to the Nord region, to eastern France, to the Lyon region with adjacent districts, and also to the Paris region which has a fairly extensive employment in

the branch. The most important sub-branch during the 1950s according to paid out declared wages was 474, *Industrie du coton.* Then followed 475, *Industrie de la laine;* 476, *Industrie de la soierie;* 477, *Production de fibres artificielles;* and 472, *Industrie textile du lin et du chanvre. Industrie du coton* is located in two belts, one in the western coast region from departement 85 up to the Belgian border, and the other from departement 42 in the Lyon region north-east along the Swiss/German border.

The number of workplaces with more than 50 workers was fairly large, especially in the typical industrial regions, but establishments with more than 1000 were few: four in the western region and three in the eastern region, in 1956. *Industrie de la laine* was more spread out, partly to the departements north and west of Paris, partly to the north-eastern corner and the south-eastern part of the country. The sub-branch had 13 workplaces with more than 1000, nine in the Nord region. *Industrie de la soie* was traditionally located to the Lyon region and the surrounding country, with branches in Paris and the regions north of it.

Sub-branch 477, *Production de fibres artificielles et synthétiques,* had a localization that much resembled that of the silk industry, but distinct from this, it had a number of establishments with more than 1000 workers.

During the 1950s, the so-called textile crisis severely affected the European textile industry. A comparison of the employment inventories of 1954 and 1962 shows this for France. A powerful decline in employment figures was apparent everywhere. In the branch taken as a whole, the industrial region Nord lost about 30,000 workers (departement 59 about 160,000 in 1954 and about 130,000 in 1962) and similar proportions seem to have occurred in other places, except for the Paris region which, to judge from these figures, was not appreciably affected by the changes. Perhaps this can seem a catastrophe for a country with a too centralized industrial production to lose large parts of a regionally well-developed industry, but we cannot judge this course without a thorough and detailed examination of the further fate of the released manpower.

Distinct from branch No. 47, No. 48, *Industries annexes des textiles,* was not appreciably affected by the textile crisis. The dominant sub-branch was 481, *Bonneterie;* then 486, *Teintures et apprêts;* and 483, *Fabrique de dentelle, guipure, broderie.* The main branch was distributed over the whole country with concentration to certain regions: the Nord region, departement 10 in the Champagne-Lorraine region, Paris, and departements 01 and 69 in the Lyon region.

The most important sub-branch, *Bonneterie,* was spread throughout the country with special concentration of bigger workplaces in departements 10 and 59 in 1956. The branch had six workplaces with more than 1000 workers. No. 486, Teinture et apprets, was partly located in northern and north-eastern France, partly to the Lyon region with adjacent districts. This sub-branch had three workplaces with more than 1000 workers located in north-eastern France. Sub-branch 483, *Fabrique de dentelle, guipure, broderie,* was mainly located in three districts: the Nord region, north-east, and south-east France.

Branch No. 49, *Habillement et travail des étoffes,* is a main branch that employs a very large number of workers. It was well represented regionally with a strong concentration to Paris, about 100,000 in 1954. Other regions with many employees in the branch were departement 59 in the industrial district in the north, and departements 69 and 42 in the Lyon region. A comparison of 1954 with 1962 does not seem to show any particular changes in the employment.

Sub-branch 492, *Confection de vêtements et lingerie (s.a.i.)* dominated. Its localization was extremely widespread, with concentration to the northern and eastern parts of the country it had no workplaces whatever in four departements in south-western France.

Sub-branch 491, *Vêtements et lingerie sur mesures (s.a.i.)* was the next in importance, but of much less potential than sub-branch 492. Its more important workplaces were located in Paris in Branch 491: 1, *Couture, fab. vêtements sur mesures pour dames, haute couture, couture artisanale.* Under this statistical heading, which also covers handicrafts, there were one workplace with more than 1000, ten in the group 201 to 1000, and twenty in the group 51 to 200.

Branch No. 50, *Pelleteries et fourrures,* from the standpoint of employment was fairly insignificant. In 1954, many departements had about 50 workers. Most of the workers, 7300, were employed in Paris, where too the majority of workplaces with more than 50 workers were found. According to paid out declared wages during the 1950s, the most important sub-branch was No. 503, *Fourreur, fabrication de fourrures (s.a.i.).* A comparison of 1954 figures with those of 1962 shows that employment decreased in Paris and in a number of departements.

Branch No. 51, *Industrie du cuir,* was spread over France with concentration of workers to Paris, to departement 12 in the Languedoc region, to departement 38 in the Savoie region, to departement 23 in central France, and to departement 81 in the Toulouse region. *Tannerie, mégisserie* was the most important sub-branch, with workplaces throughout the country and with almost twenty workplaces in the group 201 to 1000 workers. *Fabrique de maroquinerie, d'articles de voyage et de chasse* also had relatively many workplaces, which were to some extent concentrated to the Lyon region with adjacent districts. Employment in the entire main branch was reduced between 1954 and 1962.

Branch No. 52, *Chaussures et articles chaussants,* similar to other branches, had big employment in the Seine departement, but also showed quite considerable employment in what can be called the industrially underdeveloped part of France, the western and south-western provinces, where many people were employed in the branch in departements 49, 64, 33, 35, and 87. Other regions with footwear industry were the influence area of Lyon, departements 26 and 38, and departements 67, 54, and 57 in north-eastern France. The dominant sub-branch was 521, *Fabrique de chaussure (s.a.i.).* No. 522, *Fabrique de pantoufles, Kneipps, charentaises, espadrilles,* came next, although far behind.

Similar to the main branch, the workplaces in sub-branch 521 are located in the west, which is unusual in French industry. Sub-branch 521 had large work-

places with more than 1000 workers: two in north-eastern France, one in the Lyon region, and one in south-western France. In view of the employment everywhere in the country, it is a pity that the branch as a whole regressed in almost all regions, as is shown by a comparison of the figures of 1954 with those of 1962.

Branch No. 53, *Industrie du bois et de l'ameublement,* had as more important sub-branches *Fabrique d'ameublement* (533) and *Travail mécanique du bois (n.d.a.)* (532). Sub-branch 531, *Scieries,* played a somewhat prominent role. The main branch was distributed throughout the country as was also the case with the most important sub-branch, the furniture industry. In 1956, this sub-branch had no workplaces with more than 1000 workers. There were about twenty workplaces with 201 to 1000 workers.

Sub-branch 532, *Travail mécanique du bois,* was spread throughout the country without any special geographical concentration. No workplaces with more than 1000 workers were mentioned, but there were about thirty with 201 to 1000. The sub-branch *Scieries* was represented by a fairly reduced number of workplaces, mainly employing 51 to 200 workers. These workplaces were spread over France. In 1954 and 1962, employment in the main branch was evenly distributed throughout the country with marked concentration to four regions: Paris, departement 33 in Aquitania, departements 88 and 67 in north-eastern France, and departement 69 in the Nord region. Practically all departements, including Seine, showed lower employment in 1962 than in 1954.

Branch No. 54, *Industrie du papier et du carton,* as its most important sub-branch at the end of the 1950s, had No. 545, *Transformation du papier, Fabrique d'articles divers en papier.* Then followed No. 543, *Fabrique de papier (sans fabrique de pâte)* and 542, *Fabrique de pâte à papier associée à la fabrique de papier.* Establishments that produced only paper pulp played no particular role, to judge from declared, paid out wages for No. 541, *Fabrique de pâtes à papier.*

The workers in branch No. 54 were concentrated mainly to Paris, departement 38 in the Savoie region, departement 62 in the Nord region, departement 76 in Haute Normandie, and departements 16 and 33 in western and south-western France. There were also concentrations of workers in north-eastern France. There were three workplaces with more than 1000 in 1956: Paris, south-western France, and the Savoie region. There were rarely more than ten workplaces with 201 to 1000 in the various departements. A comparison of the employment figures for 1954 and 1962 shows that some expansion occurred in the districts where there was a concentration of labour, except for Paris, but that the situation was fairly unchanged in other geographical regions.

Branch No. 55, *Industries polygraphiques, presse, édition,* had two dominant sub-branches during the 1950s: 551, *Imprimerie et reproduction de textes,* and 555, *Edition et imprimerie de journaux et de revues.* The names of the different sub-branches give some idea of the homogeneous character of the main branch, which was strongly concentrated to Paris. Other geographical regions with concentration of labour were departement 59 (the Nord region), 69 (the Lyon

region), and another five departements situated regionally (67, 44, 13, 35, and 63).

The branch had six workplaces with more than 1000. Five of these were located to the Paris region, four belonging to sub-branch 551. Employment seems to have considerably increased in the branch in regions with labour concentrations, for instance, Paris. Other regions showed some increase or unchanged situation, judged by a comparison of the 1954 and 1962 figures.

Branch No. 56, *Bijouterie, orfèvrerie, joaillerie,* had a strong concentration of labour to the Paris region, both in 1954 and in 1962. Many workplaces (about 25) were also located here, whereas there were about 40 workplaces in other parts of the country. Only one had 201 to 1000 workers. A comparison of the employment figures for 1954 and 1962 shows an increase in the branch, but mainly, perhaps, in regions with concentrations of labour.

Branch No. 57, *Jeux Jouets et articles de sport,* had as most important sub-branch No. 571, *Fabrique de jeux et jouets,* followed by 572, *Fabrique d'articles de sports et de campement,* and 573, *Fabrique de voitures d'enfants et d'articles de puériculture,* but the paid out declared wages on which the rank order is based are low. The branch played a relatively insignificant role for employment. As in many other branches, Paris attracted much labour, about 7000 in 1954 and about 8200 in 1962. Other geographical regions with more developed employment in the branch were the Lyon region with adjacent districts, the Pays de la Loire region, and a little in the Nord region and in north-eastern France.

The large workplaces in the branch—those with 201 to 1000 workers—lay in the Paris region (6), along the river Loire (3), in north-eastern France (2), in the Lyon region (2), and at the Pyrenees at the Mediterranean (1). A comparison of the employment figures for 1954 with those for 1962 shows an increase in many directions. This concerned the Paris region, the Lyon region with adjacent Alpine districts, and departement 67 in north-eastern France. No particular changes seem to have occurred in western and south-western France.

In branch No. 58, *Instruments de musique,* sub-branch 582, *Fabrique de machines parlantes de phonographes, de machines à enregistrement du son,* played the biggest role in 1959, to judge from paid out declared wages. Sub-branch 581, *Fabrique d'instruments de musique (s.a.i.)* came next. Employment in the branch was small and fairly insignificant. Most labour was concentrated to Paris, where the number of workers increased from about 2900 in 1954 to about 4000 in 1962. Employment in the French rural areas did not show any particular changes in the branch. The workplaces were mainly located to the Paris region, where in 1956, there was one workplace with more than 1000 employees (departement 78).

Branch No. 59, *Brosserie, tabletterie et articles de bureau,* during the 1950s, consisted of sub-branches 593, *Fabrique d'articles de bureau,* 591, *Fabrique de brosserie,* 594, *Fabrique d'articles de Paris,* and others, in order of paid out declared wages. These workplaces were mostly located to the north-eastern half

of France. This heterogeneous branch showed no particular regional changes in employment, to judge the 1954 figures with those of 1962, except in regions with concentrations of labour, i.e. Paris and departement 39 in the Dijon region.

Branch No. 60, *Industries diverses,* is so heterogeneous that it is of no particular interest to us. Branch No. 61, *Industries mal désignées,* was located to departement 62 and was extremely insignificant. However, in 1959, its name was changed to *Transformation des matières plastiques.* In 1962, it was mainly located to Paris and the Lyon region with about 12,000 and 5000 workers, respectively.

Review of selected branches in French industry during the postwar period up to about 1962

23. Iron ore

At the beginning of the 1960s, France occupied third place, after Russia and the U.S.A. in the world production of iron ore. The French iron-ore production covered the needs of the country and also allowed exports, mainly to neighbouring countries. In 1958, the French iron-ore deposits were estimated at 8.5-milliard tons, which was said to be sufficient for the next 75 years iron production in the country. Besides those in France, there were big iron-ore deposits in Europe: Russia, Sweden, and Great Britain.[1]

In France, the iron-ore districts are localized to three regions: in the east, up to Metz and Nancy and up to the border; in the west, in central Brittany and lower Normandy. There were also iron-ore deposits in the Pyrenees in the south. The most important production was in the eastern region. In 1958, 94 % of all French iron ore was mined here. In the same year, the western region produced 5.4 % and the southern, 0.6 %.[2]

At the beginning of the 1950s, the labour force consisted of *circa* 30,000; this figure, during the period up to 1961, was reduced to *circa* 27,000, of which a large number were foreigners (30 % in 1952). The production of iron ore has increased considerably since 1952. In that year, it amounted to 40.8-million tons; in 1960, it was about 67-million tons.[3] After 1960, there was some decline.

The iron-ore production in France 1948 to 1962

Year	Million tons	Index	Year	Million tons	Index
1948	23.0	77	1956	52.7	175
1949	31.4	105	1957	57.8	192
1950	30.0	100	1958	59.5	198
1951	35.2	117	1959	60.9	203
1952	40.7	136	1960	66.9	223
1953	42.4	141	1961	66.6	222
1954	43.8	146	1962	66.3	221
1955	50.3	167			

Source: Rapports de l'activité pour les années 1950—1962. Chambre Syndicale des Mines de Fer de France.

Number of employees in the French iron-ore mines

Year	1000s	Index	Year	1000s	Index
1950	28.5	100	1957	29.3	103
1951	30.0	105	1958	28.8	101
1952	31.4	110	1959	28.3	99
1953	31.2	109	1960	27.9	98
1954	29.7	104	1961	27.3	96
1955	29.3	103	1962	26.2	92
1956	29.0	102			

Source: Rapports de l'activité pour les années 1950—1962. Chambre Syndicale des Mines de Fer de France.

Although the production of iron in France reckoned in tons seems to be impressive, the iron content is relatively slight. In 1953 when the iron content of the iron ore mined in the U.S.A. amounted to 61.5-million tons, France obtained 13.1-million tons iron from its 42.4-million tons of iron ore. The Soviet Union got about the same amount in the same year, Sweden lay not far behind with 10.3-million tons.[4]

Almost all iron ore mined in France contains phosphorus; most of the ore comes from Lorraine. The iron ore from the western district of France, however, is "moyennement phosphoreux". Other iron ore in the country is without phosphorus content. The production in the regions outside Lorraine did not rise particularly during the period 1952 to 1961, if comparison is made with the development in the eastern mining region.[5]

During the 1950s, exports played a considerable role for the French iron-ore mines. At least one-third of the production—sometimes 40 % or more—was exported between 1946 and 1962. Immediately after the war, Belgium took almost half of the exports, a situation that persisted until 1948. Luxemburg also took a remarkably large part of the French iron-ore exports, 36.5 % in 1946. Although this was reduced to about 25 %, the number of tons delivered to this small country was considerable: in 1955 and 1956, about 5-million; in 1960, almost 7-million. The deliveries to the Saar, that part of Germany that was under French administration, rose rapidly. In 1949, they were the most important: 35.6 % of the French iron-ore exports. In 1952 and 1958, the value was 40.3 % and 34.8 %, respectively. Although this part of Europe soon passed over to the German Federal Republic, considerable deliveries of French iron ore continued to go to the Saar. In 1962, they amounted to 8.6-million tons. France has not delivered particularly much to the rest of Germany including the Ruhr. The figure for 1952, concerning deliveries of this kind, was *circa* 340,000 tons, which was 2.1 % of the French iron-ore exports. In 1961 and 1962, these figures were 905,572 and 532,484, i.e. 3,5 % and 2,0 %, respectively, of the French iron-ore

exports. Italy, Great Britain, and Holland were not important buyers of French iron ore. Their shares were only a few per cent throughout the entire period.[6]

French production and exports of iron ore 1946 to 1962

Year	Million tons				
	Production of iron ore in France	Deliveries of iron ore	Exports	Variations in exports Tons	Exported iron ore Percentage share
1946	16.2	5.3	5.7		35.2
1947	18.6	13.9	6.4	+ 780,000	34.2
1948	23.0	18.4	8.7	+2,285,000	37.8
1949	31.4	32.6	11.0	+2,317,000	35.0
1950	30.0	30.5	11.3	+ 270,000	37.7
1951	35.2	37.6	14.8	+3,540,000	42.0
1952	40.7	41.5	15.4	+ 524,000	37.8
1953	42.4	40.9	16.4	+1,060,000	38.7
1954	43.8	42.4	17.5	+1.027.000	40.0
1955	50.3	51.7	20.7	+3,217,000	41.2
1956	52.7	53.5	21.3	+ 652,000	40.4
1957	57.8	56.7	22.4	+1,076,000	38.8
1958	59.5	57.8	23.5	+1,053,000	39.5
1959	60.9	60.6	24.5	+1,051,000	40.2
1960	66.9	66.3	26.8	+2,330,000	40.0
1961	66.6	66.1	26.0	+ 840,000	39.0
1962	66.3	64.4	26.0	+ 31,000	39.2

Exports include deliveries to the Saar, even when this district was under French administration.
Source: Rapports d'activités 1946—1962 Chambre Syndicale des mines de Fer de France.

This gives some idea of French iron-ore production during the postwar period. What are the other perspectives? Concerning the development in France, the period after the end of Warld War I showed a constant increase in mining up to 1928—29. This was followed by a decline which continued up to 1945, except for a few peaks, for instance in 1939 and 1943. As we have already noted, there was a powerful increase from the end of World War II; this continued up to and including 1960.[7]

The various iron-ore producing regions in France and their importance have already been mentioned. We now consider the development in each of these regions. Minette ore in Lorraine contains about 32 % iron and is therefore uneconomical to transport for long distances. It was sent to adjacent coal-mine districts in the northern and eastern parts of France and to those parts of foreign countries that lay suitably close to French borders.[8]

The iron ore mined in western France has a higher iron content, 42 to 50 %. A considerable export took place from here to Great Britain, Belgium, Holland, and the German Federal Republic. The deliveries from this region to the Saar district were not significant. The southern iron-ore region did not ordinarily have possibilities for exporting: transport costs were too high. Consequently, this ore was used in France.[9]

In the eastern region, the iron-ore production regressed slightly in 1950 compared with 1949. Thereafter, there followed a production increase, with some small variations, up to 1960; stagnation ensued in 1961 and 1962. In 1949, the amount produced in tons was the same as in 1948. The 1929 level, *circa* 50-million tons, was attained in the Lorraine district in 1956. Throughout the period 1950 to 1962, a slight decrease in the number of employees and an increase in productivity can also be noticed.[10]

The Normandy-Brittany region did not follow an exactly similar course. Here the curve of the iron-ore production has notches in 1953—54 and 1958—59. There was a peak in 1960—61 and lower value in 1962. The yield was also lower than in the Lorraine, which could be due to differences in the natural conditions. The number employed showed no particular changes.[11]

Finally, in the central and southern iron-ore districts, there were no big changes. Here too there was an increase in the profitability, but the statistics for the whole group show modest progress in this respect. The number employed, more than 1000 in 1949, 1951, and 1952, fell below this figure in 1953. From 1955, the number increased up to 1959, but then declined up to 1962, which is the last year of the period investigated here.[12]

TRADE ASSOCIATION ASPECTS OF THE DEVELOPMENT 1948 TO 1963

The annual reports published by Chambre Syndicale des Mines de Fer de France enable us to follow the opinions of the producers and their study group about the course in the iron-ore sphere in the country. A fairly rapid upswing in the iron-ore production existed in the years after the war. However, the Syndicate complained of the state regulated prices. They were too low for the financial situation of the companies to improve. The attitude to the trade unions and the state administration apparatus during the end of the 1940s seems to have been bitter. The government policy was interpreted as a brake on the necessary modernization of the branch. This situation still persisted in 1949 despite this being regarded as a good year.

New perspectives came with 1950. Despite, or because of, a decline in the demands for iron ore during the first part of 1950, a sudden increase came in September, when production reached its so far highest level. The Syndicate emphasized two other phenomena: a new price rate for iron ore determined by

the state, and President Schuman's declaration about creating the European Coal and Steel Community. The role the Syndicate played in the latter case was not large the initiative came from the French Foreign Office. We thus see that the situation was a little brighter for the iron-ore mines, or at least, so it was interpreted. However, there was great discontent within the manufacturers' Syndicate because the state decided both prices and wages. Moreover, no financial help was obtained either in 1951 or in 1952.

The new winds in the European economy reduced the tension between the trade association and the French state administration. The new situation made it necessary to liberalize the prices. The attitude of the Syndicate was, perhaps quite naturally, adopted by the French negotiators in Luxemburg. In 1953, the demands by the iron and steel industry for iron ore were suddenly reduced. None the less, production continued; it even rose by 4 % compared with 1952. What remained unsold was put in store (1.6-million tons). An improvement occurred in 1954, but the upswing did not affect the iron-ore sector until a few months later. The reduction in working hours resorted to earlier still continued in some places towards the end of the year, despite a balance having been achieved between production and delivery.

The advantageous development continued during 1955. During the past four years, the employees had suffered considerable reduction in wages. Now the 1929 results began to be achieved, the peak year in French production. In 1956, this goal was reached. Within the framework of the economic planning, there were deliberations between the French state administration, the Syndicate, and the companies in the iron-ore sector. This assembly indicated 58-million tons as the goal for 1957; this figure was fully attained. The development slowed down, however, in 1958, but despite this, a better result than the previous year was achieved. It can be thought that the iron-ore fields of western France, which were mostly export oriented, also were more sensitive to market fluctuations. In any event, there were bigger disturbances there than in eastern France. Some companies even discontinued the 48-hour week and changed over to a 40-hour week. This was done to avoid dismissals or lay-offs.

The nervous rhythm in the iron-ore branch continued. The year 1959 began cautiously; there was then an upswing followed by a strong expansion during 1960. The technical prerequisites had now advanced so far that storing was no longer necessary in order to cope with the increasing demands from the iron and steel industry, but was used as a method for avoiding sudden changes in the working conditions of the employees. The Syndicate viewed the future with optimism. It was believed that a much higher production figure could be reached without increasing the labour force. This points to important investments.

However, 1961 saw a slight regression in production for many reasons, among others, strikes in the Belgium iron and steel industry and difficulties for the French western mining districts in placing their products. Exports did not rise; they fell. However, demands in the country rose and gave some compensation.

Was this a new situation or a fluctuation of the same kind as occurred during the previous years? The goal written into the fourth plan was not achieved. Despite the results, the rate of investments rose during 1961 and 1962. The stagnation in the iron and steel industry in the Common Market continued, but the French iron-ore exports held their position during the end phase of the investigation period. However, a new situation seems to have arisen: the arrival of rich iron ore from Africa and other countries trying to obtain a market in western Europe.

This has given us some idea about the French iron-ore branch during the postwar period up to 1962. The idea is not particularly fundamental, but this is related to the orientation of the present work. However, it has enabled us to get some perspectives of the political planning during and immediately after World War II concerning industrial life in the French postwar community. State interventions in industry were not popular in industrialist circles; they seldom are. A change in the trend seems to have brought about a softening up. We have also noted that it was the politicians and not the industrialists who promoted the European Coal and Steel Community. This confirms the concept we formed earlier in the treated material.[13]

24. Iron and steel production

INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES DURING THE 1950s

The rapid development of the iron and steel industry in many countries during the period 1950 to 1959 is surprising. Italy and Spain, for example, show remarkable figures; this applies also to many communist countries. Counted in tons, however, the results are not particularly impressive, although the production of the various countries in question often doubled during the period. Here, we are mostly interested in the really big producing countries and their share of the world production. Among them, are the U.S.A., the Soviet Union, the German Federal Republic, Great Britain, France, and—towards the end of the period—also Japan and China. If, for instance, we refer to the German statistics of international comparisons, we find that the world production of "Roheisen und Ferrolegierungen" rose from around 132-million tons in 1950 to around 210-million tons in 1959. This is an increase of 59 %. Both at the beginning and towards the end of the period, the U.S.A. occupied first place, but showed considerable fluctuations in its production. Sometimes the variation of the U.S.A. production between two consecutive years during the 1950s was just as large as the entire production in this field of a big European country and sometimes even larger. On the whole, the U.S.A. production of "Roheisen und Ferrolegierungen" during

1950 to 1959 averaged 60-million tons a year. The peak of about 72-million tons was reached in 1957, the trough of about 52-million tons occurred in 1958.[1]

The development in the Soviet Union, a doubling of production between 1950 and 1959, is more optimistic. This came close to the U.S.A. value during the last years of the period: 43-million tons for the Soviet Union, 55-million tons for the U.S.A. Red China showed a similar development during the latter part of the twentieth century.

The West European countries followed a much calmer course between 1950 and 1959 in this respect. The German Federal Republic, which in 1950 had largely the same values as Great Britain reckoned in tons, during the closing years of the 1950s beat Great Britain and in 1959 had production of 18-million tons. A similar upswing occurred in France, although the values reached there were lower. The French capacity seems to have amounted to two-thirds of the German (the Saar not included). If this part of Germany is combined with France, as it was at the beginning of the period, the positions of the two countries would be similar. In any case, Germany regained the Saar in 1959, and with the production of this province, the strength of the Federal Republic was almost twice that of France. However, we recall that this big difference between the two countries corresponded to the differences in the mechanical engineering industry, where the Federal Republic dominated.[2]

Concerning the world production of "Rohstahl", this rose from 190-million tons in 1950 to 304-million tons in 1959. Throughout this period, the U.S.A. dominated the production. The U.S.A.'s share of the world production of "Rohstahl" was about one-third in 1963; its share had been decreasing since 1950. At the same time, the share of the other countries in general increased.[3]

The "Rohstahl" production in the U.S.A. showed violent variations, but there were no great changes in the level of producton, which was about 90-million tons. The production peak during the period 1950 to 1959 occurred in 1955 with 106-million tons. The highest value of the period was obtained in 1958: 77-million tons. Other big producers were the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the Federal Republic, France, Japan, and Red China. To these, we can add countries with close connexions with the French economy, such as Belgium and Luxemburg, which had considerable production in this sphere. The communist countries experienced the most rapid development. The Soviet Union, which in 1950 lay parallel to the Federal Republic in Rohstahl production, succeeded in doubling its figures, and in 1959, it lay close to the U.S.A. values. There was an upswing in western Europe. The Federal Republic passed Great Britain during the latter part of the 1950s. On the opposite side of the earth, Japan showed a strongly rising trend; this was also the case in Red China.[4]

According to what the German statistics call "Walzstahlfertigerzeugnisse", which includes such groups as Oberbanstoffe, Formstahl, Stabstahl, Stahlpundwände, Breitflauschträger, Walzdraht, Röhrenrunt und Vierkantstahl, Bandstahl und Röhrenstreifen, there is a development similar to that we have already

referred to during the period 1950 to 1959 in the world production. Although it is difficult to make comparisons now, as it was earlier, because of the different collection bases of the national statistics, we none the less see that the U.S.A. had the leading position, although its production in this sphere did not expand but rotated around 70-million tons annually concerning "Walzstahlfertigerzeugnisse" with violent changes in the production level. Other countries with high production in this sphere were the Soviet Union, the German Federal Republic, Great Britain, and France.[5]

The German comparative statistics give a more detailed picture, which is included under Wahlstahlfertigungserzeugnisse, such as Oberbaustoffe, Formstahl, Stabstahl, Walzdraht, Bandstahl einschl. Röhrenstreifen, and Bleche. If we consider the four countries U.S.A., Soviet Union, the German Federal Republic (except the Saar), and France, we are surprised at the importance of the Bleche production in the U.S.A. This was also of great importance in the Federal Republic. In France, it took second place, as it also did in the Soviet Union in, for instance, 1955.[6]

On the whole, the U.S.A. values reflect a community that had matured in this sphere, a sufficient (or too large?) capacity in the sector. The Soviet Union values show a community under expansion; the German figures are optimistic, an expanding market, or a community with a powerful mechanical engineering industry which must be served. The French figures show a more cautious attitude, or is it rather a question of the mechanical engineering industry in the domestic market not yet having reached the German dimensions?

THE SITUATION IN THE IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY IN FRANCE DURING THE 1950s

1. *The production apparatus and the production*

About 200,000 were employed both in 1950 and in 1962 in what is called in France "activité sidérurgique + ateliers annexes". However, there is an increase in the labour force of about 15,000. *Circa* 2/3 of this increase is to be found among administration personnel and technicians; the rest, among the workers.[7] The turnover rose considerably between 1950 and 1962. "Le chiffre d'affaire hors taxes", which was reached at the beginning of the 1960s, lay around 10-billion francs. During the period 1950 to 1962, the branch obtained very good results, except for 1953, 1954, and 1962. The development during 1961 also showed a slowing down in the French iron and steel branch.[8]

The dominant enterprises in the branch are located to the eastern and northern parts of France. In 1952, only 15,000 out of 138,000 workers were employed in other parts of France; in 1960, this figure was even less. A large proportion of the workers employed in the branch were foreign: in 1952, *c.* 38,000; in 1961,

about the same. This group was dominated by Italians, then Arabs from different parts of French or French-dominated Africa.[9]

The technical equipment consisted of blast-furnaces, converters, electric steel plants, &c. There were 175 blast-furnaces in 1950 and 141 in 1962, but the number in operation during the period varied: 1957 (125) was the highest figure; 1953 was the lowest (89).[10]

The number of blast-furnaces (haut fourneaux) in operation in France 1950 to 1962[11]

Year		Year	
1950	102	1957	125
1951	110	1958	113
1952	117	1959	120
1953	89	1960	120
1954	108	1961	115
1955	120	1962	104
1956	124		

These figures reflect fairly well the production variations according to the following table.

Production of fonte brute, in million "tonnes métriques"[12]

Year		Index	Year		Index
1929	10.3	132	1956	11.5	147
1950	7.8	100	1957	11.9	153
1951	8.7	112	1958	12.0	154
1952	9.8	126	1959	12.5	160
1953	8.7	112	1960	14.1	181
1954	8.8	113	1961	14.6	187
1955	11.0	141	1962	14.0	179

These large amounts come almost entirely from blast-furnaces. In 1954, for instance, only 17,742 metrical tons were produced in "four électrique"; an extremely small amount totalling approximately 9-million tons. The dominant production regions were called East I and East II and thus lay in the eastern part of the country. The northern district was responsible for approximately 20 % of the production that was derived from East I and East II combined.[13] If we regard the geographical distribution of the blast-furnaces, we find that they were spread over the whole area, but with great concentration precisely at the border of Luxemburg along the rivers Chiers, Feusch, and Orne. We here find enter-

prises such as those in Joeuf and Moyeuvre, belonging to de Wendel, and in Homecourt, Aubone, and Rombas belonging to Sidélor.[14]

Concerning the steel production, the Thomas process dominated at the beginning of the investigation period and also at its end. The Martin process took second place. This was followed by the electric production methods. The production of lingots and acier liquied pour moulage had the following values:

	Million metrical tons	
	1950	1962
1. Thomas	5.4	10.0
2. Martin	2.6	4.9
3. Electric method	0.5	1.5
	8.7	17.2

The largest relative increase is found under point 3, electric method; in 1 and 2, the development is about the same. At the beginning of the 1960s, a new method was recorded in the statistics of the trade association, the Kaldo process, which involved the use of liquid air in the production. This production increased considerably between 1960 and 1962.[15]

What goes under the name "Acieries Thomas" is concentrated to the districts close to the Belgian border, near Luxemburg and the Saar. Providence, Lorraine-Escaut, Sidélor, Sollac, and de Wendel, to mention a few examples, have their plants here. A few more plants of this type could, in 1959, be found in the Calvados and Nord départements. The Martin steel works are more spread across the country, but none the less are concentrated to two regions, Département Nord and that part of France lying immediately south of Luxemburg. Otherwise, the plants are distributed across the country as follows: One in Calvados, one in Morbihan, one in Loire Atlantique, one close to the Spanish border in the south-western part of France, and about six in the centre of France. In Département Nord, we find such names as Lorraine-Escaut and Usinor. In the Départements "Meurthe et Moselle" and "Moselle" south of Luxemburg, the names Micheville, Hayange, Homecourt are known.[16]

The electric steel works are largely concentrated to the Loire Département, but in 1959, there were plants of this type also in those départements lying at the Spanish border in the central parts of the country and at the border to Belgium and Luxemburg. We thus note the occurrence of enormous plants across the entire country, but with the greatest concentration east of a diagonal dividing the French hexagon in a north-south direction. Here and there, houses have been built, chimneys put up, railway lines laid, mountains of coal and other products piled up; all this has changed the beautiful countryside into an ugly and offensive eyesore. At the same time, however, the picture is in some way magnificent, full

of strength, memories, and hope for the future. The economic groups that dominated the operation were the companies Usinor, de Wendel, Sidélor, Lorraine-Escaut, Sollac, and U.C.P.M.I. These companies in 1960 were responsible for 65 % of the entire production of steel (acier brut).[17]

In this work, we have followed some production processes and the mining of iron ore and coal. Before the products reach the blast-furnaces, they must be treated, the iron ore must be enriched, the coal converted into coke. The various production processes, Thomas-Martin, the electric, and the Kaldo methods have been mentioned. The next step follows. According to French terminology, this is: "coulée de l'acier en lingotiéres, de moulages des lingots, rechauffage, blooming" and then the final stage when "profiles" or "produits plats" are made, whereby in both cases the product goes through rolling mills (laminoires).[18] Plants for this fabrication are found almost everywhere in the iron and steel districts of France, although concentrated to four districts in the Département Nord: Valenciennes (Usinor), Denain (Usinor, Fives-Lillecail), Haumont (Sidélor, Usinor, Providence, Dembiermont) to mention a few examples.[19]

The second region with rolling mill concentration lies in the Ardennes in, among other places, Sedan and Bréville (Lorraine-Escaut) and in Blagny-Carignan (Société des Hauts Fournaux de la Chiers). The third region lies south of the Luxemburg border: Thionville (Lorraine-Escaut), Joeuf (de Wendel) &c. The fourth region, which has many rolling mill plants, lies in the Saint Etienne district not far from Lyon.[20]

The production of "barres laminées" was for a long time the most important in France, with 1.7-million tons in 1950 and about 2.3-million tons in 1962. Production peaks occurred during the period in 1952, 1957, and 1961; there were declines in 1954 and 1959. Of all production types that we can follow in the statistics of the Syndicate, this seems to be most severely affected by the economic variations. Although a considerable decline in production of "barres laminées" occurred in 1953, there was a rapid upswing lasting until 1961.[21]

The production of what the statistics call "toles minces (moins de 3 mm) et fer noir à froid" dominated during the latter phase of the investigation. The statistical name was changed from 1958, but earlier indications seem to point to the fact that the importance of this type of production had been developing, at least since 1955. In 1962, this production was about 3-million tons. It is quite possible to examine in detail the production orientation and to see the variations of the different types of goods during the period, but that would make the work too detailed.[22]

The iron-ore consumption was doubled between 1950 and 1962. In 1961, 41-million tons of iron ore were used in France. To this can be added the consumption of scrap iron, which went mainly to the basic Martin method industry (4-million tons in 1962). Who were the customers-consumers? The French car industry took about 10 % of the 1962 steel production and 5.5 % went to the railways. Shipyards took barely 2 %. The mechanical engineering industry and

the electronic industry together took about 12 %. The group "première transformation de l'acier (tubes, tréfilage, étirage)" had 25 %, and 27.3 % went to the trade sector to the group "marchand de fer".[23]

2. *Exports and imports*

In the matter of exports of products from the iron and steel sector, France and the Saar formed an economic union up to 5 July 1959, that is to say almost throughout the period we are investigating. However, the figures for 1960 to 1962, after the surrender of the Saar to the German Federal Republic, show no particular differences concerning either results or trend in relation to previous years. Therefore it can perhaps be said that the loss of the Saar had little effect on the French economy in that respect, especially as it had for the past few years been integrated in the Common Market for coal and steel.[24]

The total exports of French-Saar products increased from 2-million tons to more than 4-million tons. In 1960 and 1961, France alone exported more than 5-million tons. In this development, certain interruptions or stoppages can be noted; for instance, in 1952, during the period 1956 to 1957, and in 1958.[25]

If we divide the receiving countries into two groups—the Common Market countries and others—we find that the group "other countries" played the more important role during almost the whole period. It was not until the 1960s that the CECA-countries took the main part of the export products. In the Common Market, the Federal Republic increased its demand for these French products (250,000 tons in 1950, 2-million tons in 1960 and 1961).[26] The reduced exports in 1952 were mainly due to a significant decline in demands from countries lying outside the CECA-countries. The negative reaction in 1956 to 1958 came from countries outside the Common Market + the Federal Republic.[27]

The exports from France and the Saar to French territories and colonies, the so-called France d'outre mer, showed no particular differences between 1949 and 1959; the level lay persistently between 500,000 and 600,000 tons. From 1958, the demand from Italy and Belgium-Luxemburg increased, 600,000 and 500,000 tons, respectively. The Federal Republic, however, was a very important customer.[28]

The imports of iron and steel goods also increased, mainly in the same way as the exports. The difference between the import and the export development is that the former followed a calmer course without abrupt fluctuations. In 1952, the countries outside the Common Market formed the most important group of exporters of iron and steel products to France, but thereafter the situation changed considerably. The imports to France with the Saar of these commodities came mainly from Belgium-Luxemburg and the Federal Republic. This course began in 1954; then from 1959, we find new figures. The Saar was surrendered to the Federal Republic. In 1961, France imported 1.9-million tons of iron and steel goods from its eastern neighbour. This shows that intimate relations existed, a situation by no means new; it already existed before World War II. Imports

from other Common Market countries did not undergo any particular changes between 1949 and 1962, and they were fairly insignificant (*c.* 100,000 tons in 1960 from Italy and Holland).[29]

The views of the trade association on the development

No annual reports from the beginning of the period could be obtained from the Syndicate for examination. Not until 1956 was there any material. This shows that the situation at the middle of the 1950s in the iron and steel industry was regarded with optimism. Despite the competition that existed with the creation of a coal and steel community, the French branch managed well and showed its dynamism. The same situation existed the following year. The trend in the Common Market was excellent, despite alarming reports from the countries outside this organizations. The object was for France to be able to compete on the same conditions as her neighbours. The road to this goal was by way of modernization of industrial equipment.[30]

The report from 1959 speaks of a new situation in the world. New iron-ore fields had been discovered and new plants had been erected for processing the iron ore into iron and steel. Was there a danger of overcapacity in the world? New material came at the same time into the market. Aluminium and plastic could replace iron and steel. Countries such as Japan and the eastern states had strongly developed their industries in this branch. In France, it was feared that these countries whose mechanical engineering industry was not fully developed would place their surplus products on the international market. Was CECA prepared to meet the new situation brought about largely through the lack of coal immediately after the war, a situation that disappeared at the middle of the 1950s? However, in 1960, there was a considerable upswing in the iron and steel production. The satisfaction was great; the internal market expanded. The exports showed even better results than in 1959, the year that French companies could take advantage of a long strike in the U.S.A. and market their products there in great quantities.[31]

Big results were achieved in 1961, but the development of production had come to a halt, and the same situation largely prevailed in 1962. How could an increase in demands be brought about? At an interview with one of the co-workers at the French trade association, I was told that it would be desirable at house building for steel elements to be used to a greater extent than hitherto. Thus the demand could be increased, the secretary said.

The difficulties at the beginning of the 1960s resulted in harder competition that earlier. The Belgian and Luxemburg iron and steel industry reduced prices by 25 to 30 %. French industry judged it impossible to follow this example. French prices had been lower than those of her neighbours for years; consequently, there was no margin for manoeuvre on this plane. We know that the tariffs of the Common Market were increased in 1963—64 to restrict such imports as those

from the Lamco Project in Liberia, in which among others American (Bethlehem steel) and Swedish interests were involved.

An important step to improve the prerequisites for the French iron and steel industry was taken at the mid-1950s: the treaties concerning the canalizing of the Moselle. For a long time, this project had been wanted in France, particularly by those with interests in Lorraine. With the creation of the canal, it would be possible to make better contacts with the Ruhr district; as we have seen, no really important sales of French iron and steel products had been made here earlier.[32] The French so-called third plan refers to other canal projects; for instance, between Dunkirk and Valenciennes, and others in different parts of the country. The Moselle canal was not completed until 1964.[33]

The German railway tariffs that affected the French iron and steel companies were regarded in France as an injustice and as opposed to the ideas and rules underlying the creation of the Common Market. The German companies situated as far from the Ruhr as were those in Lorraine had a 35 % reduction on transport costs for coal &c. In 1958, the French companies had to pay 8-milliards A.F. to the Germans for transports in Germany. Of these, 2-milliards A.F. could have been saved if there had been a similar price rate for both German and French companies; that was the opinion of the Syndicate. The tariff question lasted for two or three years, involving the highest courts, before a solution was reached.[34]

There is no doubt that precisely the iron and steel branch is an extremely interesting phenomenon in postwar France. This branch and its operation has political aspects which, unfortunately, we cannot describe satisfactorily. The necessary material has not been put at our disposal by the trade association. The French Foreign Office has refused a request for permission to use material concerning German-French relations during the postwar period; this is understandable, as it refers to fairly recent conditions.

The French political circles, after the war, wished for reasons of security to control those sectors of German economy that could be utilized for aggression. This attitude is fully understandable. At the same time, there were other reasons for co-operation.

25. Coal

Annuaire Statistique de la France, Rétrospectif, Ed. 1961, gives an account of the energy resources of France during the postwar period. For the period 1948—1959, it reports an expansion for "produits pétroliers", "électricité hydraulique", and "gaz naturel". For coal, it states that a fairly unchanged position existed as regards production in tons.[1] However, we must bear in mind that new technical processes and procedures can bring about an improved use of the energy resources.

The direct figures for coal production for the postwar period up to 1962 have the following appearance:

Net production of coal in France[2]

	In 1000 tons	Index
1938	47,562	90
1946	49,289	94
1947	47,309	90
1948	45,136	86
1949	53,408	101
1950	52,521	100
1951	54,975	104
1952	57,355	109
1953	54,536	104
1954	56,315	107
1955	57,389	109
1956	57,381	109
1957	59,089	112
1958	60,039	114
1959	59,781	113
1960	58,236	111
1961	55,263	105
1962	55,241	105

Source: Charbonnage de France Statistique Annuelle 1946—1962 tab. 1 p. 8—9. Ed. 1963.

The table confirms the relative uniformity of production. The employment in the branch is shown in the following table.

Number of employees in the coal branch in France (workers, management, administration) in total[3]

Year	Persons	Index
1948	321,382	111
1949	313,595	109
1950	287,031	100
1951	284,400	99
1952	276,762	96
1953	263,164	92
1954	254,501	89
1955	245,723	86
1956	242,321	84
1957	243,779	85
1958	239,899	83
1959	232,493	81
1960	216,793	75
1961	207,782	72
1962	202,792	71

The table shows quite a strong reduction in the labour force during the period 1948—1962, but the yield/working day in the various regions rose during the same period.[4]

We will now consider the objectives of the coal sector in France according to the plan. *Rapport Général sur le Premier Plan de modernisation et d'équipement* presented the following:[5]

"*Production :* Accroissement jusqu'à 65 millions de tonnes en 1950, soit 17,4 millions de plus qu'en 1938, dont 7,3 dans le Nord et le Pas-de-Calais, 5,3 en Lorraine (augmentation de 80 %) et 4,8 dans le Centre-Midi.

Modernisation des méthodes : Concentration de l'exploitation, développement de la mécanisation, essai des méthodes américaines par « chambres et piliers », électrification du fond, amélioration du roulage (transport des ouvriers), modernisation des techniques de lavage du charbon, etc...

Investissements : Dépense de l'ordre de 115 milliards de francs en dix ans se décomposant en 30 milliards pour les travaux neufs courants, 45 milliards pour la modernisation et l'équipement, et 40 milliards pour des logements ouvriers. Sur ces 115 milliards, 56,5 sont prévus pour la période 1947—50, dont 22,5 pour la construction de logements ouvriers."

These objectives agree in the main with those we have observed in the earlier material in this dissertation, taken from the investigation material concerning the period before the liberation.

THE COURSE IN THE COAL BRANCH

Studies of the annual reports from *Charbonnages de France* give us some idea of the general course after 1948. Concerning the French economy, 1949 was said to be characterized by "le retour à une situation d'équilibre et de relative stabilité ; elle est la période de transition au cours de laquelle le régime du libre marché a succédé au régime de contingentement et de répartition."

It also said: "L'évolution de l'Industrie Houillère a obéi aux mêmes règles et l'année 1949 est essentiellement caractérisée par la stabilisation du prix de vente, par le maintien des salaires à un niveau sensiblement constant, assortis uniquement d'une prime de résultat déterminée en fonction de la réalisation du programme de production, par une amélioration sensible du climat social et par la continuation de la rénovation et de la modernisation des installations."[7]

The following year's report declared optimism: "L'année 1950 est caractérisée, au plan technique, par une montée des rendements obtenue dans le cadre d'une capacité de production qui ne cesse également de s'élever. Un retour rapide en arrière montre que depuis 1948 la progression dans le domaine de la productivité n'a cessé d'être continue. Elle se poursuit actuellement au même rythme et les résultats de 1951 accusent la même tendance satisfaisante."[8]

There can be noted the increased yield in the coal production and signs of an improvement of the technique reflected in reduced figures for *"les effectifs du jour"*.[9]

The report from 1951 showed that now, five years after the nationalization of coal production, a higher level than ever before had been reached. The yield had increased since 1948 by 39 %: a very satisfactory situation.[10] On this occasion, it was desirable to enter *"la communauté européenne du charbon et de l'acier"*. What attitude did the syndicate adopt to this? The improvements led to an increased confidence, but it said: "Tous les problèmes que cet événement pose n'en sont pas résolus pour autant. La nature de nos gisements et notre handicap technique consécutif à la fois à la crise de 1930 et à l'occupation — six ans de rééquipement n'ont pas encore permis de le rattraper entièrement — laissent subsister des difficultés certaines. Aucune d'entre elles n'est telle qu'elle soit insurmontable : le concours que le pays ne leur a jusqu'ici pas marchandé continuera toutefois d'être indispensable à nos charbonnages pour les mettre à même de tenir dans la communauté le rôle sur lequel ils sont en droit de compter."[11]

How did the French coal industry appear from an international perspective at the beginning of the 1950s? In 1951, five giants dominated coal production throughout the world: the U.S.A., which produced the most coal (*c.* 500-million tons), and four others: the newly-formed Coal and Steel Community, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the rest of Europe. The coal production from these sources was in round figures 230-million tons. To this was added some brown coal production for all except Great Britain. For the group "the rest of Europe", this brown coal production was considerable, but the coal production amounted to only about 120-million tons.[12]

The countries of the Coal and Steel Community were thus—at least from the standpoint of figures—combined into an effective group. Here, the West German coal production was the most important. It was more than twice as large as the French. To this was added the fact that almost all the brown coal production of the Coal and Steel Community came from the Federal Republic.[13] The British coal production was almost twice as large as the West German and employed a considerable labour force (about 700,000 workers).[14] Although the French coal production occupied second place in C.E.C.A., i.e. the Coal and Steel Community, it was quite modest compared with the combined production of the British and West German. The French coal production employed about 250,000 workers, but to this was added the values for the Saar, which was under French administration. Good yield values were attained in this district. The Saar employed about 60,000 in the coal branch.[15]

On the whole, the picture was optimistic. The yield had risen strongest in France during the postwar years compared with the Federal Republic and Belgium.[16] The coke production in this sphere should provide us with some idea of the strength balance:

Production of coke at the beginning of the 1950s[17]

	Million tons		Million tons
The German Federal Republic	37.2	Belgium + Luxemburg	6.2
France	11.1	Holland	3.9
Saar	3.9	Italy	3.1

During 1953, the French net production of coal decreased compared with the 1952 production. The report from *Charbonnage de France* for 1953 has a heading: *"Alourdissement des stocks, chômage"* and precisely this was pointed out as conspicuous phenomena in the branch. The oil consumption had increased, and this was not exactly greeted with acclaim. There were complaints of the various bases for price fixing of oil and of coal: *Différance de structure des prix, le côut du fuel étant lié aux prix internationaux, celui du charbon aux prix français,* as was said. At a general price reduction, international prices were much more sensitive.[18]

In the description of the 1954 situation, the syndicate spoke of a crisis that had affected the French coal industry since the 1st of July 1952 and whose causes were competition with new sources of energy and various handicaps, higher social costs, and so on.[19] The 1955 report, however, is quite optimistic. Better times had arrived with good markets for coal. The large stocks of coal dwindled. The syndicate expressed its satisfaction: *"Le charbon conserve le premier rôle, et le gardera longtemps encore, face à la « faim d'énergie » qui caractérise notre époque."*[20] In France, 1956 was a good year for the sale of coal on account of bad weather and the Suez crisis. During 1957, France's coal production reached record figures. The productivity progressed; there was a good sale situation; however, despite this, economic problems persisted.[21] However, we go no further into these problems. Let us consider Professor Vidal's historiography of what took place in the French coal industry during the period after World War II.[22]

The description, which is technical, was printed in *Revue de l'industrie minérale* in December 1956.[23] In his conclusions, Vidal pointed out that, whereas many countries in Europe had obtained poorer or approximately similar results to those obtained during the period before the war, France had increased production and improved its yield by 30 %. Now the French mines had modern equipment. Great attention was paid to training; there existed better staff organization and organized co-operation concerning ideas and information. New material and new methods were expected within the immediate future.[24] Thus Vidal.

A comparison of 1947 with 1957 shows that coal mined in 1957 amounted to more than 10-million tons above the amount mined in 1947, that the daily production per mine worker had increased from 958 kg in 1947 to 1700 kg in 1957. The combined labour force had at the same time been reduced by more than 100,000, the turnover figure had risen, and the number of mines had been reduced from 220 to 140. All this points to extensive efforts having been made

in the branch, extensive rationalizations, and modernizations. It also shows the figures concerning the technical methods.[25]

Rapport de Gestion for 1958, however, advises of a severe crisis in the coal sector in Belgium and Germany, and also that difficulties had arisen in the French branch. Faced with the threat of a shortage of coal in Europe during 1957, an extensive import of coal from the U.S.A. had been made. A number of other factors had also played a role; for instance, mild weather, the general economic climate, and so on, which had led to the reduced consumption of coal.[26]

In an *"Aperçu général et conclusion"* presented by *Charbonnages de France* of the operations in 1960, mention was made of the crisis that was still a reality. It said: *"en dépit d'amélioration dans certains pays, d'une manière générale l'écoulement du charbon a été difficile et l'offre est demeurée supérieure à la demande."*[27] In this situation, it was necessary to curtail working hours and to store some of the production.[28]

The causes of the coal shortage in France was said in 1960 to be the following: "— les besoins en énergie n'augmentent pas en fonction de l'indice de la production industrielle, autant que l'expérience passée semblait le démontrer ; — la recherche des économies d'énergie dans les divers secteurs industriels porte ses fruits, et l'on peut aussi penser que, dans certains secteurs en expansion rapide, les consommations spécifiques d'énergie sont relativement faibles ; — les facteurs climatiques du début de l'année 1960 ont été peu favorables à une forte consommation d'énergie pour la production d'électricité thermique et pour les foyers domestiques ; — les ventes de gaz de Lacq se développent et la concurrence des produits pétroliers, soutenue par une pratique offensive de rabais commerciaux, s'accroît."[29] During 1960, 1961, and 1962, however, coal consumption in France showed increased values, although the French coal production showed slightly declining values.[30]

What variations existed commercially for the French coal industry during the period 1946 to 1960? We can get a rough idea of the relative displacement between various customer categories from the following table:

The total sale in tons by the French coal sector in 1946, 1951, 1956, and 1960[31]
Percentage distribution

	1946	1951	1956	1960
S.N.C.F.	14.9	12.1	9.2	6.7
G.d.F.	7.5	8.3	6.6	5.9
E.d.F.	12.0	8.4	8.5	10.1
Sidérurgie	12.9	12.5	17.0	22.7
Industrie	29.7	29.8	28.6	27.6
F.D.P.I.	19.6	23.0	24.1	23.2
Divers	2.4	1.9	1.1	0.5
Exportations	1.0	4.0	4.9	3.3
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

The table reveals a striking fall in S.N.C.F.'s share. This was connected with the modernization of the French railways system.[31] G. de F. (Gaz de France) increased its share from 1947 up to 1963; thereafter, it was reduced of varied. E.d.F.'s (Electricité de France) relative share also decreased somewhat. On the other hand, the relative share of the iron and steel branch went through a powerful expansion, whereas the share of industry was more or less unchanged. All this points to an expansion in the industrial production where other kinds of energy were increasingly used. F.D.P.I. (households and small industries) also increased their relative share to some extent. Exports in general were fairly insignificant, but in 1955 showed a relatively high figure (12.3 % of the total sale).[32]

To summarize some aspects of the French coal sector during the period after World War II up to the beginning of the 1960s, we note the following: the coal industry was nationalized in 1946. This was when the basic industries were being nationalized. Energy, steel, banks, and transports were nationalized. The railways were already under state control. France had suffered much during the occupation. Very extensive investments had to be made before the coal mines, for instance, could be put in order. Hardly any private company, at least, not the small ones, could, without help, start profitable production. The state would have to provide the finance, so why not go the whole way and nationalize?[33]

Charbonnage de France has mentioned that the state often intervened. At first, there was not a sufficiently large production of coal in the country, but towards the end of the period, things were different. Coal faced great competition from gas and petrol. Although, as we have seen in the foregoing, France was an exporter of coal, the exports concerned only small quantities, and from border regions over to neighbouring consumers across the border.[34]

The material presented here shows the importance that French political circles attached to the German energy supplies. Towards the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, there was no shortage of energy in France. The position was that what was required was available and there was no dependence on Germany. The coal syndicate considered that the import of coal should come from where it was cheapest and best.[35]

In the space available here, only brief mention can be made of the French coal sector. The conclusion is that at the beginning of the 1960s France found itself in a position different from that at the end of the war. The plans submitted in 1945—46 aimed at putting the French economy on its feet, and the general picture of the 1950s was a powerful French industrial expansion. The considerable state investments in the energy sphere seem to have been justified and necessary at the beginning of the period. However, at the beginning of the 1960s, the influence of the state was interpreted as embarrassing in *Charbonnage de France*.[36]

26. Concluding remarks

The foregoing has shown how the creation of public opinion in the French Resistance Movement influenced political circles immediately after the war. The long depression in France during the 1930s and the political debacle in 1940 probably created in many Frenchmen a desire for change in the country. The Petain regime worked for such a renewal, but it was their political opponents who brought it about.

Structural changes were thought necessary, but this concept should be interpreted in a wide sense. It was considered that the population pyramid should be given a new and better structure; also that industry, agriculture, domestic and foreign trade, banking system, apparatus of administration, school and university system should be changed. It involved an extensive modernization of French society.

In this large complex, we have selected a few points that we have thought essential and illuminating for the course. We have touched upon the nationalization ideas, the introduction of the co-influence of employees on the production apparatus, and the realization of a directed economy in the country. An attempt has been made to trace the origin of these ideas in order to obtain a more definite concept of their background and aims. All these ideas and measures have been a way to create the visualized society. We have also witnessed the origin, organization, and main result of the planification. Finally, we have tried to get an idea about French industry during the postwar period.

Lack of space compels the exclusion of the agrarian sector, the apparatus of distribution and the associated problems, and a number of other matters that would have been of interest here. Instead, we have been able to refer to a few main objectives of French economic policy for the postwar period. Naturally, it was necessary to create satisfactory economic and social conditions for the populace. The production apparatus had to be brought into function in a better way than it did during the 1930s. To get satisfactory production, it was considered essential to ensure sufficient energy resources. This became a political issue, and we have seen that, among other things, German coal supplies were much wanted. This was, of course, a matter for the politicians, who obtained them. The Coal and Steel Community was thus, among other things, a result of a wish of the French for ensured supplies of energy. But these thoughts also held political security aspects. However, we notice in many directions the absence of bitter feelings towards Germany.

A description of the course and structure of the industrial production apparatus was judged to be an essential for the purpose of the present study. It is important to know not only the course of industry along broad lines, but also in fuller detail: France played a very big role in the European Market.

How have state interventions and economic planning influenced the structural development of the industrial apparatus during the postwar period? This ques-

tion cannot be answered in general terms. Here, further studies must be undertaken to obtain a clearer idea. Each branch must be investigated individually. A few branch studies have been carried out in this work. For instance, we see in the study of the coal sector that an extensive modernization and co-ordination was achieved after the war. These changes must be ascribed to state intervention. However, the state can act in many and various ways concerning influence on the structure of a branch, for example, by granting credits, or restricting credits, by granting building permits, or refusing them.

The interest of the French State in its own production apparatus has been much greater than in other West European countries. France carries on a growth policy.

In the chapter about the French industrial structure, we noted the extremely strong concentration of industry to the Paris region and the slight industrialization in the rural areas, mainly in the western parts of the country. It seems as though this concentration increased during the 1950s. The fourth plan, which began in 1962, included as an objective an improvement of the economy of the underdeveloped regions. Here, it is not possible to determine whether, from the beginning, considerable work should have been put into localizing industry across the whole country. Concentration to the Paris region was, for many reasons, unavoidable because of the administrative and financial concentration there, the expanding communication system centred on Paris, and so on. The urgent necessity to provide employment and rapid industrial production for the country was a strong argument against complicating the reorganization by decentralization.

How in 1970 does one of the key persons regard the course and a few of our objectives? We put the question to M. Jean Monnet:

INTERVIEW WITH JEAN MONNET 5TH OCTOBER 1970

— What role did the ideas of the resistance movement play for the future economic development of France?

— As you are aware, I was a member of *Comité de la Libération* together with, among others, André Philip and Jules Moch. Some projects were proposed, but I am unable to say whether these were realizable. The most important thing of this period is that the resistance movement created the feeling that all Frenchmen must stand united and that co-operation must be ensured. Between 1944 and 1945—46, there was much disorder in the country and economic life functioned badly. There were not sufficient resources.[1]

It was in 1945 that General de Gaulle asked me to become planning commissioner.[2] My work was facilitated by the unity between the parties resulting from the resistance period. Immediately after the war, the Communist Party was also

included in the government, and the plan was based on co-operation between the different social fractions in the country. Now we could set the production targets. This referred mainly to steel, petrol, and electricity.

We in the planning committee had some idea of the overall design, but not of the details. Subordinate organs, i.e. the representatives of the various branches, must formulate the details. I had Etienne Hirsch and later Pierre Uri as co-workers.

Our goal for production was to achieve 25 per cent above the 1939 value. We had at our disposal organizations for each industrial branch. These organizations included representatives for the state administration, employers, employees, and experts; they numbered about 1000 persons, although the executives and staff were, and still are, few.

We in the committee did not know how we should achieve the 25 per cent goals, but we put the question to the branch committees: tell us how this can be done and they formulated production programmes.

Thus the plan grew. Summaries and conclusions were compiled about how it should be done. The co-operating organizations were asked not to compete with one another about resources, but instead to solve a problem jointly. All must help, and so it came about.

The realization of the plan was hindered by the inflation period that hit France and other countries after the war. To begin with, the plan was financed by Marshall Aid, set at disposal by the Americans, who never interfered concerning the use of the money.[3]

This continued up to 1950. It seems simple, but it involved the right choice and the correct investment. In order to be able to do this, I and my co-workers were continually in contact with industry. It was a very extensive work, and we had to become familiar with extensive material. However, we were accepted. We never took anybody's place. Our prestige was never questioned.

— What were the obstacles to the economic development in France, in your opinion?

— The obstacles were mainly financial: lack of money and inflation. But there were no obstacles created by employers and workers.

— Was the economic structure an obstacle here? Did you discuss this?

— I believe we spoke of it, but that is about all.[4]

— What role did Germany and its resources play in the economic objectives in France after World War II?

— When I was with the plan immediately after the war, it was clear that a country cannot manage alone. All countries, even Germany, had to be reconstructed. We did not want a Germany dominated by France. In 1918, there was a domination peace, but we did not want anything like that. We thought that France and Germany should associate on equal footing. We could not do everything at once; therefore we began with the Coal and Steel Community.

— When the Coal and Steel Community was created, did you think that it was

just a stage and that the economic co-operation should also be extended to other sectors?

— Yes.

— Were the talks you had in Algiers with André Philip, Jules Moch, and Mendes France about the economic conditions of France important for the future development?

— We had talks, but they produced no concrete results. I had talks with André Philip, but they led to nothing definite. I cannot remember Jules Moch from that period. De Gaulle took part in the discussions from the start; it was mainly with him that I discussed matters. I gradually worked out a memorandum (*"memorandum sur le plan de modernisation et l'équipement"*) which was handed to General de Gaulle 13th December 1945. This initiated the economic planning. I did not agree with some of General de Gaulle's ideas. He opposed, for instance, the idea of a unified Europe, but played the role I have already spoken of. André Philip was intelligent and proposed things, but he was a theoretician.

— How do you interpret the general economic course during the whole of the postwar period?

— France had two handicaps: inflation, which had for long been a constant presence in the country, and protectionism. These were two misfortunes that had to be removed. The organization of Europe into a unity was a remedy for one. France must also get rid of foreign competition. European collaboration forced into being competitive production.

— What is your opinion of Sweden in the E.E.C. question?

— Sweden's entry into the E.E.C. is particularly important for everybody, but I think Sweden ought to come in under the same conditions as every other nation. From the standpoint of all nations, it is unfortunate that Sweden does not choose full membership. Europe is the path to unity and peace. The various countries should only surrender certain parts of their sovereignty, foreign policy, and defence. These are matters that one country alone cannot manage. Those who wish to be included must agree with decisions made by others. If a country has full membership, it can influence these decisions. I consider it would be a weakness for Sweden to join by trade agreement or some similar arrangement.

— In a country such as Sweden, fear can be felt concerning lack of political balance in the big countries.

— Since the war, Germany has worked to produce a democratic system, and this functions. The European thought is the guarantee that we shall enjoy peaceful conditions.

— Do you consider that the political development in France during the period since 1945 has been unlucky?

— Frenchmen do not believe in institutions as do Englishmen. They believe in people. France, contrary to Germany, is a country with many differences in the population. The inhabitants of Lille do not have the same origin and the same

opinions as those in Midi; this is reflected in their politics. Therefore we can see a number of agreements and associations at elections or re-elections . . .

I consider that the changes in the constitution carried out under General de Gaulle, which led to greater authority for the government, were fitting. I hope they will be permanent, but I am doubtful . . .

The interview with Jean Monnet shows that de Gaulle's importance for the economic reforms was other than that maintained in the interviews with André Philip and Jules Moch.

Monnet's memorandum, which he handed to General de Gaulle in December 1945, emphasizes the importance of a simultaneous modernization and reorganization of France. It was necessary to catch up with the lead that certain other industrial countries had over France during the war and earlier. This modernization would affect both the industrial and the agrarian sectors, the distribution system, and the public sector. By modernization, the condition of the populace could be improved, but it had to take place quickly if an acceptable level was to be attained. Monnet regrets that no plan for co-ordinating the reorganization of the country had been made. He considered that the government should intervene to determine objectives and priorities in production. In this way, competition could be avoided between the various branches for energy resources, for instance. The plan should not only be an aid to the authorities and other organs, but also a means for reaching and orienting the general public. Thereby, individual initiative could be influenced. Monnet also suggested that workers, administration personnel, and executives should co-operate with experts. Finally, he presented in this memorandum a conclusion which, in the main, indicated that concrete proposals should be submitted concerning modernization of the production in France and in the French Commonwealth. He also referred to the working methods that have since come into being. In other words, it was a simple plan containing the prerequisites for success.

We find in the document lines of thought that call to mind much that is treated in the foregoing. What is the difference between this document and what we have attempted to examine earlier?

We quote Jean Monnet: This is action!

Notes

1 *France—General outlines*

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2 Vera Lutz, French Planning, Washington D.C., 1965; John H. McArthur and Bruce R. Scott, Industrial Planning in France, Boston 1969; Stephen S. Cohen, Modern Capitalist Planning: The French Model, London 1969.
3 Tübingen 1967.
4 Hoffman—Kindleberger—Wylie—Pitts—Duroselle—Goquel, Cambridge, Mass. 1963.
5 Copenhagen 1966.
5a La croissance économique en France, Annales, Juillet—Aout 1968, p. 788 ff.
6 Paris 1954.
7 Henri Michel, Les courants de pensée de la Résistance, Paris 1962, H. Michel et B. Mirkine-Guetzévitch, Les idées politiques et sociales de la Résistance, Paris 1954.
8 René Hostache, Le conseil national de la Résistance, Paris 1958.
9 Forces et Faiblesses de l'économie française, 1945—1959 2e éd. Paris 1959.
10 Annuaire statistique de la France. Rétrospectif Ed. 1961, Stat. internat. p. 9.
11 Brockhaus Enzyklopedie, Vierter Band p. 495, Wiesbaden 1968.
12 See note 10.
13 Ibid.
14 See e.g. Heaton, Economic History of Europe.
15 See note 10.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid. p. 25.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid. p. 22.
20 Ibid.
21 See e.g. M. Reinard et A. Armengaud, Historie de la population Mondiale de 1700 à 1960, Paris 1961.
22 See note 19.
23 See note 10, p. 45.
24 Ibid. p. 48.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid. p. 26.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 See p. 00.
30 See e.g. Eli Heckscher, Svenskt arbete och liv.
31 See J. C. Toutain, La population de la France de 1700 à 1959 ISEA no. 133, p. 137.
32 Ibid.
33 See note 10, p. 105.
34 Ibid.
35 T. J. Markovitch, L'industrie française de 1789 à 1964, Paris 1966.
36 Ibid. Cahiers de L'I.S.E.A. No. 179, p. 319.
37 See p. 15.
38 See p. 16.
39 Ibid.
40 See e.g. Rondo E. Cameron, France and the development of Europe 1800—1914, Princeton 1961.
41 Ibid.
42 See e.g. Jean Bouvier, Le Crédit Lyonnais 1863—1882, Paris 1961.
43 See note 10.
44 Ibid.
45 See note 31 and 35.
46 See note 31, p. 161 (tableau 57).
47 O.E.E.C. Industrial statistics 1900—1959, Paris 1960, p. 3.
48 See note 31, p. 27.
49 See note 36, p. 319—320.

2 *The development in France during the interwar years and World War II*

1 See, e.g., Maurice Crouzet, l'Epoque Contemporaine, del VII (l'Histoire générale des civilisations. Pierre Renouvin, Les crises du XX^{e} siècle, del VII, VIII (Histoire des relations internationales), Jean Touchard, Histoire des idées politiques.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 See Industrial Statistics 1900—1959. OEEC. Paris 1960, p. 8 ff.
8 Le Procès du Maréchal Pétain. Compte rendu sténographique. Ed. Alb. Michel.
9 See, e.g., general Weygand. Le Procès du Maréchal Pétain. Ed. Alb. Michel p. 397 ff.
10 J. O. 9/7 1940, No. 42, p. 814, Edouard Herriot: "... au lendemain des grands désastres on cherche des responsabilités. Elles se dégageront. L'heure de la justice viendra. La France la voudra sévère, exacte, impartiale. Cette heure-ci, n'est pas l'heure de la justice; elle est celle du deuil. Elle doit être celle de la réflexion, de la prudence. Autour de M. le maréchal Pétain, dans la vénération que son nom inspire à tous, notre nation s'est groupé en sa détresse. Prenons garde à ne pas troubler l'accord qui s'est établi sous son autorité ..." See also Robert Aron, Histoire de Vichy. Paris 1954, p. 95.
11 J. O. 10/ 1940, No. 43, p. 5.
12 "Article unique. — L'Assemblée nationale donne tous pouvoirs au Gouvernement de la République, sous l'autorité et la signature du maréchal Pétain, à l'effet de promulguer, par un ou plusieurs actes, une nouvelle constitution de l'Etat français. Cette constitution devra garantir le droit du travail, da la famille et de la patrie. Elle sera ratifiée par la nation et appliquée par les Assemblées qu'elle aura créées." J. O. 10/7 1940, No. 43, p. 5.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Le maréchal Pétain: Appels aux Français. Ed. Fernand Sorlot p. 24. See also Robert Aron opus cit. note 10, p. 218.
17 Ibid. Appel 13/8 1940.
18 Le Maréchal Pétain: Reconstruction de de la France. Ed. F. Sorlot p. 16 (9/10 1940).
19 Le Maréchal Pétain: Message du 11 octobre 1940. Reconstruction de la France, p. 27 ff.
20 Ph. Pétain. Appel du 11 juillet (1940). Ed. F. Sorlot, p. 21 ff.
21 Robert Aron: Histoire de Vichy, pp. 211 ff., 404 ff.
22 See, e.g., note 27, p. 1121.
23 See, e.g., Blocq-Mascart, p. 239.
24 Supplément au Journal Officiel de la République Française. Jeudi 4/11 1943, p. 1 f.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Se Le Procès du Maréchal Pétain, compte rendu sténographique, part 2, p. 1117 ff. Ed. Albin Michel.
28 Ibid., part 1, p. 32.

3 *The opposition formulates its action programme*

1 Le procès du Maréchal Pétain. Compte rendu sténographique. Ed. Albert Michel.
2 See Chapter 2.
3 See note 14, Chapter 8.
4 Michel: Les courants de pensée de la résistance.
5 Ibid. (among others).
6 See interview with Maxime Blocq-Mascart, p. 239. See also Arthur Calmette: L'« O.C.M. » Histoire d'un Mouvement de Résistance de 1940 à 1946, p. 68 ff., Paris 1961.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid. See also Henri Michel, Les Courants de Pensée de la Resistance.
9 P. 27.
10 See interview with André Philip, p. 240.
11 Ibid.
12 Daniel Mayer's statement.

13 Ibid.
14 Dist. by S.E.V.P.E.N.
15 B. N. Rés G 1470 (53—67).
16 B. N. Rés G 1470 57 546—11.
17 See interview statement of, e.g., Blocq-Mascart, p. 239. See also R. Hostache, "Le Conseil national de la Résistance". P.V.F., Paris 1958.
18 Card index B.D.I.C.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 See interview, p. 246.
23 Ibid.
24 This work was written by René Courtin. See Henri Michel: Les Courants de Pensée de la Résistance. P.U.F. Paris 1962, p. 394, note 6.
25 e.g. note 14, Ch 8.
26 See Michel: Les Courants de Pensée de la Résistance, p. 392 ff.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 C.N.E. Paris 1943. See note 24.
31 "Rapport sur la politique économique d'après-guerre", pp. 12—39.
32 Ibid. pp. 40—56.
33 Ibid. pp. 57—60.
34 Ibid. pp. 60—96.
35 Ibid. pp. 96—99.
36 Ibid. pp. 99—105.
37 Ibid. p. 5.
38 Ibid. p. 5.
39 Ibid. p. 5.
40 Ibid. p. 5.
41 Ibid. pp. 5—6.
42 Ibid. p. 6.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Petit Larousse 1963, p. 997.
46 Rapport sur la politique économique d'après-guerre C.G.E., Paris 1943, p. 8. "L'expérience d'avant-guerre continue d'être diversement interprétée et ne peut fournir de principe d'action. Pour les uns l'anarchie libérale porterait la responsabilité de la dépression et du chômage pendant que les autres accusent les nombreuses interventions maladroitement effectuées d'avoir paralysé l'action des forces de redressement et de porter ainsi la responsabilité et de la longeur et de la gravité de la crise. - - -"
47 Ibid. p. 11.
48 Ibid. p. 7.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid. "On est donc conduit, moins à chercher l'élimination d'une classe, que la sélection et la promotion d'une élite ouvrière, appelée à renforcer et compléter ce qui subsiste de l'ancienne élite bourgeoise."
53 Ibid. "- - - son éducation économique est encore insuffisante. Les travailleurs ont, du reste, un sens très aigu de leurs possibilités, et les chefs syndicalistes restés en contact étroit avec les militants sont les premiers à se défier de solutions trop ambitieuses. Un accord de principe semble ainsi devoir être facilement obtenu."
54 Ibid. p. 7.
55 Interview with Daniel Mayer.
56 Ibid.

4 "*Rapport sur la politique économique d'après-guerre*"—*more detailed*

1 "Rapport sur la politique économique d'après-guerre", C.N.E., Paris 1943, p. 7 ff. See also Andre Siegfrid and others. Aspects de la société française e.g. p. 99 ff. Paris 1954.
2 By the coming to power of the Labour Party.
3 See note 1, e.g., p. 7.
4 Ibid. p. 6.
5 Ibid. p. 8.
6 Ibid. e.g., p. 9.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., see e.g., p. 10.
9 "... au cas où la situation s'avèrait confuse, au cas, notamment où l'Angleterre et la Russie adopteraient des positions différentes, peut-être serait-il donné à notre pays d'exercer un choix ou, mieux même, fidèle à son antique tradition, d'établir, ici encore, une synthèse entre des tendances en apparence contradictoires." Ibid. p. 10.

10 Ibid. p. 10.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid. p. 11.
14 Ibid.
15 Interview with M. François de Menthon.
16 See note 1, p. 6.
17 Ibid. pp. 9, 10.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid. p. 7.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid. p. 16.
22 Ibid. e.g., p. 18.
23 Ibid. p. 16 f.
24 Ibid. e.g., p. 15.
25 Ibid. p. 16.
26 Ibid. e.g., p. 23.
27 Ibid. p. 14.
28 Ibid. p. 15.
29 Ibid. p. 15.
30 Ibid. p. 15.
31 Ibid. p. 18.
32 Ibid. p. 19.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid. p. 19.
37 Ibid. f.
38 Ibid. p. 19.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid. p. 20.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid. e.g., p. 20.
46 Ibid. pp. 23, 25.
47 Ibid. p. 25.
48 Ibid. p. 24.
49 See chapter 1.
50 Ibid. p. 24. It also says "ce furent... les industriels et les agriculteurs qui pour lutter contre la crise, adoptèrent des positions de repli. Renonçant de lutter contre leurs concurrents étrangers, ils s'étaient, à l'abri d'une prodigieuse muraille de droits de douane et de contingents, réservé le marché national."
51 Ibid. pp. 24—25.
52 Ibid. p. 25.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid. p. 27.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid. p. 29 f.
60 Ibid. p. 30.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid. p. 35.
63 Ibid. pp. 35—36.

5 *Documents belonging to Blocq-Mascart*

1 See interview with Maxime Blocq-Mascart p. 239. See also: Maxime Blocq-Mascart, Chroniques de la Résistance, Paris 1945 and Arthur Calmette: L'O.C.M., Paris 1961.
2 See note 7 and 8 Chapt. 1.
3 In 1964 in the poss. of Blocq-Mascart.
4 78 Réformes Economiques. Papers bel. to Blocq-Mascart.
5 See note 1.

6 *The economic policy immediately after the liberation*

1 Blocq-Mascart's documents. See notes 3 and 4, Chapter 5.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid. Personnel S.N.C.F. Questionnaire. Ibid.
4 Ibid. Questionnaire Personnel. Ponts et Chaussés. About the nationalisations, see also Les Nationalisations en France et à l'Etranger. Les Nationalisations en France. Publié sous la direction de L. Julliot de la Morandière, Maurice Byé, Paris 1948.

7 *Material made available by André Philip*

1 See interview, p. 240.
2 Ibid.
3 See note 1, Ch. 4.
4 Réformes de structure.
5 Ibid. p. 2.

6 Ibid.
7 Ibid. p. 3.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid. pp. 3—4.
11 Ibid. p. 5.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid. See also interview with André Philip, p. 240.
15 Ibid. p. 5.
16 Ibid. p. 8.
17 Ibid. p. 9.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid. pp. 12, 13.
20 Ibid. p. 12.
21 Ibid. p. 15.
22 Ibid. pp. 15—16.
23 Ibid. p. 17.
24 Ibid. pp. 17—18.
25 Ibid. p. 18.
26 Ibid. p. 19.
27 Ibid. pp. 19—20.
28 Ibid. p. 20.
29 "l'Institut de la Conjoncture".
30 "Services du Commerce extérieur".
31 Conseil National Economique.
32 Ibid. p. 20 f.
33 Ibid. p. 7 f.

8 *Origin of the reform ideas—Some interviews*

1 Interview with Daniel Mayer. In a letter dated 24.2.1971 M. Mayer writes ... il conviendrait peut-être de préciser que si socialistes et communistes étaient partisans de la nationalisation des usines Renault pour des raisons économiques et de programme, la fraction de la Résistance bourgeoise ne l'a acceptée qu'au titre d'une pénalisation infligée à une entreprise qui avait collaboré avec les Allemands.
2 Ibid. In his letter of the 24th of Febr. 1971 Daniel Mayer writes: "Léon Blum avait donné, non point un texte rédigé, mais les grandes lignes des idées qu'il aurait voulu voir insérer dans un programme commun. Pierre Villon a présenté le texte communiste. Un accord général est intervenu sur une rédaction de synthèse. Il est certain que les communistes, comme ils l'avaient fait au moment du Front Populaire, préféraient un accord général, même sur des positions moins avancées, à des affirmations plus proches de leurs pensées profondes mais qui n'auraient pas été acceptées par tous. D'autre part, différents travaux avaient été faits par des membres du Comité directeur du Parti socialiste clandestin, et ils ont été versés au dossier aux fins d'étude. Le texte définitif a été adopté par tous."
3 See interview with Jules Moch, p. 242.
4 Ibid.
5 See interview with André Philip, p. 240.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 See interview with Maxime Blocq-Mascart, p. 239.
10 Ibid.
11 See interview with François de Menthon, p. 246.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Léon Blum: La Prison, le Procès, La Déportation. Mémoires et Correspondance, Paris 1955, p. 382 f.
15 "Nous savons que l'immense majorité des Français, dans laquelle nous comptons, a définitivement condamné ... les abus anarchiques d'un régime en décadence, ses gouvernements de prébendes et de privilèges ..." Extract of a speech held 15/11 1941 in Albert Hall. The quotation is reproduced in "La France sera la France. Ce que veut Charles de Gaulle." R.P.F., Paris 1951, p. 19.
16 "La France sait aussi ce que lui coûte un régime social et moral sclérosé dans lequel la Patrie se vit successivement négligée par des masses exploitées, puis trahie par des coalitions de trust et de gens en place. Elle entend construire chez elle un édifice social et moral dans lequel chaque individu pourra vivre dans la dignité et dans la sécurité, où nul monopole ne pourra abuser des hommes ni dresser aucune barrière devant l'inté-

rêt général." Speech in Albert Hall 11/11 1942. Reproduced in "La France sera la France. Ce que veut Charles de Gaulle." R.P.F., Paris 1951, p. 115, f.

17 "... veut que cesse un régime économique dans lequel les grandes sources de la richesse nationale échappaient à la nation, où les activités principales de la production et de la répartition se dérobaient à son contrôle, où la conduit des participation des organisations de travail-entreprises excluait la participation des organisations de travailleurs et de techniciens dont cependant, elle dépendait." Supplément du Journal Officiel de la République Française, 3.11 1943, No. 33, p. 3. The Senate Library.

18 See interview with André Philip, p. 240; Hostache: "Le Conseil National de la Résistance", and other works.

19 It should, at least partly, be the case.

20 See interview with André Philip, p. 240.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.

23 The speech is reproduced in "La France sera la France. Ce que veut Charles de Gaulle" R.P.F. Paris 1951, pp. 114—115.

24 See interview with Maxime Blocq-Mascart, p. 239.

25 Interview with Daniel Mayer in 1964.

26 See interview, p. 240.

27 See interview, p. 239.

28 See Chap. 10—13.

29 Interview, f. M. Mayer writes in his letter 24.2.71: "de Gaulle a été désigné à la fois parce qu'il était le symbole national et international de la Résistance française, parce qu'il a permis la participation de la France à l'effort de guerre des alliés, et parce que, en 1944 et 1945, au moins jusqu'à l'écroulement de l'hitlérisme, il était le carrefour de l'unité française."

30 Audience du 10 mars 1942. Interrogatoire de M. Léon Blum, Léon Blum: La Prison, Le Procès, La Déportation, Mémoires et Correspondance, Paris 1955, p. 235.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid. p. 349.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.

35 Daniel Mayer's testimony and André Philip's material.

36 S.F.I.O. Congrès national extraordinaire. November 1944. Stenographic protocol. Party archives.

37 Ibid.

38 See note 25.

39 Mentioned in Léon Blum: La Prison, Le Procès, La Déportation. Mémoires et Correspondance. Paris 1955, p. 357.

40 "Schéma d'une sorte d'instruction pour mes amis", Paris-Londres. Ibid. p. 363.

41 "... Si nous pouvons et devons apporter des amendements profonds à notre organisation de parti, à notre tactique politique, à l'inspiration de notre propagande, en revanche — et c'est là le point capital — *nous n'avons absolument rien à changer à notre doctrine socialiste.* Là, rien à « repenser », rien à réviser. La doctrine sort de l'épreuve, immuable, intacte. Les événements accomplis depuis trois ans l'ont vérifé jour à jour." Ibid. p. 364.

42 Ibid. p. 367.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid. p. 368.

47 Ibid. p. 382. M. Mayer writes to the author 24.2.1971: "Vous m'interrogez également sur l'apport de Léon Blum en ce qui concerne les idées qu'il a lancées après la guerre. Il est exact qu'il a pris des positions sur l'attitude à avoir à l'égard de l'Allemagne, sur les modalités, acceptables ou souhaitables, de la construction européenne, et qu'il a consacré de nombreaux articles à la vie constitutionnelle française, aux institutions à modifier ou à créer. Il a notamment répondu aux différents discours que de Gaulle a prononcés à l'époque, dans lesqueles celui-ci préfigurait déjà la Constitution qu'il a imposée à la France à partir de 1958. Mais déjà au procès de Riom — dont vous parlez par ailleurs — Léon Blum avait donné de la Résistance française une idée plus précise en soulignant qu'il ne s'agissait pas de combats sporadiques et épars, différents d'ailleurs

selon les régions de France où les Allemands étaient plus ou moins présents; il a en quelque sorte unifié les combats de la Résistance en soulignant que lutter contre Vichy c'était lutter contre Berlin, et que le gouvernement français était un jouet entre les mains de Hitler."

9 *The international perspective*

1 C.N.E., Paris 1943.
2 Ibid. p. 40.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid. pp. 40—41.
8 Ibid. p. 41.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid. p. 42 f.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid. p. 42.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 See interview, p. 240.
17 P. 96 f.
18 P. 96.
19 P. 97.
20 P. 96.
21 e.g., p. 96.
22 Supplement du J.O. de la République Française, No. 33, 4/11 1943.
23 2e séance 23/3 1945. Annexe No. 386. Documents de l'Assemblée consultative provisoire, p. 458. The Senate Library.
24 Séance du 20/3 1945. Proposition de la résolution. Documents de l'Assemblée Consultative provisoire. The Senate Library.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 See note 23.
28 See note 23, p. 460.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid. See also Erling Bjøl, La France devant l'Europe. La politique européenne de la IVe République. Copenhagen 1966, p. 65, and Paul Reynaud: S'unir ou périr. Paris 1951, p. 205 ff.

10 *Attitudes and opinions in the Socialist Party S.F.I.O.*

1 Congrès National extraordinaire des Cadres des Fédérations Socialistes reconstituées de la résistance. Stenographic protocol. S.F.I.O. archives. See also L'Année Politique 1944—1945, Paris 1946, p. 58 ff.
2 S.F.I.O. Congrès National extraordinaire, novembre 1944. Stenographic protocol, p. 524, "Ce congrès n'est pas une assemblée de discussion doctrinale. Plus tard peut-être, dans un prochain congrès nous aurons le loisir de reprendre la doctrine du Parti, de la préciser et de la représenter à l'ensemble de notre peuple."
3 Documents belonging to S.F.I.O. congress, Nov. 1944. S.F.I.O. archives.
4 Ibid.
5 "Les décisions du congrès au sujet de parlementaires." Congrès national extraordinaire 9—12 novembre 1944. S.F.I.O. archives.
6 See p. 27.
7 See note 5.
8 See note 5. *Circa* 80 members of parliament were excluded from the party.
9 S.F.I.O. Congrès National extraordinaire. Nov. 1944. Stenographic protocol, p. 566 ff.
10 Ibid. p. 565 ff.
11 Ibid. p. 587.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid. p. 565.
14 Ibid. p. 587.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid. p. 588.
19 Ibid. p. 51.
20 Ibid. p. 52.
21 Ibid.
22 Information about preparatory works within the party during the war was given by Daniel Mayer at the beginning of the congress. He mentioned that Charles Dumas had inspired and created study committees that studied "les problèmes de l'avenir, problème de la con-

stitution, problème des nationalisations". Ibid. p. 48.

23 S.F.I.O. Congrès National extraordinaire. Nov. 1944. P. 350 ff. S.F.I.O. archives.

24 Ibid. p. 350.

25 Ibid. p. 351.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid. p. 353. Auriol: "Nous présentions à l'assemblée une proposition de solution qui portait sur le présent, mais en fonction d'un plan complet d'économie dirigée, à base de nationalisations précises, de rénovation morale et de reconstruction sociale, dans l'ordre national, dans le domaine international."

28 Ibid. pp. 353, 354. "... à quelques formules près absolument semblable à celle que le Comité Exécutif présentait comme programme commun à la résistance et qui a servi de base au programme plus vague certes, moins audacieux du Conseil National de la Résistance."

29 Ibid. p. 362. "... la délégation socialiste put animer et diriger, disons le mot sans excès de fierté, l'assemblée sur chaque sujet particulier." See also Edonard Bonnefous, L'Europe en face de son destin, Paris p. 93 ff.

30 Ibid. p. 362.

31 Ibid. p. 365. Auriol's statement continued: "... car attaquer les privilèges d'argent en laissant subsister les privilèges de ses puissances c'était nous désarmer."

32 Ibid. p. 365.

33 Ibid.

34 See Churchill's and de Gaulle's memoires.

35 Ibid. p. 379. Auriol quotes what has often been said earlier: "Comment ! On ne reconnaît pas la France ? La France n'est pas admise dans les commissions européennes ? Mais, après tout, les plans économiques, les plans politiques, c'est nous qui allons les apporter."

36 Ibid. p. 380. Auriol ended his speech by saying that peace should not only be a political construction, but must stand on European foundations "avec son gouvernement, avec sa force internationale et aussi avec une armature économique".

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid. p. 500.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid. p. 501.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid. p. 502.

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid.

48 J.O. Documents du 23 mars 1945 no. 386. Documents de l'Assemblée consultative provisoire p. 460.

49 Ibid.

50 Parti Socialiste. S.F.I.O. Congrès des 11—15 août 1945. Compte rendu sténographique. Ière séance, samedi 11 août matin. P. 2 introductory address by M. Jaquet.

51 S.F.I.O. Congrès des 11—15 août 1945. Compte rendu sténographique p. 160. Address by Vincent Auriol.

52 Ibid.

53 See p. 57 ff.

54 S.F.I.O. Congrès des 11—15 août 1945. Compte rendu sténographique p. 373—375 S.F.I.O. archives.

55 Ibid. pp. 485—486.

56 Ibid. p. 486, Guy Mollet: "... justice incomplète, épuration sabotée, inobservation totale des avis de l'Assemblée consultative, mépris des indications données par les élections municipales, non-réalisation faites quant à la nationalisation du gaz, de l'électricité etc. ..."

57 Ibid. p. 486.

58 Ibid. p. 865, Guy Mollet: "... le Congrès ... invite les camarades du Parti membres du Gouvernement à donner immédiatement leur démission."

59 Ibid. p. 865.

60 Ibid. p. 882.

61 Ibid.

62 See Chap. 8, p. 64. Léon Blum, at the congress in August 1945, said in connexion with Guy Mollet's intervention: "je m'étais promis de n'intervenir sur aucune question ayant trait à la politique proprement dite. Mais dans un moment aussi sérieux, je dirai même aussi grave, mon devoir est de vous donner mon avis", he meant, among other things, that Mollet ought not to believe "que vous ferez comprendre à la population de ce

pays les raisons réelles de votre intransigeance au retardement." Blum's reason, which he stated and seems to have insisted on mostly, was that General de Gaulle should shortly go to America. Why weaken his position now before his important meeting? Léon Blum added: "Il ne s'agit pas ici d'affaiblir un gouvernement ; ils s'agit d'affaiblir la position de la France !"

63 Ibid. p. 880.
64 Ibid. pp. 13—14.
65 Ibid. p. 893 "L'Atmosphère de ce congrès contraste singulièrement pour ceux d'entre nous qui ont connu les congrès d'avant-guerre avec l'atmosphère du passé."
66 Ibid.
67 L'Année Politique 1946 p. V—VI.
68 The purge must have contributed to a development in this direction.
69 S.F.I.O. Congrès des 11—15 août 1945. Compte rendu sténographique.
70 Ibid. S.F.I.O. archives, p. 648—649.
71 Ibid.
72 See p. 63.
73 Ibid.
74 S.F.I.O. Congrès des 11—15 août 1945. Compte rendu sténographique p. 884 ff.
75 Ibid. p. 885.
76 Ibid. p. 886.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid. p. 887.
81 Ibid. p. 160 ff. Vincent Auriol's answer to criticism delivered by M. Socolover.
82 Interview with M. Barjonet C.G.T.
83 S.F.I.O. Congrès des 11—15 août 1945, compte rendu sténographique p. 887 ff.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid. p. 891.
89 See Chap. 8.
90 See Andre Philip's interview statement, p. 239.

11 *Attitudes in economic and social matters with associated problems in Mouvement Républicain Populaire (M.R.P.) immediately after the liberation in 1944*

1 Congrès Consultatif. M.R.P. Microfilm 051, p. 080. F.N.S.P.
2 Ibid. p. 055 ff. 068.
3 Participation au 3ème Congrès National M.R.P. Microfilm 53, p. 742.
4 Interview with M. Bordry.
5 P. 60.
6 Interview p. 244.
7 Congrès Consultatif M.R.P. 1944, p. 001. Microfilm 51, F.N.S.P.
8 Ibid. p. 004. Questionnaire M.R.P., microfilm 51, F.N.S.P.
9 Congrès Consultatif M.R.P. 1944, microfilm 51, p. 087 ff.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 See H. Michel: Les courants de pensée de la Résistance.
13 See interview, p. 239.
14 IIe Congrès National. Programme, p. 1 M.R.P. microfilm 52, M.R.P. F.N.S.P.
15 Congrès Consultatif M.R.P. 1944. Rapport de M. Pierre-Henry Teitgen sur la politique générale du mouvement M.R.P., microfilm 51, p. 51, F.N.S.P.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid. p. 053.
21 Ibid. p. 004 ff.
22 Ibid. p. 060.
23 See p. 50 ff.
24 Congrès Consultatif M.R.P. 1944, microfilm 51, p. 048, F.N.S.P.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Such attitudes could be noted in certain circles in, for instance, the Saar and the Ruhr May 1945 and thereafter.
28 Congrès Consultatif M.R.P. 1944, microfilm 51, p. 081 F.N.S.P.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.

32 Ibid. p. 069 (M. Lescorat).
33 Ibid. p. 067 (M. Morlot and others).
34 M. Davaine. Discussion du nouveau projet de manifeste sur la politique générale et suite de la discussion. P. 10, microfilm 51, S.F.N.P.
35 Ibid.
36 Congrès Consultatif M.R.P. 1944, microfilm 51, p. 069 F.N.S.P.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 See, e.g., note 33, 34.
40 Congrès Consultatif M.R.P., microfilm 51, p. 080 F.N.S.P.
41 Ibid. p. 081.
42 See C.N.R.:s program L'Année Pol. 44—45, p. 429.
43 Congrès Consultatif M.R.P. Stenographic protocol, microfilm 51, F.N.S.P.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid. p. 048.
46 Ibid.
47 IIe Congrès National M.R.P. Programme, p. 1. Microfilm 52, M.R.P., F.N.S.P.
48 Ibid.
49 See interview with Blocq-Mascart.
50 Comité directeur année 1945—1946, M.P.P., microfilm 52, M.R.P., F.N.S.P., p. 1226.
51 Ibid.
52 2ème Congrès National M.R.P., microfilm 52, p. 1082 ff., F.N.S.P.
53 Ibid. p. 1084.
54 Ibid. pp. 1084, 1085.
55 Ibid. p. 1087.
56 Rapport présenté par Jean Letourneau au Congrès National des 13 et 16 décembre 1945 sur la Politique extérieure, M.R.P. p. 1, microfilm 52, M.R.P., p. 1180, F.N.S.P.
57 Ibid. p. 8,8 microfilm 52, M.R.P., pp. 1187, 1189, F.N.S.P.
58 Ibid. p. 10, microfilm 52, M.R.P., p. 1189.
59 Ibid. p. 17, microfilm 52, M.R.P., p. 1196.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 "Nous pensons pouvoir faire confiance aux juristes pour qu'ils trouvent une formule, qui, sans engager le statut politique de ce territoire, en mette les richesses au service de l'économie de la France." Ibid. p. 10, microfilm 52, M.R.P., p. 1189, F.N.S.P.
63 Se interview with Buron, p. 244.
64 IIe Congrès National M.R.P. 2/2, p. 6, discussion 15/12 1945, microfilm 52, p. 1105, F.N.S.P.
65 Ibid. M. Givert said that it was desirable to clarify the party's position in the doctrine question ... "parce que nous ne pouvons pas être un bon Parti Gouvernemental tant que nous n'aurons pas clarifié notre doctrine."
66 Ibid. 2/2, p. 6, microfilm 52, M.R.P., p. 1129, F.N.S.P.
67 a) Ibid. pp. 39, 40, microfilm 52, p. 667, F.N.S.P.
b) The party's position towards C.N.R.'s programme is illustrated by Audel Colin's statement that M.R.P. had discussed this and that it had produced good results in the elections. IIe Congrès National M.R.P., microfilm 52, M.R.P., p. 1016 ff.

12 *The attitudes and the atmosphere in the Republican, Radical, and Radical-Socialist Party after the Liberation*

1 See p. 27.
2 See p. 73 ff.
3 See p. 27.
4 Petit Congrès 19/12 1944—21/12 1944. Parti Républicain, Radical et Radical-socialiste. Stenographic protocol, p. 750—752. Party headquarters.
5 Ibid. p. 750.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid. pp. 750, 751.
8 Ibid. p. 751.
9 Ibid. p. 752.
10 Ibid. pp. 18, 20.
11 Ibid. pp. 621—667.
12 Ibid. pp. 653—655.
13 Ibid. e.g., p. 65.
14 See Chap. 10 and 11.
15 La Politique économique et financière p. 9. Petit Congrès des 19—21 Décembre 1944. Parti Républicain Radical

et Radical-Socialiste. Reprint. Party headquarters.

16 Ibid. pp. 6—8 and mainly p. 14.

17 "Il ne s'agit plus de savoir si nous sommes partisans ou adversaires d'une économie dirigée ou contrôlée" : c'est une nécessité qui s'imposera à nous demain. Petit Congrès nov. 1944. Stenographic protocol. Rad.soc.party. Party headquarters.

18 Interview with M. Schmidt, secretary of the Radical Socialist Party, Party headquarters, 1 Place de Valois, Paris 2/7—1964.

19 "La politique économique et financière". Rapport de M. George Laffarque. Reprint from 1944 party congress documents, p. 14. Parti Republican, Radical et Radical-socialiste.

20 Ibid.

21 Petit Congrès 19/12—21/12 1944. Parti Républicain, Radical et Radical-socialiste. Stenographic protocol, p. 314. Party headquarters.

22 The country's economic structure must be protected and maintained. "... tant en ce qui concerne la petite et moyenne industrie, l'artisanat, la paysannerie, que l'ensemble des classes moyennes." La Politique économique et financière. Rapport de M. George Laffarque, p. 14. Parti Républicain, Radical et Radical-socialiste. 1944.

23 Ibid.

24 The party was "naturellement opposé aux trusts, sorte de féodalité capitaliste".

25 "Secteur de l'économie nationalisée, secteur de l'économie contrôlée, secteur libre ou l'Etat garderait un simple rôle d'orientation." Ibid.

26 "... Susceptible d'augmenter nos productions, d'alimenter nos exportations". Ibid. p. 15.

27 Ibid.

28 "--- sa doctrine est celle de l'équilibre budgétaire sincère et véritable. Il repousse toute inflation et en dénonce le péril comme un danger mortel pour la structure même de la nation." Ibid.

29 "nationalisation oui, mais à une condition: gestion autonome, comme celle de la S.N.C.F. et les Tabacs avec le conseil d'administration, la comptabilité." Ibid. p. 6.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid. p. 6.

32 Ibid.

33 Nous demandons que le gouvernement soit très attentif à la part économique que nous devons retirer des traités de paix: exploitation d'une partie du sous-sol allemand ..." Ibid.

34 "Larges prélèvements sur le matériel lourd nécessaire aux rééquipements de notre industrie et de nos moyens économiques, chemin de fer, ports, aérodromes, canaux etc. ; prise de participation et de contrôle dans les grandes sociétés d'outre-Rhin." Ibid.

35 Ibid. p. 8.

36 Ibid.

37 "On ne fait pas de l'industrie lourde, de produits chimiques, de l'électricité avec des petites entreprises." Ibid. p. 8.

38 Ibid.

39 Les buts du trust sont non point la prospérité nationale, mais la vente au prix le plus élevé aux fins de bénéfices sans accrus, aux fins de puissance sans cesse grandissante ..." Ibid.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 See note 19, p. 8, 14.

44 Ibid. p. 7, 8.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid. p. 14.

47 Ibid.

48 See p. 27.

49 See p. 66.

50 Petit Congrès 19/12—21/12 1944 Parti Républicain, Radical et Radical-socialiste. Stenographic protocol, p. 315—399. Party headquarters.

51 Ibid. p. 403.

52 M. Bastid: "... Nous reviendrons de la sorte aux vieilles méthodes employées par les rois de France qui recherchaient, pour contenir l'Allemagne, l'alliance des Principautés allemandes des marchés de l'Empire ou plutôt du Royaume de Prusse." Ibid. p. 403.

53 Ibid. pp. 402—403.

54 Ibid. p. 401.

55 Ibid.
56 The party congress 20—23 Aug. 1945. Parti Républicain, Radical et Radical-socialiste. Stenographic protocol. Party headquarters.
57 Ibid. p. 1159.
58 Ibid. p. 1160.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid. pp. 1159—1160.
61 Ibid. p. 1156 ff.
62 "Les classes moyennes, le petit commerce et l'artisanat menacés de retomber dans le salariat". Ibid. p. 1158.
63 Ibid. p. 1155 ff.
64 Ibid. p. 500 ff.
65 Ibid. pp. 500—505.
66 "Les destructions, quelque vastes qu'elles aient été sont amplement compensées." Ibid. p. 505.
67 Ibid. p. 507.
68 Ibid. p. 515.
69 "... perdu son ressort physique, le goût du travail et le sens de l'émulation." Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid. p. 516.
74 "Le grand moteur humain, c'est le profit." Ibid.
75 C'est aimer passionnément la classe ouvrière que de lui offrir les moyens de s'émanciper. Ibid. p. 516.
76 Ibid. p. 524.
77 Ibid. p. 523.
78 Ibid. p. 525.
79 See p. 73 ff.
80 Note 78, p. 1156.
81 Ibid. p. 531.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid. pp. 550—551.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid., e.g., p. 576.
87 Ibid. p. 770.
88 Ibid. p. 576.
89 Enligt M. Laffay: "il est temps de faire comprendre au peuple de ce pays que le marxisme est l'ennemi de l'égalitarisme." Ibid. p. 577.
90 Ibid. pp. 577—578.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
93 "... dans un pays comme le nôtre, ils sont fort heureusement très nombreux et dépassent la majorité de la population." Ibid.
94 Ibid.
95 "... prétendez-vous prolétariser 60 p. 100 de la population française, pour aboutir à un résultat dépourvu pratiquement d'intérêt, consistant à faire passer l'ouvrier du salariat de l'entreprise privée au salariat de l'entreprise étatisée ? Ibid.
96 Ibid. p. 578.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid. p. 586.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid. p. 588.
101 "... stranguler toutes les catégories sociales et économiques qu'il voudront." Ibid.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid. pp. 602—603.
104 See also Petit Congrès. P. Rad. p. 450 ff. Stenographic protocol. Party headquarters.
105 See p. 203.
106 See p. 239, 57 ff.
107 See p. 248.
108 Note 56, p. 601 ff.
109 Partycongress 20—23 Aug. 1945. Stenographic protocol. Parti Republicain, Radical et Radical-socialiste, p. 611. Party headquarters.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid p. 613.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid. p. 617.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid. pp. 617—619.
116 Ibid. p. 619.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid. p. 625.
119 Ibid. p. 713.
120 Ibid. p. 664 ff.
121 See p. 34 ff.

13 *Attitudes in the Communist Party in France after the liberation 1944*

1 Rapport présenté par Maurice Thorez à la session du comité central (du Parti Communiste) des 21—23 Janvier 1945, p. 26.
2 "Sept ans de luttes ardentes au service du peuple contre l'Hitlerisme et le fascisme, pour une France libre, démocratique et indépendante." Rapport du Comité central pour le Xe Congrès National du Parti Communiste français, p. 15.
3 Ibid. p. 20. Some copies are kept in Bibliotèque de Documentation Internationale Contemporaine. P. 305 Rés. Paris.
4 Ibid. p. 20.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid. p. 21.
7 Ibid.
8 "- - - par des délégations patriotiques qui prendront en main la direction du ravitaillement et de l'administration publique." Ibid.
9 Ibid. p. 43.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid. p. 44 f.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid. p. 57.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid. pp. 58—59.
16 Ibid. p. 57.
17 Petit Larousse, Paris 1963, p. 1735.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid. p. 59.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid. p. 61.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid. pp. 41—42.
28 See p. 101.
29 See note 27, p. 43.
30 Ibid.
31 Maurice Thorez, "Discours prononcé à Waziers 21/7—1945 devant les cadres communistes mineurs du Nord et Pas-de-Calais". P. 18.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid. p. 16.
34 Sept ans de luttes ardentes au service du peuple contre l'Hitlerisme et le fascisme, pour une France libre, démocratique et indépendante. Rapport du Comité central pour le Xe Congrès Nationale du Parti Communiste Français, p. 15 f.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid. p. 15.
42 See p. 250.
43 Ibid.
44 Note 34, p. 6.
45 Que doit être la Politique Financière de la France ? Discours prononcé à l'Assemblée Consultative par Jacques Duclos, p. 3. Ed. du Parti Communiste Français.
46 Ibid.
47 Interview with Daniel Mayer.
48 Sept ans de luttes ardentes au service du peuple contre l'Hitlerisme et le fascisme, pour une France libre, démocratique et indépendante. Rapport du Comité Central pour le Xe Congrès National du Parti Communiste Français, p. 51.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Que doit être la Politique Financière de la France? Discours prononcé à l'Assemblée Consultative par Jacques Duclos, p. 15—16. Edition du Parti Communiste Français.
54 Ibid.
55 See p. 73 f.
56 See p. 96.
57 Le Chemin de la renaissance française, discours prononcé le 23 Janvier 1945 au Comité Central du Parti Communiste Français par Jacques Duclos, p. 4.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.

61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid. p. 5.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid. p. 6.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
80 Congrès National du Parti Communiste Français, 26—30 Juin. Rapport présenté par Maurice Thorez, p. 34.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid. p. 35.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid. pp. 36—42.
89 Ibid. pp. 36—42.
90 Ibid. p. 36.
91 Ibid. pp. 36—37.
92 Ibid. p. 37.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid. p. 38.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid. p. 39.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid. p. 40.
108 Ibid. pp. 41—42.
109 Ibid. p. 43.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid.
118 See p. 51.
119 See note 80.
120 Ibid. p. 45.
121 Ibid. p. 46.
122 Ibid. p. 45.
123 See p. 34 f.
124a See, e.g., Speech by Maurice Thorez, 2/10—1945 Œuvres de Maurice Thorez, livre cinquième, tome vingt et unième, p. 203, Paris 1963, and
124b Spreech Maurice Thorez, 22/10—1946. Œuvres ....., tome vingt — deuxième, p. 239.
125 Ibid.
126 Speech by Maurice Thorez, 2/10—1945. See note 124, p. 203.
127 See note 124 b.
128 See p. 73 f.
129 Maurice Thorez: Au service du peuple. Report at the 11th party congress 1947.
130 Ibid. pp. 48 and 53.

14 *The economic objectives in France immediately after the end of World War II*

1 See Chap. 3 ff.
2 See Chap. 8, 10—13.
3 See Chap. 8.
4 About the nationalisations, see René Gendarme, L'Expérience Française de la Nationalisation industrielle ..., Paris 1950.
5 Séance, 5/7—1945 J.O.
6 Ibid.
7 L'Année Politique 1946, Paris 1947, p. 5.
8 Ibid. p. 7.
9 Ch. de Gaulle, Mem. de Guerre. Le Salut. Paris 1959, p. 280.
10 Ibid.
11 L'Année Politique 1944—1945, p. 365. See also note 17.
12 See note 9, ch. Départ.

13 Se not 7, p. 25.
14 Se not 9, p. 281.
15 Séance, 4/7—1945. Assemblée Consultative provisoire J.O., p. 1312.
16 Ibid. p. 1311.
17 Propositions au sujet du Plan de modernisation et d'équipement adressées au général de Gaulle par M. Jean Monnet haut commissaire au Plan, et adoptées par le général. The report is dated 4/12—1945 and quoted in Mémoires de Guerre — le Salut by Ch. de Gaulle, p. 634.
18 The first plan.
19 Ibid.
20 Documents relatifs à la Première Session du conseil du Plan, (16—19 March 1946). The Senate Library.
21 See Chap. 3 ff.
23 Données statistiques sur la situation de la France au début de 1946 rassemblées en vue des négociations de Washington, p. 17, Table XII. The Senate Library.
24 Ibid. p.18, Table XIII.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid. pp. 15, 16.
27 Ibid. p. 21. Table XIV.
28 Ibid. p. 22 a.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid. Table XV.
31 Ibid. Table XVI.
32 Ibid. p. 9.
33 Ibid. p. 22.
34 Ibid. 9.28.

15 *Economic planning and economic development in France*

1 Documents relatifs à la Première Session du Conseil du Plan (16—19 March) p. 2. Impr. Nat. 1946.
2 Ibid. p. 6.
3 Ibid. p. 8.
4 Ibid. p. 9.
5 Assemblé Consultative ... Séance, 4/7—1945 J.O.
6 Ibid.
7 See note 1, p. 10.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid. p. 11.
12 Ibid.
13 Rapport Général sur le Premier Plan de modernisation et d'équipement Novembre 1946—Janvier 1947.
14 Ibid. p. 5 ff.
15 Ibid. p. 5.
16 Ibid. p. 13.
17 Ibid. p. 14.
18 Ibid. p. 23.
19 Ibid. p. 24.
20 Ibid. p. 26.
21 See, e.g., Chap. 9.
22 See note 13, p. 35.
23 Ibid. p. 37.
24 Ibid. p. 42.
25 Ibid. p. 43.
26 Ibid. pp. 44, 45.
27 Ibid. p. 46.
28 Ibid. p. 47.
29 Ibid. pp. 48—50.
30 Ibid. pp. 51—56.
31 Ibid. p. 66.
32 Ibid.
33 See Chap. 9—13.
34 Annuaire statistique de la France, Rétrospectif. Edition 1961, Graphic II, p. 91.
35 Ibid.
36 Etudes et Conjoncture No. 1—2, 1946, p. 15.
37 Ibid.
38 See, e.g., Chap. 6.
39 Etudes et Conjoncture No. 5 et 6, pp. 130—131.
40 Ibid. p. 131.
41 Etudes et Conjoncture No. 1—2, 1946—1947, p. 9.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Etudes et Conjoncture 14—15—16, 1947, p. XV.
45 Annuaire statistique de la France, Rétrospectif, Edition 1961, p. 245.
46 Ibid. 245—247.
47 Etudes et Conjonctuer No. 6—7—8, 1948, p. 47.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Rapport Moral présenté par Maurice Bouladoux, 25me Congrès National 4, 5, et 6 juin 1949, CFTC, p. 40.

51 Ibid.
52 J.O. Assemblée Nationale, 20/12—1948, p. 7763.
53 La Voix du Peuple p. 69, XXVII[e] Congrès confédéral 11 au 15 oct. 1948, C.G.T.
54 Etudes et Conjoncture, Mars—Avril 1949, p. 53.
55 La situation économique en Mai 1949, Etude et Conj., p. 3.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid. p. 4.
58 Figure information supplied by Commissariat général du Plan d'équipement et de la productivité. (M.B. Cazes.). See also, Marcel Maratz' Le Plan Marshall. Succès ou Faillite ? Paris 1950. François Perroux, Le Plan Marshall ou L'Europe Nécessaire au Monde, Paris 1948.

16 *The second and third plans*

1 P. 3.
2 Ibid. pp. 3—4.
3 See e.g., J. O.
4 See note 1, p. 4.
5 Ibid. p. 5.
6 Rapport Moral, C.F.T.C. 12—14 Mai 1951, p. 34.
7 La Voix du Peuple, XXVIII[e] Congrès confédéral, (1951) p. 73.
8 La Voix du Peuple 27/5—1/6—1951, p. 67.
9 P. 4—5 published by Crédit Commercial de France, Paris.
10 La Situation en France. Mars 1955, p. 62.
11 Ibid. p. 64.
12 Information supplied by Commissariat géneral du Plan d'équipement et de la productivité.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Chap. 21.
16 Published by Crédit Commercial de France, p. 5.
17 Réformes de structure, p. 23 ff.
18 La situation en France Septembre 1958 passi.
19 Claude Prêcheur: La Lorraine Sidérurgigue.
20 See note 12.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 See Chap. 22.
27 See Chap. 8.
28 See Appendix.
29 See Chap. 22 ff.

17 *Economic planning during the postwar years—Summary*

1 See Chap. 1. See also Pierre Bauchet, L'expérience française de planification, Paris 1958.
2 See Chap. 3 ff.
3 See, e.g., Chap. 8.
4 See Appendix p. 246.
5 See, e.g., Appendix p. 240.
6 See Chap. 14, 15.
7 See Chap. 15.
8 See Chap. 15, 16.
9 See Chap. 15.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 See Chap. 7.
21 See Chap. 15.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 See Chap. 16.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.

18 *Aspects of the French trade-union movement during the postwar period*

1 See, e.g., Chap. 4 and 17. See also Georges Lefranc, Les expériences syndicales en France de 1939 à 1950. Paris, 1950.
2 See Appendix p. 240 M. Benoit Frachon (C.G.T.) violently criticized this opinion at an interview in June 1970.
3 Rapport présenté par G. Levarel.
4 Ibid.
5 Administration—Organisation 2 C.F.T.C. June 1963.
6 Les Etudes Sociales et Syndicales, No. 94, pp. 23, 24.
7 Ibid.
8 27 Congrès Conféderal 23—25 Mai 1953, C.F.T.C. La C.F.T.C. face aux responsabilités du syndicalisme moderne, pp. 12 et 13.
9 Ibid. p. 14.
10 Ibid. p. 15.
11 La Voix du Peuple, XXIX[e] Congrès Confédéral, 7—12 Juin 1953, p. 33.
12 Ibid. p. 12.
13 Ibid. p. 13.
14 La Voix du Peuple 27/5—1/6—1951, p. 67.
15 Statement by M. Barjonet, C.G.T. at an interviev 7/4 1964.
16 Pour une planification démocratique. Rapport sur le programme économique de la C.F.T.C. p. 12—13, (1959).
17 Ibid. ff.
18 See note 15.
19 See Appendix, p. 244.
20 Ibid.
21 Among others La Politique Economique Française immédiatement après la libération, Promemoria. Blocq-Mascart's documents.
22 M. Boudard, Ministére de Travail at a meeting, 27/4—1964.
23 Ibid.
24 Material supplied by Ministère de Travail.
25 See note 22.
26 Ibid.
27 See Appendix, p. 241.

19 *Aspects of the Algerian group's reform programme*

1 Chap. 7, 8. See also André Hauriou: Vers une doctrine de la Résistance. Le socialisme humaniste. Alger 1944.
2 Chap. 17.
3 Chap. 23.
4 "Réformes de Structure". P.M. i André Philips ägo.
5 See Appendix, p. 246.
6 See note 4, p. 23 ff.
7 Ibid.
8 See Chap. 5.
9 See note 6.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Interview.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Statement in interview in 1964.
21 See Appendix, p. 239.
22 See Chap. 10—13.
23 See note 4, p. 41.
24 Schéma d'une sorte d'instruction pour mes amis, Paris-Londres printed in La Prison, Le Procès, La Déportation, Mémoires & Correspondance. Paris 1955, p. 363.
25 Note Adressée au Général de Gaulle pour le Président Roosevelt et M. W. Churchill, printed in La Prison, Le Procès, La Déportation, p. 382.
26 See Chap. 8.
27 Ibid.
28 See p. 200 f.
29 See Appendix, p. 250 Barjonet.
30 See, e.g., Appendix, p. 246.

20 *France and the German Federal Republic. Comparison survey of the industrial development during the postwar period up to about 1960*

1 O.E.E.C. Industrial Statistics 1900—1959, p. 2. (The German population

increase depends largely on population resettlement after 1945.)
2 See Appendix, p. 244.
3 O.E.E.C. Industrial Statistics, 1900—1959, p. 9, Paris 1960.
4 Ibid. p. 4.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid. p. 6.
7 O.E.E.C. Industrial Statistics, 1900—1959, Paris 1960, p. 17.
8 Situation et problèmes de l'économie française. O.E.C.E. 1953, p. 12.
9 Ibid. p. 14.
10 Ibid.
11 Perspectives de l'Economie Européenne. O.C.D.E. Dec 1952, p. 284.
12 Economic Conditions in the Federal Republic of Germany O.E.E.C. 1953, p. 21.
13 Economic conditions in the Federal Republic of Germany O.E.E.C. 1954, p. 17.
14 Situation et problèmes de l'économie française O.E.C.E., p. 15, 1956.
15 Economic Conditions in France, O.E.E.C. P. 5, 1957.
16 Economic conditions in member and associated countries of the O.E.E.C. France 1958, p. 6.
17 Economic conditions in member and associated countries of the O.E.E.C. France 1960, pp. 9—10.
18 Economic conditions in member and associated countries of the O.E.E.C. France 1961, pp. 32—33.
19 Economic conditions in the Federal Republic of Germany. O.E.E.C. 1956, p. 15.
20 Economic conditions in member and associated countries of the O.E.E.C. Federal Republic of Germany, 1958, p. 24.
21 Economic conditions in member and associated countries of the O.E.E.C. Federal Republic of Germany, 1960, p. 5.
22 Statement in interview in 1964.

21 *French industrial development during the 1950s in more detail*

1 Annuaire statistique de la France, indices de la production industrielle.
2 Annuaire de Statistique industrielle, Paris 1961, p. 215 ff.

22 *The French industrial structure during the postwar period*

1 Les établissements industriels et commerciaux en France en 1954, Paris 1956. Les établissements industriels, artisanaux et commerciaux en France en 1958, Paris 1959.
Les établissements industriels et commerciaux en France en 1962, Paris 1963. Ministère des Finances: Statistiques et Etudes Financières, No. 44, 61, 73, 93, 107, 122, 148, 157.

23 *Iron Ore*

1 Guy Pajot: L'Evolution technique des mines de fer ; Actualités Industrielles Lorraines, No. 58 Nov.—Déc. 1958.
2 Chambre Syndicale des Mines de Fer de France. Rapport d'Activité p. 3 ff.
3 Annuaire Statistique de la France 1961 p. 188.
4 Les Mines de Fer Françaises, MCML IV, p. 6. Chambre Syndicale des Mines de Fer de France.
5 Rapports d'Activité 1952—1961. Ch. Syndic. des Mines de Fer de France.
6 Ibid., 1962.
7 Annuaire Statistique de la France.
8 See note 5.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 M. Guy Pajot, Secrétaire géneral de la Chambre Syndicale des Mines de Fer de France, indicates the following objectives for the iron ore industry in Lorraine during the postwar period: to increase production, to create good working conditions and thus attract and maintain manpower at a certain numerical level, and to carry out the greatest possible mechanization. This programme encoun-

tered the following difficulties: lack of suitable material of French origin (not until 1949 could ways be found for obtaining American machines) and lack of coke, which resulted in the iron and steel industry being unable to achieve the desired production level. Price fixing was not satisfactory until 1953; therefore the modernization could not be accelerated until that year. Pajot also mentions social difficulties. In the sphere of productivity, however, the same results as at similar American plants were obtained at the end of the 1950s (see note 1).

24 *Iron and steel production*

1 Produktion wichtiger Erzeugnisse der verarbeitenden Industrie im Ausland 1950, 1952 bis 1960. Reihe 4, Heft 32, p. 20 f. Statistiches Bundesant Wiesbaden. Dez. 1961.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid. p. 21.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid. pp. 22—23.
6 Ibid.
7 Bulletin de la Chambre Syndicale de la Sidérurgique Française.
8 Groupement de l'Industrie sidérurgique. Rapports du Conseil d'Administration, 1957—1962.
9 Statisque de la Production Sidérurgique 1952—1961. Bulletin de la Chambre Syndicale de la Sidérurgique Française.
10 France Statistique de la Production Sidérurgique. Bulletin de la Chambre Syndicale de la Sidérurgique, mars 1959.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Projet d'Atlas Sidérurgique, mars 1959.
15 See note 10.
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17 La Sidérurgique en France. Chambre Syndicale de la Sidérurgie Française p. 60. Paris 1961.
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19 See note 14.
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21 See note 10.
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23 See, among others, La Sidérurgie Française en 1962. Rapport d'Activité. Chambre Syndicale de la Sidérurgie Française, 21 Juin 1963.
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25 Ibid., No. 173, 310, 412.
26 Ibid.
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30 La Sidérurgie Française en ... Rapport d'Activité 1956, p. 6, 1957 p. 5 ff.
31 Ibid. 1959 p. 7.
32 Ibid. 1957 p. 32.
33 See also: Rapport sur l'état d'exécution du IV^{ème} Plan de Modernisation et d'Equipement de la Sidérurgie et des Mines de Fer. Among others, p. 33.
34 See note 30, 1958, p. 26.

25 *Coal*

1 Chapitre XII E. Disponibilités énergétiques, p. 132.
2 Charbonnage de France. Statistique Annuelle 1946—1962, Table 1, p. 8—9. Ed. 1963. Analysis.
3 Ibid. p. 11. Analysis.
4 Ibid. p. 16.
5 Commissariat général du plan de modernisation et d'équipement. Novembre 1946 — Janvier 1947.
6 See Chap. 15—17.
7 Charbonnage de France. Rapport de gestion. Exercice 1950, p. 65.
8 Ibid. Exercice 1950, pp. 56—57.
9 Ibid. p. 57.
10 Ibid. Exercice 1951, p. 64.
11 Ibid.
12 Charbonnages de France: Résultats et perspectives. Décembre 1952.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.
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18 Ibid. October 1954, p. 2.
19 Résultats et perspectives, 1954, 1955, pp. 2, 4, 8.
20 Ibid. 1955, 1956, p. 1.
21 Ibid. Rapport de gestion. Exercice 1957, p. 119.
22 V. Vidal, professor at l'Ecole des mines de St. Etienne. Président des Houillères du Bassin de Blanzy.
23 Pp. 723—753. Bilan de 10 ans de travail et de paix.
24 Ibid.
25 Charbonnages de France. Résultats et perspectives, pp. 5—6.
26 Charbonnages de France, p. 113 ff and p. 12.
27 P. 7.
28 Ibid.
29 Charbonnages de France. Rapport de gestion. Exercice 1959, p. 121.
30 Charbonnages de France. Statistique annuelle 1946—1962, pp. 22—23.
31 Ibid. p. 9. Analysis.
31 a La S.N.C.F. Organisation générale. Fonctionnement. Importance. Evolution. Juin 1961, annexe 9.
32 See Paul Baseilhac: Le charbon matériau de base de la civilisation industrielle. Conférence prononcée à Tarbes le 26 Avril 1957. Charb. de France.
33 M. Jules Lepidi, Charb. de France in an interview 10/9—1963.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Jules Lepidi: Le Charbon en France. Problèmes et Perspectives. Extrait de la Revue de la Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie de Marseille, No. 742, p. 31.

26 *Conclusion*

1 M. François Fontaine, Directeur du Service d'Information des Communautés Européennes à Paris has at the request of Mr. Monnet scrutinized the interview and would point out the following "75 départements sur 90 que compte la France étaient considérés comme sinistrés, 475 000 immeubles étaient totalement détruits et 1 350 000 très endommagés, la production agricole et industrielle réduite de moitié, 65 % des wagons de marchandises et 40 % des automobiles détruits, 55 % de la flotte de commerce disparus, bref, une perte de capital d'environ 1000 milliards de francs de l'époque, représentant deux ans et demi du produit national. Mais surtout l'état de vieillissement de l'économie était très grave. Les Charbonnages avaient des installations vieilles de trente ans et les plus récentes usines sidéurgiques dataient de 1918. La plupart des maisons dataient de 50 ans dans les villes." (Letter to the author 24.4.1971.)
2 The decision about the Plan was signed by General de Gaulle on the 3rd January 1946.
3 Mr. François Fontaine in his letter 21.4.1971: "After 1948, the Plan was financed by the counterpart (contrevaleur en francs) of Marshall Aid."
4 Mr. F. Fontaine declares that he has often heard Mr. Monnet express the following: "Nous n'étions pas préoccupés de changer d'abord les structures économiques mais surtout les structures mentales, c'est-à-dire l'état d'esprit. Nous disions alors : la modernisation est un état d'esprit. Le changement des structures était moins important que l'esprit de progrès et de modernisation ; les structures changeraient naturellement ensuite dans la mesure où cela était nécessaire." Compare with Bertrand de Jouvenel's announcement p. 124. Mr. Fontaine continues with the following announcement: "Il y avait des lacunes dans le Plan. La reconstruction, le logement, les biens de consommation, la distribution, etc. ... mais c'étaient des lacunes volontaires. On ne cherchait pas à faire un plan intellectuellement complet, géométrique, avec des symétries, etc. ... On choisissait les secteurs qui commandaient les autres. Le Plan, c'était essentiellement le choix des priorités. Les priorités étaient aux équipements de base, aux industries lourdes, ce qui donnait au Plan une apparence de plan quinquennal soviéti-

que. Cela plaisait aux communistes. Mais le but n'était pas de leur plaire. Seulement d'être efficace. Cela ne peut se comprendre, pour le premier Plan en tout cas, que par l'état de vieillissement et de désorganisation terrible dans lequel la France se trouvait en 1945, non seulement en raison de la guerre mais également par suite de l'imprévoyance entre 1918 et 1939."

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Diagrams

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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Interviews

INTERVIEW WITH MAXIME BLOCQ-MASCART 8 OCTOBER 1964

Blocq-Mascart declared that he was anti-Communist and nowadays also anti-Gaullist. He continued: The Communists were very brave. They thought for a long time that in the war against the Germans, they would take charge. It can be said that in their doctrines they put water in their wine, and we put wine in our water. I had friends who made great sacrifices in their attitude. We were very hostile to what happened before the war, but now we wanted to join forces against a common enemy. There was a maximum of 80,000 resistance fighters in the country.

We sought a joint programme. It was based on the idea of attacking what, during the war, was called the trusts. Even Liberals, such as I am, supported these ideas, and we did this because we were negative in our attitude towards what had taken place in the country before the war. We wanted nationalization of what we call 'Public services'. It no longer concerned nationalizations of the arms industry, but direct intervention into the country's economic life.

The ideas of the resistance movement came to play a big role in the economic planning. For my own part, I am a supporter of an imperative plan. It should have been stated: 'You can do as you like, but you must follow the plan's main course.' However, one thing is certain, and that is that the economic planning played a bigger role as idea than the nationalizations. It was C.G.E. that was occupied with the preparatory studies. The European scheme has always been present, but now it advanced further.

Let us now get the problem solved within the framework of Europe. In the resistance movement, we looked upon de Gaulle as a leader. Already in 1941, we followed him; even the Communists did. But de Gaulle did nothing when finally he came into power. Thorez supported him; therefore the Communists could not make a *coup d'état.*

It can be said that de Gaulle was a paradox. He created C.N.R. and introduced the parties into it. I was opposed to this. There were no longer any parties, but de Gaulle reinstated them. Then it finished in an open fight between de Gaulle and the parties, and seven months after the war ended, he relinquished the reins of government.

Concerning the constitution, I had a suggestion. I carried on a long letter and telegram exchange with de Gaulle urging him to give the nation a constitution immediately. He did not want that; he considered his leadership of the government to be provisory. But all governments are provisory. By not acting in 1944—1946 (January) he wanted a return to prewar conditions without any big changes. By that, he destroyed his possibilities for making reforms, the reforms we wanted. When a new constitution finally came into being in 1958, it was my suggestion—the one I prepared during the war—that was adopted. I showed it to de Gaulle in 1957. If it had been adopted in 1943, the development would perhaps have followed different lines. The 1958 constitution was thus based on my suggestion, except for § 16.

The ideas of the resistance movement were certainly not common in France. The "left" took a step to the "left"; the inheritance from this period was the political ideas. A Catholic party, M.R.P., was created around Bidault. He was a member of C. N. R., but it was said

that he represented the Catholics, but what, in reality, he represented was nothing. But Bidault was a clear thinker, and was well regarded by the Communists. I could not accept a Communist as chief of C.N.R. They could not accept me. We agreed on a compromise candidate. That was Bidault. The choice of Bidault was good. He had an "*esprit public*". He is now out of the country and living in Brazil where he gets sufficient for his food from his Brazilian friends. But he lives in dignity. He will not return until de Gaulle has gone, he would never ask for favours, never . . .

INTERVIEW WITH ANDRE PHILIP 12 NOVEMBER 1964

Where did the economic ideas of the resistance movement come from?

— Quite early, small study committees were set up in that part of France not occupied by the Germans, in the free zone. The function of these study committees was to bolster up the morale in the country. I was the head of C.G.E. We signed a declaration that we had formulated beforehand. All that stood in the declaration, we fulfilled after the war. The nationalizations were written in there. As a result of this manifesto, we introduced in France: a) industrial councils, b) nationalizations, c) the economic planning.

— You soon came over to England and from there to Algiers. Had your activities there any importance for the way France's rehabilitation later came about?

— I sat in Algiers and discussed and co-operated with Mendès-France, Jean Monnet, and Jules Moch. We tried to evolve a study of the structural reforms that we judged necessary for the future of the country. It can be asserted that Jean Monnet was liberal, but it was during these discussions that he changed over to our camp.

— Can it be said that it was Jean Monnet who suggested the idea of the economic planning in France?

— This thought was born during our discussions. We came upon it together. Jean Monnet was accustomed to viewing things on a large scale. From the beginning he was located in London and provided France with necessities from England. Then he provided England with necessities from the U.S.A.

In Algiers, he provided the French army with American material. The idea of an economic planning thus came into being as a result of our exchange of ideas and discussions. We had a considerable communication with the metropolis (France). It was a continuous exchange of thoughts and ideas. For instance, we sent over memoranda to Blocq-Mascart's organisation, O.C.M.

The nationalization idea came from all quarters. My first contact was in Montpellier in 1941. I met René Courtin, who was liberal and belonged to the bourgeois milieu. René Courtin said then: 'It is the bourgeoisie that has betrayed the country. We will therefore nationalize. The present generation of bourgeoisie deserves this.' Courtin was an economist. He believed that it was no greater advantage, but a political necessity. 'In fifteen years when a new bourgeoisie has emerged that is worthy, denationalization can be accomplished.' It was, instead, the workers who adopted the dignified attitude.[7]

De Gaulle, who sat in London, was in the beginning right-wing and nationalist. When I came over to England, de Gaulle and I went for a walk on Hampstead Heath. I said that we in the resistance movement were not nationalists, we were not against the Germans, but we were against Hitler. Henry Freynet had in his possession a paper that stated our aims: to create a united Europe. That was at the end of August 1942. We always had Germans, Austrians, and Italians with us in the resistance movement, social democrats who had sought refuge in France. An Austrian Socialist, Strasser, was a skiing instructor in the vicinity of Grenoble. In France, the resistance movement took a turn to the left. Most were Socialists and Catholics, but de Gaulle and the circle around him were right-wing and nationalists. Many were that.

Jouhaux, Vivier-Merle from C.G.T., and Brodier from C.F.T.C. wrote an appeal, which was sent to de Gaulle in London with Christian Pinnault. 'If you read this over the radio on 1 May (1942), we will consider you as leader of the resistance movement.' De Gaulle immediately answered 'No'. But when Pinnault was on the airfield to return to France, a messenger gave him the following note: 'Yes, de Gaulle accepted and would read the communique.' Thus this was the price for him to become leader. The speech was read over the radio, and two or three hours later, it was distributed into all letterboxes in the metropolitan area of Paris, Ile de France. Imagine the distribution apparatus that de Gaulle had at his disposal. It made a big impression.

Thus de Gaulle stayed on the fence, as he always does. In 1942, he took a step to the left, in 1943, to the right, with the assault of all military forces on Algiers. In 1944, when he saw how the wind was blowing, he went left again.

— What was the greatest significance of the nationalizations?

— Apart from it being a great success purely technically—nowhere in the world have railways such great comfort and speed at so low operational costs as in France—its greatest significance was that social unrest in the country was avoided. By investing money into and laying the emphasis on the basic industries, something that was neglected after World War I, employment was created for everybody, and the investments were put into objects suitable for the country.

— Did the nationalizations introduced under Léon Blum inspire those nationalizations that came after the liberation in 1944?

— No, they did not. The railway companies had, of course, been nationalized in 1936—1937, but we were especially inspired by our discussions with the British Labour Party.[8]

The Comité d'entreprises (the joint industrial council), which came into existence after the war, contained a trisection: one-third consisted of representatives of the state, one-third technicians, and one-third worker representatives. Gradually, the workers representation was reduced. They were wanted, but they were insufficiently educated to be able to continue. The nationalizations became an economic success, but a social setback. This was because of lack of professionally skilled workers. Les Comités d'entreprises are wealthy, especially where the manager is a strong personality. They are allowed to manage the lunch service, the day nursery, and the holiday home themselves, but on condition that the manager personally looks after the business side. I do not know why the workers have not taken more responsibility.

— "Perhaps it is a matter of wages. If the wages were increased, perhaps the feeling of belongingness and of being able to make decisions would develop.

— Hardly. It is tradition that plays a very big role in this connexion. High wages cannot take the place of tradition. Nowadays, there are many more skilled workers in industry than there used to be. It is specialists who are needed to control and supervise with great attention and so on. 80 to 90 per cent of this part of the labour force belong to the trade unions. Of the unskilled workers, however, only 10—20 % are members of the trade unions.

C.F.T.C. has now been reorganized. I believe it will have great importance that it no longer appears as a Christian syndicate. ... I also believe that the new syndicate can attract large crowds. The big battle, however, must be fought on the company level. We have no national or regional agreements in the country; instead, each enterprise arranges its own. The Renault Company, which is state owned, leads the way. Quite recently, it initiated a four-week paid holiday for its workers. Such things create an example. M. Dreyfys, the *directeur* of Renault, carried this through despite the big competition in the car market. The tendency is thus successes here and there. The central organization of the trade unions does not bring about an improvement in the conditions. The initiatives, instead, come from les comités intersyndicales or from the local organizations.

— How do you think the European market will fare?

— It will be all right. Industry is considerably interested and permits no disunity. It will

exert strong pressure on the Germans. Why should they keep on haggling with the Americans?

— Do you think that Sweden and the other Scandinavian countries will be able to join the Common Market, or will this be impossible until after de Gaulle has gone?

— It can be realized at once if these countries change their attitude on independence. When they submit to a supernational organ, things will go their way. De Gaulle's resignation is not at all a prerequisite. He can very easily change his standpoint according to how opinion swings. He has done so many times in the past. Think of what we spoke of earlier and of the Algerian issue. He was carried to power to make Algeria French, but he quickly realized that this solution was not opportune. He swung with the wind to the chagrin of those who had borne him to power.

— Is it conceivable that the left can produce a candidate and win a presidential election?

— There is no left.

— By the left, I mean the Socialists and Gaston Deferre.

— We presented Gaston Deferre because he is in no way compromised by Algeria or similar sensitive matters. At a presidential election, de Gaulle will come out on top. Deferre will perhaps get 25—30 % of the votes; the Communist candidate less. Gaston Deferre will then lead the opposition. De Gaulle will resign after one or two years as president and leave a new presidential candidate, Pompidou. In turn, Pompidou will be defeated by Deferre.

— How can we be sure that de Gaulle will resign his presidency after one or two years?

— Because he will not be a Pétain. Pétain was a warning example and has always been an example to de Gaulle. Have you read the book, Secrets d'Etat . . .?

INTERVIEW WITH JULES MOCH 15 OCTOBER 1964

— With reference to an investigation of the economic development of France—or aspects of it—after 1945, may I ask what significance the resistance movement can have had during World War II. Did it give rise to any ideas that, after the end of the war, were important for the economic and social development in the country?

— *Henry Teitgen* formulated these. Personally, I had nothing whatever to do with it. I fled from the country in 1943 after having been in prison. However, I formulated other proposals: those concerning the constitution that were sent to London; also those concerning social conditions and the labour market, for instance, that if the three parties—that is, the economic council, the employers, and the employees—agreed to an 8-hour working day, parliament would not need to become involved in these matters. It was a tripartite agreement that I proposed. *George Boris* recieved my proposals in London. I had signed the constitution proposal X 314. X because I am a polytechnologist, and 314 which was my code. One day, over the radio, I heard "X 314 : L'étude sur Constantin de Grèce bien reçue." Constantin was the constitution proposal.

As a result of the work of the resistance movement, the big nationalizations were carried out in France. We nationalized electricity, banks, insurance system, coal mines, and so on. The insurance system included 13 groups rather than companies, as in their turn, they have subsidiaries which are all nationalized. Personally, I nationalized, among others, three large shipping companies. All these companies kept their old names. One day, I crossed the Atlantic with an american friend. He said: "Imagine, here we can really enjoy the good French wine, but of course, it is not on a socialized line." I replied: "I cannot agree with you and say what you would like to hear, this is actually a completely socialized line." However, here in France, we have free competition between the nationalized companies. As far as the merchant navy is concerned, half of the tonnage is nationalized. Electricity is ninety per cent nationalized; petrol is partially nationalized. The state owns some petrol companies. Uranium is also state controlled. Only the state is allowed to erect atomic piles.

Transports are to some extent state controlled. In 1937, the railways were nationalized. River transports along the Rhine are state controlled. Air France is responsible for air traffic, one of the best and biggest enterprises of its kind in the world. I nationalized that before the war.

The Socialists and M.R.P. carried out these reforms under *de Gaulle*. Some nationalization could, of course, have been carried out more efficiently. We nationalized all electric power. *It would have been better if we had concerned ourselves with only the electricity production and the power transmission by high-voltage lines. Thereafter, the many municipalities could have taken responsibility for distribution.*

André Philip made the mistake of allowing competition between the nationalized banks. It is only the four big banks that are nationalized. The disadvantage was that their deposit offices compete with one another in the larger places, whereas in other places there are perhaps no banks at all. For what it costs for our present restricted and concentrated spread of banks in the country, we could, instead, have a big spread of banks in all districts.

The business banks are still private. Roughly 25 per cent of economic life in France is nationalized, but it is very difficult to make a correct estimate as the state has capital in some companies.

Technically, nationalization was a considerable success. Compared with the figures for 1938, the upswing was very large. The nationalization of S.N.C.F. was excellent; no country in Europe has such comfort and speed in their railway communications as has France. Air France is good; the big banks are good. Technically, thus it was good, but not socially. Despite the companies being nationalized and the employees being elected into the management, there were strikes in the nationalized companies, strikes against their own management which they had themselves chosen. Big public utilities cannot be operated cooperatively if regard is paid only to the workers. *It is thus obvious that the social problems were not solved.*

State control is a heavy burden on all. There is technical control as well as financial control. The big companies can operate in many ways. Before the war, there was a group of companies with the same owner, who personally was an honest man. The group owned shipping companies that constantly worked at a loss. This caused an increase in tariffs and a request for state subsidies. The other parts of the group: workshops, shipyards, and ironworks, however, were excellent and delivered transport material at good prices. We stopped that, but they had worked in that way since the railways started at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Thus the good companies and the bad companies must be controlled so that everything is operated correctly.

What was the merit of the resistance movement? It was to launch ideas; ideas that were old and came from the socialist party. Even before the war, in 1937, we had nationalized:

a. la Banque de France
b. the arms industries
c. arsenals and factories that delivered to the armed forces; for instance, Snecma, Nord-Aviation, Sud-Aviation.

Pièrre Cot did this. Another thing we nationalized was L'agence France Presse. It replaced L'agence *Havas,* in other words, there was a change of name. The reason was: When I was in Léon Blum's government, we had communications in L'agence *Havas* to prove that they conspired against the existing government. Nationalization followed at once. Certain film companies were nationalized: Pathé-Cinéma, for example. And so we come to the Renault company, which was nationalized by expropriation because of its connexions with the Germans during the war (deliveries of tanks on a large scale).

Renault supplied 50 % of all cars manufactured in France. One-million cars thus came from the state sector. Renault, Citroen, Peugeot, Simca: that is the order of the car com-

panies size. Renault, Savien make lorries. Another big business is *Berliet*, which was nationalized, but returned to private ownership, the only example, I think. Do you want to ask any questions?

— Can it be said that de Gaulle inspired these?

— Not at all, not at all. De Gaulle had nothing to do with this. He is not and never has been interested in economic affairs. You have probably heard his expression "*l'intendance suivra*".

De Gaulle has always had his own ideas: the power position of France, la force de frappe, the spreading abroad of the French language via primary school teachers; those are de Gaulle's interests. I remember when I met him in 1943 and what he said then. I had been released from prison and secretly went through Spain to Gibraltar. I was dressed in my naval officer's uniform; well, actually, I had the gradings and buttons in the lining of the coat and the uniforms cap in my pocket. It took me two months to get to London, from February 1943 to April. I had my uniform restored to order in Gibraltar and became a French naval officer. It is not every day that a former minister flees from his country, and de Gaulle met me when I arrived. As soon as we met, I said: "Mon général, I have been commissioned by the Socialist Party to tell you that it is solidly behind you, not because you are a general, but despite that fact." De Gaulle replied: "But I am no longer a general." It is true that he was sentenced to death, and he had been deprived of his grade. I said: "Of course you are a general." "I stand completely above the military hierarchy", de Gaulle answered.

The economic ideas did not come from de Gaulle; Henri Teitgen's work was thus not in the least inspired by de Gaulle. De Gaulle wanted to condemn the third republic, wanted to condemn all the past.

INTERVIEW WITH FORMER MINISTER ROBERT BURON (NOWADAYS A HIGH OFFICIAL IN O.E.C.D., 91 Bd. Exelmans, Paris) 10 June 1964

Robert Buron:

— After the end of the war, we had three important problems in France: 1) The plan. 2) Rehabilitation. 3) The question of Europe.

In M.R.P. at that time, we were directors in favour of economic control by the State. Our voters came from the middle class and the farmers. They liked the ideas, but fundamentally, they were opposed to the terms. A farmer is against everything in the form of socialization and state intervention; he walks safely on his land. Nobody interferes with him, but at the same time, he is quite satisfied if the state has a strong position to protect him against lowering of the prices of his products. They were thus not averse to our ideas, but at the same time, they were reserved on the question of controlling the economy. However, at the beginning of the period, state interventions were necessary; after 1951 and 1952, these things were no longer popular and M.R.P. lost some of its electors. The bourgeoisie, the farmers, and the Christian workers are and were thus our basis.

When I was Minister of Economics, I entered into a dispute with Dr Erhard, who later became German Chancellor. He considered that all progress rested on finance. It is possible that he thus created the German miracle, but we consider that Erhard's thinking was shocking. Our directing, however, was a thorn in the flesh of our voters; when the situation became more normal, that among others things, was why M.R.P. lost its positions. On the other hand, control was needed after the war, mainly so that private industry could not take advantage from the situation. We therefore carried through the nationalizations. Personally, I was, and am, a supporter of such ideas; in France, we must protect our industry against foreign competition. I belong to that flank in our party, Lecanuet belongs to the other.

The other big idea we had was: how to get industrial production on its feet and according to the lines formulated. Pfimlin was more liberal than I was. He sided with the agricultural

plan, I took charge of the general propaganda. Information was necessary. Investments were needed, but in the right place. We spoke of intelligent investments and the investment of intelligence. By that, we meant that people should be educated: skilled workers, foremen, engineers, and other technicians, who would then be spread across the country. With the times, we modified our programme. Direction was transferred to the planification through the struggle for productivity. The necessity for investments was generally agreed upon.

Now we come to the European question. How would this be realized according to our ideas in M.R.P.? In 1949, these questions were being discussed in O.E.E.C. The liberal Anglo-Saxons wanted to lower the tariffs and form a common market. I and our party replied: "No, we cannot do that. Our industry is too vulnerable; it would cut a poor figure. We must first build up and organize our country. In 1952 and 1953, I was for Europe, but I was a nationalist and wanted to protect our industry. The whole things was gradually solved by progression of our industry under the direction of the Plan. However, the position in this matter still persists. M.R.P. has maintained its stand, but naturally there different attitudes in the party. I represent the standpoint I have already declared. Lecanuet is probably more liberal than I am, he is on the other flank.

— Who introduced the thought of nationalization?

— Pierre-Henry Teitgen in C.N.E. (Committé Nationale d'Etude) an organization or committee that studied these questions on behalf of C.N.R., the Conseil Nationale de Resistance. Bidault was head of this, as we remember. It must have been at an earlier stage or during the middle of the war. It was

Tietgen who was in favour of direction of economy. He and representatives of other parties included in the group did all this.

Concerning these interventions in industry, l'école dirigiste was created. We tried to collaborate with the socialists, but I find the socialists to a little bit too conservative in France. Economy must be controlled with the aid of a price policy.

— What role did the trade union movements play during the period immediately after the war?

— They played a big role, but unfortunately their vision was limited. Well, perhaps a few leaders had vision, but in general, it was lacking.

— Within C.G.T. it is said that nationalization favoured the big industries but not the small. What is your opinon of that?

— Define it more closely.

— Within C.G.T. it is said that the state controlled companies, for instance, E. de F. (electricity) delivered cheap electric power to the private industry that thereafter sold back expensive machinery. Thus the private sector was enriched, whereas the state-owned part of the industry became poor.

— It is obvious that he who buys much always gets a rebate. It is a principle applied even in socialist countries, in the eastern block, yes, everywhere. Take Pechiney as an example. They mine bauxite in France, but send it to the Camaroons for processing. Despite the freight costs, it is cheaper for Pechiney to do it that way. The enterprises buy cheaply where they can. This also applies to Russia. The behaviour of the enterprises is conditioned by the circumstances under which they exist. The big banks that were nationalized have functioned in the same way as when they were private. It does not matter who is leader for certain economic interests. These will always make themselves felt in one way or another.

— What role did Germany play in French policy, the economic as well as the political? Can it be said that the common market and its associated problems is a stage in France's security system against Germany?

— I understand very well what you want to say. I believe that Robert Schuman thought it to be the only way it was possible to permanently agree with the Germans. It was necessary to remove all misunderstandings.

— Surely, German-French co-operation is quite natural in view of the large iron-ore deposits in Lorraine?

— Yes, it probably is.

— I was very surprised to note that the iron-ore syndicate has said that this, with the canalizing of the Moselle, is an excellent idea, but why were we not asked. Is it the administration that has introduced this matter?

— It is very difficult to say whether it is one or the other power that directs the economic life. It refers to a complex of powers that are always present concerning whether it is state controlled enterprises or others. They are always present. Louis Armand, who was head of the Railway Company, was the chief opponent to the canalizing of the Moselle. It was not profitable to the interests he represented. To protect itself, this company's attitude became even severer.

— What role did General de Gaulle play in the nationalizations after the war ended?

— A big role. He wholeheartedly approved of the ideas presented by C.N.E., and he also carried them through. With time, however, he crossed over to a liberal view. Nowadays, he gives the capitalist interests a free rope.

INTERVIEW WITH THE FORMER MINISTER, M. FRANÇOIS DE MENTHON
24 October 1964

— Where did the economic ideas held by the resistance movement during the war in France originate?

— That was a long time ago, more than twenty years. It came about in C.G.E. *René Courtin* wrote a memorandum. He was a liberal. He edited and prepared the work concerning nationalizations together with M. *Monick*, the Governor of La Banque de France.

The nationalizations (and the planification) originated for political reasons, not for economic. All this was prepared in C.N.R., whose programme you probably know. *Bidault*, Christian Democrat, was President. *Laniel*, who later became President of the Council, accepted this programme for political reasons. However, I must point out that what interested us was particularly the nationalizations. These—but not the planification—came direct from C.N.R.'s programme. C.N.R. contained people from all quarters and factions of the community. But the planification was not discussed by us. I protest against this being a result of the resistance movement's ideas.

Jean Monnet lay behind this. He had lived in America for 15 or more years and was placed in London in 1940 by the Americans and the English, not as an official representative, but in a business capacity. His job was to furnish England with arms and others essentials from the U.S.A. He came to Algiers in 1943 to equip similarly the French army with American material. Thus he contacted the French government there. Later when he became Planning Commissioner, he occupied an independent position. *Jean Monnet* took the initiative in creating the Commissoner's Planning Office only because it was a rational way of producing heavy industry in France, which was what he wanted. However, I cannot remember that the planification played any role as an idea in the resistance movement; no, the economic programme was *nationalizations*. We naturally wanted the state to play a bigger role in the economic sector of the community, but the discussion about whether the plan should be indicative or imperative . . . *No, we never discussed that.*

However, we wished to create a heavy industry in the country. Another important feature of the French community after the liberation was the very considerable imports from the U.S.A. When I was Economics Minister, it was particularly important to compile import programmes for each quarter, long lists of what was necessary to be imported. The plan was then realized and my duties were the following two:

1. to give priority to the organization of a heavy industry in France

2. to import all kinds of material necessary for building up the heavy industry. We therefore needed the import programmes.

As I said, the planification idea did not originate in the resistance movement. *Monnet* was not a doctrinaire he wanted to rehabilitate the country.

I now showed de Menthon the list of the co-workers in C.G.E. Menthon read through the list of co-workers and commented:

Paul Bastid was a radical. He is a professor in public law here in Paris.
Albert Bayet was concerned with press matters and founded l'Association de la Presse.
René Courtin has already been mentioned.
Michel Debré occupied himself with appointment matters, such as to prefectures and other high posts.
Léo Hamon is professor in Dijon.
Hours was an historian, professor in Lyon.
Lacoste socialist, syndicalist, was probably one of those who forced through the nationalizations.
Parodi, whom you should visit, became Président du Conseil d'Etat. He is Conseiller d'Etat. He and Debré collaborated in the reorganization of the administration.
Leonard Rist I never met.
Domingue Parodi was brother of Alexandre Parodi.
Edmond Vermeil was a Germanic philologist and a specialist on German questions.

C.G.E. was formed by *Bastid,* former radical, *Lacoste,* socialist, *Parodi,* haut-fonctionnaire, and me, *de Menthon,* Christian Democrat. C.G.E. represented the entire community and its different factions.

Concerning the economic ideas, de Menthon wanted to mention that Keynes was hardly known in France at the time in Question. His books were not even translated into French. The French economists were not Keynes-inspired until after the end of the war. Monnet was a businessman; to him the plan was merely a method for bringing forward the development as soon as possible. The vichy government was allied certain conservative powers. The reaction to the regime was nationalizations.

Some industrialists delivered war material to the Germans. Rightly or wrongly, during and after the war, one wanted to take revenge on the capitalists, who had to bear the blame for the misfortunes. Thus, the nationalizations were brought into being after the liberation in 1944 without anyone being able to prevent them. The nationalizations were a way of restraining the power of the capitalists far more than a way of leading the country to prosperity.

We wanted a new government in the country. We were tired of the old one that had led the country to ruin. We wanted an anticapitalistic government. The nationalizations were a method of reducing the strength of capitalism.

— Now 20 years laer, can it be claimed that the nationalizations were a success?

— It was good as far as concerned the organzation of coal, gas, and electricity production. In these sectors, all the investments that were made would never otherwise have been carried out and co-ordinated within the given time limit. In this sphere, it was good.

But the nationalized banks and insurance system served little purpose. There, it was probably more of a rebound, which was interpreted as negative. It can be said that the nationalization of the banking and insurance world was unnecessary and served no positive purpose; everything became rather more complicated than before.

M. Barjonet: France and Sweden are not in the same situation. The two countries have different social structures, different histories, and different traditions. It is impossible to imagine France developing along the same lines as Sweden. At present, a depolitization of the institution in France is in progress. We regard this development as very disturbing. It is not so much what happens, but if all the facts are added together, the government's intention becomes obvious. The H.L.M.-houses, for instance, may no longer have a parliamentary type of management. The government nowadays appoints as administrator one who usually belongs to U.N.R. A big administrative reform is also about to be made; naturally, this sort of thing is always necessary. We within C.G.T. even hasten the process. Actually, the administration dates from the time of Napoleon, and that in turn probably had its predecessors, But now the administrative reform is taken as an excuse for undermining or dismissing local governments with socialist or communist majority. These can be removed by centralization. The Paris area is estimated to have a population of 20-million. General de Gaulle cannot remain for ever: his time is limited, although he may become as old as Adenauer. But it is not de Gaulle we fear. He is a particularly honorable man, whom we respect highly. There are even those who consider him to be left-wing. Conservative elements have even tried to murder him. What we fear is Gaulism as expressed in the actions of de Gaulle's co-workers. It is not that in France we have concentration camps, or that it is impossible to express our ideas freely in the press; that can be done, but democracy is, none the less, in danger and Caesarism is in the seat of honour.

Here in France, we have succeeded in carrying through a series of nationalizations after the war. It was the National Liberation Council's programme, carried out in parts. At that time, we had a strong, or fairly strong, representation. We wanted to nationalize the key industries, the iron and steel industries, the coal industries, and, among others, the big business banks. To some extent, this succeeded, but in the matter of the business banks, de Gaulle intervened personally and prevented this by threatening to resign. If we communists had succeeded with the nationalization, we would have won the battle. De Gaulle's left-wing orientation was thus not worth much. The nationalization really played into the hands of the big trusts. Electricité de France delivered energy at very profitable prices, and the State Railway Company transported goods cheaply. But these state-owned companies had to pay high prices to the private industry. We within C.G.T. remarked on this, perhaps to some extent exaggeratedly, but not much. It is shown in those documents that we put at your disposal.

Recently, we in the trade-union movement have had our representation doubled in those committees that have charge of "the planification", and we are very satisfied with this. It makes it possible for us to gain an insight into, and an idea about, the economy. The trusts and the large industries, which at first were fairly indifferent to the Monnet plan, as it was then called, have now become alive to it and are more interested.

Concerning the economic development in France, we have a big upswing from 1954 lasting until 1958. From then, there is also an upswing, but not as strong as the previous period (1954—1958). My personal opinion is that the upswing was due to the preparatory efforts for the common market, but there are still tariffs. Thus investments and concentrations, fusions, and so on, are in progress and contribute to maintaining the rotation in the economic life.

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Abbreviations

B.D.I.C.	Bibliothèque de documentation internationale contemporaine
B.N.	Bibliothèque Nationale
C.F.T.C.	Confédération française des Travailleurs chrétiens
C.F.N.L.	Comité Français de Libération Nationale
C.G.E.	Comité général d'Etudes
C.G.T.	Confédération générale du Travail
C.N.R.	Conseil National de la Résistance
F.N.S.P.	Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques
M.R.P.	Mouvement Républicain Populaire
O.C.M.	Organisation Civile et Militaire
R.P.F.	Rassemblement du Peuple Français
V.I.M.	La Ventilation Industrielle et Minière S.A.R.L.

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